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1Introduction
Human migration is one of the key components of the international integration process
that has been shaping the world over past decades. The acceleration of global develop-
ment has been accompanied by increasing individual human mobility at all spatial scales.
First, the number of international migrants has been steadily growing in recent years. Ac-
cording to the United Nations Population Division, the stock of international migrants
increased by more than 100 millions, from 153 millions in 1990 to 258 millions in 2017.
This corresponds to an increase in the share of international migrants as a percentage of
the global population from 2.9 percent in 1990 to 3.4 percent in 2017. Second, the United
Nations Population Division estimates that the share of the global population residing in
urban areas increased from 43.0 percent in 1990 to 55.3 percent in 2018. Part of this ur-
banization process is attributable to increasing numbers of individuals moving from rural
to urban areas (United Nations, 2015). The mobility at the local level, rural-to-urban
migration, or the individual movement from one country to another are facilitated by the
process of globalization and advances in technological development.
The recent rise in human migration has sparked public debates and increased interest
about this topic. Numerous analyses reveal that human mobility is multidimensional,
interconnected with global development inequality and affected by diverse phenomena.
One of the factors that are closely connected with migration streams is education. The lit-
erature demonstrates that in particular high-skilled educational attainment is affected by
international migration. High-skilled individuals have been shown to be the most mobile
group of individuals and are positively selected. Hence, an investigation of the education-
migration nexus is of critical importance and a crucial part of this thesis analyzes the
interdependence between human migration and high-skilled educational attainment. Fur-
thermore, a second factor that is closely linked with human mobility is the phenomenon
of climate change. The projected future slow-onset effects of climate change are expected
to induce large migration streams. Given that climate change will likely have very hetero-
geneous impacts in distinct world regions, human migration will be affected at different
scales. A second part of this thesis addresses the connection between climate change
and individual human mobility. Finally, this thesis analyzes how these different factors
and phenomena are interconnected. The aim of the thesis is to focus on the relationship
between human capital accumulation, climate change and inequality, on the one hand,
and local, regional and international mobility, on the other hand. In this way, the thesis
intends to jointly discuss important elements connected with migration that are usually
discussed separately.
The analysis starts with an assessment of the geographic distribution of skills. By
addressing the education-migration nexus, the first chapter of this thesis provides a basis
for the discussion in the subsequent parts. Chapter 1, coauthored with Micha l Burzyn´ski
and Fre´de´ric Docquier, analyzes the relationship between human capital and global de-
velopment inequality. It discusses how the mobility of high-skilled individuals, defined
2as workers with completed tertiary education, shapes development disparities between
regions and countries. To this end, a multi-country model with two sectors (rural and
urban) and two classes of workers (high-skilled and low-skilled) is developed. The model
endogenizes individual education and migration decisions, population growth, and in-
come inequality between countries and between rural and urban regions. Calibrating the
model for a set of 179 countries enables us to project income, population, education, and
urbanization levels for the 21st century. The calibrated model matches data for the past
decades and official projections of the global population, the share of high-skilled workers
and urbanization patterns. We find that the geography of skills has a large impact on
global inequality. In a final part of this chapter we analyze the effect of policies aiming at
improving the access to education or to the urban sector. We conclude that such policies
have potentially a large beneficial impact on future development inequality.
In the second chapter, coauthored with Micha l Burzyn´ski, Fre´de´ric Docquier, and
Jaime de Melo, we widen the focus of the analysis. We include the phenomenon of
climate change in the discussion about the education-migration nexus by extending the
theoretical framework developed in Chapter 1. In addition to the endogenous components
of the model described above, the model in Chapter 2 further endogenizes the effect of
temperature and sea level rise on productivity and individual mobility. The extended
model allows us to investigate the effect of global warming on human mobility at the
local, regional and international scale. We distinguish and assess the impact of several
different future scenarios derived from official projections on temperature levels and rise in
sea level. The analysis also includes extreme scenarios that address the impact of conflicts
or direct utility losses triggered by increasing temperature levels. Moreover, Chapter 2
evaluates the effects of migration policies on extreme poverty in the context of global
warming. We find that climate change induces about 120 million individuals to move
over the 21st century. The majority of this movement is at a local level and less than a
fifth of these additional migrants move to another country. This general conclusion holds
also for the more extreme scenarios that account for the impact of potential climate-
induced conflicts or direct utility losses and project higher levels of migration. The
findings further indicate that current international migration policies are already fairly
restrictive, particularly for the poorest groups. We conclude that international migration
may only serve as an adaptation strategy to climate change of last resort.
While Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 analyze the development at the global level, the
third chapter focuses on the more regional context in Africa. It directly addresses the
link between climate change and high-skilled human capital accumulation in African
economies. The particular aim of this chapter is to further develop the understanding of
the mechanisms through which weather changes affect tertiary educational attainment.
The analysis addresses the slow-onset effects of climate change and investigates specific
links between education and climate change in a world region in which the impacts of
climate change are expected to be particularly large. Building on the central finding
of the previous chapter, which states that climate change predominantly induces local
migration, a two-sector model is developed that endogenizes internal migration and edu-
cation decisions. The model predicts that adverse climatic conditions, such as decreases
in rainfall or increases in temperature levels, promote the process of urbanization. This
in turn impacts on high-skilled educational attainment, because the access and returns to
education are higher in urban areas. The third chapter also contains an empirical analysis
with several different empirical specifications focusing on 37 African countries and 111
African provinces. The empirical findings validate the key predictions derived from the
3theoretical framework. The analysis leads to the conclusion that adverse weather changes
in Africa may increase high-skilled educational attainment.
In Chapter 4, coauthored with Fre´de´ric Docquier, the focus of the analysis returns to
the global scale and to migration across country borders. This chapter addresses the con-
nection between international migration, high-skilled human capital accumulation and
inequality. It refines the conclusions drawn from the many studies on the brain drain
phenomenon. In a first part, an update of the macro-econometrical findings on the rela-
tionship between migration and higher education is provided. In a second part, a dyadic
micro-founded model is developed that analyzes high-skilled education and international
migration decisions. This model is calibrated for a set of 174 countries and matches the
migration patterns of the past two decades well. Contrary to the standard approach of
the literature, our calibrated model allows us to investigate country-specific effects of in-
ternational migration prospects on educational attainment. Our model predicts smaller
average effects of international migration on human capital accumulation than the stan-
dard macroeconometric models. Furthermore, Chapter 4 analyzes how public education
policies are affected by international migration. On average, we find small effects and
conclude that the impact of international migration on the global distribution of human
capital is rather limited.
Overall, the four chapters show that human mobility, high-skilled educational at-
tainment, global economic inequality and climate change are interconnected phenomena.
This thesis attempts to illuminate and address some of the mechanisms through which
these phenomena are connected. In this way, the following chapters seek to contribute to
the debate about the multidimensional effects of migration, in the context of increasing
human mobility.
4
5Chapter 1
The geography of skills and global
inequality
Abstract1
This chapter analyzes the factors underlying the evolution of the worldwide distribution
of skills and their implications for global inequality. We develop and parameterize a
two-sector, two-class, world economy model that endogenizes education and mobility
decisions, population growth, and income disparities across and within countries. First,
our static experiments reveal that the geography of skills matters for global inequality.
Low access to education and sectoral misallocation of skills substantially impact income
in poor countries. Second, we produce unified projections of population and income for
the 21st century. Assuming the continuation of recent education and migration policies,
we predict stable disparities in the world distribution of skills, slow-growing urbanization
in developing countries and a rebound in income inequality. These prospects are sensitive
to future education costs and to internal mobility frictions, which suggests that policies
targeting access to all levels of education and sustainable urban development are vital to
reduce demographic pressures and global inequality in the long term.
Keywords: human capital, migration, urbanization, growth, inequality
JEL codes: E24, J24, O15
1.1 Introduction
It is commonly accepted that human capital acts as a proximate cause of development.
Recent studies show that highly educated workers, namely, those who have completed a
tertiary/college education, exhibit the highest productivity levels, generate labor market
1This chapter is coauthored with Micha l Burzyn´ski and Fre´de´ric Docquier. The chapter benefited
from helpful comments from two anonymous referees. We also thank the participants of the EDEEM
Summer Meeting 2016 (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, July 2016), participants of the First NOVAFRICA
Workshop on Migration and Development (Universidade Nova de Lisboa, July 2016), participants of
the OLG Days (University of Luxembourg, December 2016), seminar participants at the University of
Western Australia (February 2017), participants of the CSAE Conference 2017: Economic Development
in Africa (University of Oxford, March 2017), participants of the International Conference on Migration
and Welfare (Sapienza Universita` di Roma, May 2017), and seminar participants at the University of
Paris 1 Panthe´on-Sorbonne (May 2017) for their helpful comments.
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complementarities with the less educated, and are instrumental in supporting democra-
tization and in facilitating innovation and technology diffusion when knowledge becomes
economically useful.2 However, the factors governing the geography of skills, its long-term
developments, and its interaction with the world distribution of income are quantitatively
uncertain.
In this chapter, we quantitatively analyze the root drivers underlying the long-term
trend in the worldwide distribution of skills (i.e., domestic access to education, sector
allocation of workers, and international migration) and highlight the implications of these
root drivers for economic convergence and global inequality. To do so, we develop a
two-sector, two-class, world economy model that endogenizes education and labor mo-
bility decisions, population growth, and income disparities across countries and across
regions/sectors. In our framework, each country has two sectors/regions (urban and ru-
ral or equivalently, nonagriculture and agriculture), which are populated by two types
of adult workers (those who have completed a college education and the less educated)
and by their offspring. Production and income depend on the size and structure of the
domestic labor force. We parameterize the model to match the current structure of the
world economy and the ongoing socio-demographic trends. We then carry out a set of
static and dynamic numerical experiments. By decomposing contemporaneous income
inequality, we find that the allocation of educated workers explains a significant part of
global disparities. In particular, we find that the divergence across countries is induced
mainly by the heterogeneity with respect to the overall supply of tertiary educated work-
ers rather than by the different patterns in across-sectors and cross-border mobility. With
our dynamic simulations for the years 2010-2100, we give suggestive evidence that con-
vergence and inequality prospects reveal significant sensitivity to education and mobility
policies.
We first use the model to quantify the fraction of contemporaneous income inequality
that is explained by the geographic allocation of skills. In particular, we shed light on
the global inequality implications of disparities in education policies, for the allocation of
labor across sectors and for international migration. We then use dynamic simulations to
gain an understanding of the main drivers of the geography of skills and of its interaction
with global inequality. Again, we study the sensitivity of future disparities in human
capital and income to the convergence in education costs, to immigration policies and to
internal mobility frictions. We also assess the robustness of our results to the technological
and preference assumptions of the model.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the importance of the subject matter. In many countries and
regions, college graduates form a minority. Although the worldwide average proportion
of college graduates increased from only 2.4% in 1970 to 8.8% in 2010, this share is cur-
rently smaller than 1% in fifteen developing countries, such as Niger, Malawi, Zambia,
Zimbabwe, and Tanzania (Barro and Lee, 2013). Using our human capital estimates (see
Section 1.4 below), Figure 1.1a shows the evolution of human capital inequality in ten-
year intervals from 1970 to 2010. We use the Theil index of inequality and investigate
its between-country component (capturing differences in the country average proportion
of college graduates) and the within-country component (capturing differences between
rural and urban regions). Human capital disparities are predominantly explained by the
2This was the case during the Industrial Revolution (Mokyr, 2005; Squicciarini and Voigtla¨nder,
2015) and it is still relevant in the modern world: see Castello´-Climent and Mukhopadhyay (2013),
Jones (2014), Kerr et al. (2016) on productivity growth, or Castello´-Climent (2008), Bobba and Coviello
(2007), Murtin and Wacziarg (2014) on democratization.
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between-country component (as illustrated on Figure 1.1c). This means that between-
country disparities are much greater than the within-country ones. Since 1970, the num-
ber of skilled workers has grown faster in poor countries. Hence, the Theil index has
decreased, reflecting unconditional convergence in the share of college graduates (with
a speed of approximately 0.7% per year). However, this process stalled after 2000, and
large differences persist between the tails of the distribution. The latter is illustrated in
Figure 1.1b, which depicts the density of the shares of college-educated workers in the
year 2010 for a sample of 179 countries and 358 regions (i.e., rural and urban regions of
the 179 countries). Figure 1.1d shows that the ratio of human capital between agricul-
ture and nonagriculture reaches the lowest values for the developing countries. Hence, in
poor countries, the share of college graduates is remarkably low in the rural areas (often
smaller than 4%), in which a large fraction of the population lives.
We study the drivers and implications of these geographic disparities in the world
distribution of skills. The accumulation of human capital is clearly endogenous: higher-
education investments are costly; returns to schooling depend on production technologies
and labor market characteristics; and workers are mobile across nations and regions. To
study interdependencies between the accumulation of skills and global income inequal-
ity, our model endogenizes the formation of human capital and the mobility decisions
of workers. Adults decide how much to consume, how many of their children will be
provided with higher education, and where to live. Internal and international migration
decisions depend on geographic disparities in income and on moving costs. Accounting
for international labor mobility helps to identify the effect of skill-biased migration flows
on human capital and income disparities. Distinguishing between urban and rural regions
allows us to model the differential in the access to education across regions (as in Lucas,
2009) and helps us to quantify the role of internal mobility frictions (as in Rodrik, 2013).
The model is stylized and omits several features of the real world.3 However, it does
account for long-run interactions between human capital accumulation, migration and
economic growth. Our quantitative theory is helpful for investigating how the geography
of skills affects economic development and for identifying the key factors governing future
demographic pressures and global inequality.
We first run static numerical experiments and use the technological block of the model
to quantify the fraction of contemporaneous inequality that is explained by disparities
in the share of college-educated workers. We show that the geography of skills matters
for development, regardless of the size of technological externalities. In the absence of
technological externality, transposing the US full educational structure (i.e., the US na-
tional share of college graduates and its allocation by sector/region) increases income
per workers by a factor of 2.5 in the poorest countries (i.e., the bottom quartile of the
income distribution). This is very much in line with Jones (2014); we obtain greater
effects because in our two-sector model, transposing the US educational structure implies
increasing the share of the labor force employed in the urban sector, in which productivity
is greater. Our baseline scenario is even more optimistic; it assumes that half the cor-
relation between productivity (aggregate or skill bias) and the share of college-educated
workers is due to technological externalities. In this context, the growth factor increases
from 2.5 to 5 in the poorest countries.4 Interestingly, we show that keeping the share of
3The model does not account for all demographic variables (such as mortality or aging) and economic
variables (such as trade, unemployment, or redistribution).
4In a maximalist scenario in which the sizes of externality are proxied by the correlations, human
capital almost becomes the single determining factor for global inequality.
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Figure 1.1: Worldwide distribution of skills
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college-educated workers constant but transposing the US sector allocation explains one
third of the total effect above. This suggests that internal mobility frictions (such as liq-
uidity constraints, imperfect information, or congestion effects) generate a misallocation
of workers in poor countries and shows the relevance of a two-sector approach (see Hsieh
and Klenow, 2009; Bryan et al., 2014). In contrast, with the exception of small island
developing states, the effect of international migration on economic development is small.
Second, we use the model to predict the future geography of skills (i.e., the evolution
of human capital and urbanization), population and income during the 21st century. Ac-
counting for interdependencies among demographic, economic and educational variables
has rarely been done in projection exercises.5 In contrast, our micro-founded structure
enables us to produce consistent projections and to identify the key factors that will
govern the future geography of skills and income. Our baseline scenario assumes a con-
tinuation of the ongoing convergence trends in the access to education (possibly initiated
by the Millennium Development Goals). In terms of education and urbanization, our
baseline prospects are less optimistic than official projections. In line with the evolution
of the last decade (see Figure 1.1a), the baseline predicts fairly stable disparities in the
world distribution of skills. We also envisage slower urbanization in developing countries,
due to persistent mobility frictions. When extrapolating ongoing trends, the dynamics
of the geography of skills per se does not translate into drastic changes in global income
inequality. These socio-demographic and inequality prospects are highly robust to the
size of technological externalities, to the preference structure, and to future international
migration policies.
Within the context of the convergence literature,6 this means that the current con-
vergence in the access to education is too slow to drastically reduce income inequality.
The recent decline in inequality is due to the success of some of the largest countries
in the planet (for example, China, India and the rest of Asia), which offsets the diver-
gent incomes of the poorest countries (for example, the African continent). Demographic
imbalances are such that the weight of the poorest countries will continuously increase.
Without drastic changes in the ongoing productivity and socio-demographic trends, our
baseline shows that world income inequality should start rising again. In addition, the
future geography of skills and income is sensitive to education policies and to internal
mobility frictions. Attenuating or eliminating the convergence in education costs induces
dramatic effects on population growth, urbanization and income inequality. In the same
vein, obstructing internal mobility generates huge misallocation costs. In line with the
5For example, the demographic projections of the United Nations do not anticipate the economic
forces and policy reforms that shape demography (see Mountford and Rapoport, 2016). The recent
projections by International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) include the educational
dimension (see Samir et al., 2010), predicting the population of 120 countries by level of educational
attainment and accounting for differentials in fertility, mortality and migration by education. However,
assumptions about future educational development (e.g., partial convergence in enrollment rates) are
also deterministic and seemingly disconnected from changes in the economic environment. Given the
high correlation between economic and socio-demographic variables, assuming cross-country convergence
in demographic indicators implicitly suggests that economic variables should also converge in the long
run. This is not what historical data reveal (see Bourguignon and Morrisson, 2002, or Sala-i-Martin,
2006).
6The convergence literature studies the evolution of inequality between people and between countries.
Absolute divergence in income per capita is obtained when countries are not weighted by their size
(Pritchett, 1997). When country size is accounted for, global inequality continuously increased between
the Industrial Revolution and the 1970s (Bourguignon and Morrison, 2002) but has decreased since then
(Sala-I-Martin, 2006).
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Sustainable Development Agenda, our analysis clearly suggests that policies targeting
access to all levels of education (what is needed to promote higher education), education
quality and sustainable urban development are vital to limit demographic pressures and
global inequality.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 provides a summary of
the related literature. Section 1.3 describes our model. In Section 1.4, we parameterize
this model to match historical data over the period 1980-2010 and the socio-demographic
prospects for 2040. Section 1.5 discusses our simulation results, distinguishing between
the contemporaneous implications of human capital inequality, the projections for the
21st century, and a sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Related literature
This chapter speaks to the literature on the links between human capital accumulation
and productivity growth and the literature on the determinants of labor mobility and its
effect on economic development. In this section, we review the body of literature that
helps contextualizing our approach.
Although the role of human capital as a determinant of productivity growth has
been debated, its importance as a proximate cause of development is much less disputed
(Glaeser et al., 2004; Acemoglu et al., 2014; Jones, 2014). Our technological specifica-
tion distinguishes between college and non-college educated workers. This is consistent
with Goldin and Katz (2008), Card (2009) and Ottaviano and Peri (2012), who find
high substitutability between workers with no schooling and those with a high school
degree but small substitutability between those with no schooling and workers with a
college education. In this context, increasing the share of college-educated workers not
only affects their average skill level and cognitive ability but also generates positive labor
market complementarities for the less educated. Jones (2014) builds a generalized devel-
opment accounting framework that includes such complementarities; he shows that for a
reasonable level of the elasticity of substitution (e.g., equal to 2), human capital explains
approximately 50% of the ratio of income per worker between the richest and poorest
countries. Although such a success rate is still limited, it is greater than what was found
in earlier studies that assumed perfect substitution between all categories of workers.7
Furthermore, greater contributions of human capital to growth can be obtained by
assuming technological externalities. These externalities have been the focus of many
recent articles and have generated a certain level of debate. Using data from US cities
(Moretti, 2004) or US states (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000; Iranzo and Peri, 2009), some
instrumental-variable approaches show substantial externalities (Moretti, 2004), while
others do not (Acemoglu and Angrist, 2000). In the cross-country literature, there is
evidence of a positive effect of schooling on innovation and technology diffusion (see Ben-
habib and Spiegel, 1994; Caselli and Coleman, 2006; Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2009).
Other studies identify skill-biased technical changes: when the supply of human capital
increases, firms invest in skill-intensive technologies (Acemoglu, 2002; Autor et al., 2003;
Restuccia and Vandenbroucke, 2013). Finally, another set of contributions highlights
the effect of human capital on the quality of institutions (Castello´-Climent, 2008; Bobba
7Assuming the income per worker equals $100,000 in the richest countries and $5,000 in the poorest
countries, a success rate of 50% means that income per capita would reach $10,000 in poor countries after
transferring the human capital level of the richest countries to the poorest countries (i.e., the income
ratio would decrease from 20 to 10).
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and Coviello, 2007; Murtin and Wacziarg, 2014). Comparative development studies sug-
gest that focusing on highly skilled workers is more appropriate for accounting for such
externalities.8 Squicciarini and Voigtla¨nder (2015) show that upper-tail human capital
was instrumental in explaining the process of technology diffusion during the French In-
dustrial Revolution. However, they assert that mass education (proxied by the average
level of literacy) was positively associated with development at the onset of the Indus-
trial Revolution but did not explain growth. Confirming Mokyr’s findings for the British
Revolution, they conclude that the effect of “the educated elite” on local development
becomes stronger when the aggregate technology frontier expands more rapidly. It can
be argued that this situation also characterizes the modern globalized world, in which
most rich countries use advanced technologies, while poor countries struggle to adopt
them. The contemporaneous contributions of human capital in poor countries are stud-
ied in Castello´-Climent and Mukhopadhyay (2013). They use data on Indian states over
the period 1961-2001 and show that a one percent change in the proportion of tertiary-
educated workers has the same effect on growth as a 13% decrease in illiteracy rates
(equivalently, a one standard deviation in the share of college graduates has the same
effect as three standard deviations in literacy). Aggregate and skill-biased externalities
cannot be ignored when dealing with long-run growth and inequality. However, given
the uncertainty about their levels, our analyses and projections cover several plausible
scenarios.
As far as the source of human capital disparities is concerned, the geography of skills
is clearly endogenous. Investments in higher education depend on access to education
- which varies across income groups (e.g., Galor and Zeira, 1993; Mookherjee and Ray,
2003) and regions (e.g., Lucas, 2009) - as well as on the quality of education (e.g., Castello´-
Climent and Hidalgo-Cabrillana, 2012). Human capital disparities are also affected by
international and internal labor mobility. International migration affects knowledge ac-
cumulation, as well-educated people exhibit much greater propensity to emigrate than
do the less educated and tend to agglomerate in countries/regions with high rewards to
skill (Grogger and Hanson, 2011; Belot and Hatton, 2012; Docquier and Rapoport, 2012;
Kerr et al., 2016). This predominating high-skilled bias in international migration is due
to migrants’ self-selection (high-skilled people being more responsive to economic oppor-
tunities and political conditions abroad, having more transferable skills, having greater
ability to gather information or finance emigration costs, etc.) and to the skill-selective
immigration policies conducted in the major destination countries (Docquier et al., 2009).
Internal mobility frictions can also be responsible for development inequality. Rodrik
(2013) demonstrates that manufacturing industries exhibit unconditional convergence
in productivity, while the whole-economy income per worker does not converge across
countries. The reason is that a fraction of workers is stuck in the wrong sectors and that
these sectoral and/or regional misallocations are likely to be important in poor countries.
Such misallocations can be driven by the existence of liquidity constraints, imperfect
information, or congestion effects (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Bryan et al., 2014). In the
same vein, our analysis sheds light on the effect of international migration on global
inequality, on the fraction of income disparities explained by internal mobility frictions,
and on the implications of labor mobility for future development.
8Meisenzahl and Mokyr (2012) argue that the British Industrial Revolution is not so much due to
the few dozens of “great inventors” (scientists, PhD holders) nor to the mass of literate factory workers.
Instead, in terms of skills, they highlight the role of the top 3-5% of the labor force, including artisans,
entrepreneurs and employees.
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1.3 Model
Our model sheds light on the interactions between the geography of skills and the distribu-
tion of income. It endogenizes the accumulation of skills and its implications for economic
development.9 We depict a set of economies with two sectors/regions, r = (a, n), denot-
ing agriculture (a) and nonagriculture (n), and two types of workers, s = (h, l), denoting
college-educated workers (h) and the less educated workers (l). We assume that agents
live for two periods (childhood and adulthood). The number of adults of type s living
in region r at time t is denoted by Lr,s,t. Time is discrete, and one period is meant to
represent the active life of one generation (30 years). The retirement period is ignored.
In the benchmark version of the model, goods produced in the two sectors are assumed
to be perfectly substitutable from the point of view of consumers; their price is normal-
ized to unity. In the robustness checks, we consider an alternative specification with
imperfectly substitutable goods entering into a non-homothetic preference structure, as
in Boppart (2014). Adults are the only decision makers. They maximize their well-being
and decide where to live, how much to consume, and how much to invest in their chil-
dren’s quantity and quality. The latter decisions are governed by a warm-glow motive;
adults directly value investments in the quality and quantity of their children, but they
do not anticipate the future income and utility of their children (as in Galor and Weil,
2000; Galor, 2011; de la Croix and Doepke, 2003 and 2004). The dynamic structure of
the model is thus totally recursive. The model endogenizes the levels of productivity of
both sectors/regions (and the resulting productivity gap), human capital accumulation,
fertility decisions, and internal and international labor mobility. This section describes
our assumptions and defines the intertemporal equilibrium.
1.3.1 Technology
Total output in period t is a sum of the production in agriculture and nonagriculture,
Yt = Ya,t + Yn,t. In each sector, production is proportional to labor in efficiency units.
Such a model without physical capital features a globalized economy with a common
international interest rate. This hypothesis is in line with Kennan (2013) or Klein and
Ventura (2009), who assume that capital “chases” labor.10 In line with Gollin et al.
(2014b) or Vollrath (2009), each country is characterized by a pair of production func-
tions with two types of labor, college-educated and low-skilled labor (`r,s,t ∀r, s). We
generalize their work by assuming CES (constant elasticity of substitution) specifications
with sector-specific elasticities of substitution.11 The supply of labor, `r,s,t, differs from
the adult population size, Lr,s,t, because participation rates are smaller than one: as
9Our model is similar to Delogu et al. (2018) but relies on a different training technology, accounts
for richer technological externalities, includes two sectors per country, and jointly endogenizes internal
and international migration flows.
10Ortega and Peri (2014) find that capital adjustments are rapid in open economies: an inflow of
immigrants increases one-for-one employment and capital stocks in the short term (i.e. within one year),
leaving the capital/labor ratio unchanged. In the medium term, demographic change may affect the
worldwide capital/labor ratio. Nevertheless, in a closed setting a la Ramsey (1928) or Solow (1956), the
interest rate is totally determined by the inter-temporal discount rate of individuals (or by the savings
rate) on the long-run balanced growth path. In this chapter, we abstract from potential variations in
the international interest rate and its impact on within- and between-country inequality.
11This elasticity plays a key role in development accounting and is shown to vary across sectors (Jones,
2014; Caselli and Ciccone, 2014; Lucas, 2009).
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explained below, raising children induces a time cost and decreases labor market partic-
ipation. Output levels at time t are given by the following:
Yr,t = Ar,t
(∑
s
$r,s,t`
σr−1
σr
r,s,t
) σr
σr−1 ∀r, t, (1.1)
where Ar,t denotes the productivity scale in sector r at time t, $r,s,t is a sector-specific
variable governing the relative productivity of workers of type s (such that $r,h,t+$r,l,t =
1) and σr ∈ R+ is the sector-specific elasticity of substitution between the two types of
workers employed in sector r.
The CES specification is flexible enough to account for substitutability differences
across sectors. In particular, we consider a greater elasticity of substitution in the agri-
cultural sector (σa > σn). Wage rates are determined by the marginal productivity of
labor and there is no unemployment. This yields:
wr,s,t = Ar,t
(∑
s
$r,s,t`
σr−1
σr
r,s,t
) 1
σr−1
$r,s,t`
−1
σr
r,s,t ∀r, s, t. (1.2)
It follows that the wage ratio between high-skilled and low-skilled workers in region
r is given by the following:
Rwr,t ≡
wr,h,t
wr,l,t
= R$r,t
(
R`r,t
)−1
σr ∀r, t, (1.3)
where R`r,t ≡ `r,h,t`r,l,t is the skill ratio in the labor force of region r at time t and R$r,t ≡
$r,h,t
$r,l,t
measures the skill bias in relative productivity. Although human capital is used in
agriculture, the literature has emphasized that the marginal product of human capital
is greater in the nonagricultural sector (see Lucas, 2009; Vollrath, 2009; Gollin et al.,
2014b).
Two types of technological externality are factored in. First, we consider a simple
Lucas-type, aggregate externality (see Lucas, 1988) and assume that the scale of the total
productivity factor (TFP) in each sector is a concave function of the skill ratio in the
resident labor force. This specification captures the fact that college-educated workers
facilitate democratization, innovation and the adoption of advanced technologies. We
assume that the region-specific TFP equals to the following:
Ar,t = γ
tAr,t
(
R`r,t
)r ∀r, t, (1.4)
where γt is a time trend in productivity that is common to all countries (γ > 1), Ar,t is
the exogenous component of TFP in region r (reflecting exogenous factors such as the
proportion of arable land, climatic factors, soil fertility, ruggedness, etc.), and r ∈ (0, 1)
is a pair of elasticities of TFP to the skill-ratio in the sector. The TFP gap between the
two sectors is thus given by the following:
Γt ≡ An,t
Aa,t
=
An,t
(
R`n,t
)n
Aa,t
(
R`a,t
)a . (1.5)
In Gollin et al. (2014b), the “nonagriculture/agriculture” ratio of value added per
worker decreases with development; it amounts to 5.6 in poor countries (bottom 25%)
and 2.0 in rich countries (top 25%). After adjusting for hours worked and human capital,
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the ratio falls to 3.0 in poor countries and 1.7 in rich countries. In our model, on the one
hand, the findings of Gollin et al. (2014b) can then be driven by the correlation between
economic development. On the other hand, they can be triggered by (i) the exogenous
productivity gap between sectors, An,t 6= Aa,t, (ii) the differences in the elasticity of
TFP to human capital, n 6= a, or (iii) the disparities in human capital across sectors,
R`n,t 6= R`a,t. The latter operate through the ratio of TFP (as shown in Equation (1.5)) and
through labor market complementarities (captured by the CES transformation function
in Equation (1.1)).
Second, we assume a skill-biased technical change. As the technology improves, the
relative productivity of college-educated workers increases, and this is particularly the
case in the nonagricultural sector (Acemoglu, 2002; Restuccia and Vandenbroucke, 2013).
For example, Autor et al. (2003) show that computerization is associated with a declining
relative industry demand for routine manual and non-cognitive tasks and an increased
relative demand for non-routine cognitive tasks. The observed relative demand shift
favors college versus non-college labor. We write:
R$r,t = R
$
r
(
R`r,t
)κr ∀r, t, (1.6)
where R
$
r is an exogenous term, and κr ∈ (0, 1) is a pair of elasticities of the skill-bias to
the skill-ratio in the sector.
1.3.2 Preferences
We now model the process of skill accumulation as the outcome of education and mobility
decisions. First, individual decisions to emigrate result from the comparison of discrete
alternatives: staying in the region of birth, emigrating to the other region, or emigrating
to a foreign country. To model these decisions, we use a logarithmic outer utility function
with a deterministic and a random component. The utility of an adult of type s, who is
born in region r∗ and is moving to region/country r, is given by:
Ur∗r,s,t = ln vr,s,t + ln(1− xr∗r,s,t) + ξr∗r,s,t ∀r∗, r, s, t, (1.7)
where vr,s,t ∈ R is the deterministic level of utility that can be reached in the location r at
period t (governed by the inner utility function described below) and xr∗r,s,t ≤ 1 captures
the effort required to migrate from region r∗ to location r (such that xr∗r∗,s,t = 0).
Migration costs are exogenous; they vary across location pairs, across education levels,
and over time. The individual-specific random taste shock for moving from country r∗
to r is denoted by ξr∗r,s,t ∈ R and follows an iid Type-I Extreme Value distribution:
F (ξ) = exp
[
− exp
(
− ξ
µ
− ϑ
)]
,
where µ > 0 is a common scale parameter governing the responsiveness of migration
decisions to changes in vr,s,t and xr∗r,s,t and ϑ ≈ 0.577 is the Euler’s constant. Although
ξr∗r,s,t is individual-specific, we omit individual subscripts for notational convenience.
Second, we model education decisions as in Galor and Weil (2000), Galor (2011), de
la Croix and Doepke (2003, 2004), Delogu et al. (2018). We assume that the inner utility
ln vr,s,t is a function of consumption (cr,s,t), fertility (nr,s,t) and the probability that each
child becomes highly skilled (pr,s,t):
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ln vr,s,t = ln cr,s,t + θ ln (nr,s,tpr,s,t) ∀r, s, (1.8)
where θ ∈ (0, 1) is a preference parameter for the quantity and quality of children.
The probability that a child becomes high skilled increases with the share of time that
is spent in education (qr,s,t):
pr,s,t = (pir + qr,s,t)
λ ∀r, s, (1.9)
where pir is an exogenous parameter that is region-specific and λ governs the elasticity of
knowledge acquisition to the education investment.
A type-s adult in region r receives a wage rate wr,s,t per unit of time worked. Raising
a child requires a time cost φ (thereby reducing the labor market participation rate), and
each unit of time spent by a child in education incurs a cost equal to Er,t. The budget
constraint is written as follows:
cr,s,t = wr,s,t(1− φnr,s,t)− nr,s,tqr,s,tEr,t. (1.10)
It follows that the labor supply of type-s adults in region r at time t is given by the
following:
`r,s,t = Lr,s,t(1− φnr,s,t). (1.11)
In the following sub-sections, we solve the optimization problem backwards. We first
determine the optimal fertility rate and investment in education in a given location r,
which characterizes the optimal level of utility, vr,s,t, that can be reached in any location.
We then characterize the choice of the optimal location.
Education and fertility
Each adult in region r maximizes her utility (1.8) subject to the constraints (1.9) and
(1.10). The first-order conditions for an interior solution are as follows:
φwr,s,t + qr,s,tEr,t
wr,s,t(1− φnr,s,t)− nr,s,tqr,s,tEr,t =
θ
nr,s,t
,
nr,s,tEr,t
wr,s,t(1− φnr,s,t)− nr,s,tqr,s,tEr,t =
θλ
pir + qr,s,t
.
Solving this system gives the following:{
qr,s,t =
λφwr,s,t−pirEr,t
(1−λ)Er,t
nr,s,t =
θ(1−λ)
1+θ
· wr,s,t
φwr,s,t−pirEr,t
∀r, s.
The cost of education is assumed to be proportional to the wage of high-skilled work-
ers in the region, multiplied by a fixed, region-specific factor ψr,t (capturing education
policy/quality, population density, average distance to schools, etc.):
Er,t = ψr,twr,h,t ∀r, s. (1.12)
Factoring (1.12) into the first-order conditions gives the following:{
qr,h,t =
λφ
(1−λ)ψr,t − pir1−λ
qr,l,t =
λφ
(1−λ)ψrRwr,t −
pir
1−λ
and
{
nr,h,t =
θ(1−λ)
1+θ
1
φ−pirψr
nr,l,t =
θ(1−λ)
1+θ
1
φ−pirψrRwr,t
(1.13)
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Note that Rwr,t > 1 implies that college-educated workers have fewer and more educated
children in all regions (qr,h,t > qr,l,t and nr,h,t < nr,l,t). The model also predicts that invest-
ments in education vary across regions, and are likely to be greater in the nonagricultural
region. Under the plausible condition ψa,t/ψn,t > 1, college-educated workers living in
urban areas have fewer and more educated children (qn,h,t > qa,h,t and nn,h,t < na,h,t). Fi-
nally, when (ψa,tR
w
a,t)/(ψn,tR
w
n,t) > 1, this is also the case for the low skilled (qn,l,t > qa,l,t
and nn,l,t < na,l,t). These results are in line with Lucas (2009), who assumes that human
capital accumulation increases with the fraction of people living in cities (seen as centers
of intellectual interchange and recipients of technological inflows).
The deterministic indirect utility function can be obtained by substituting (1.13) into
(1.8): 
ln vr,h,t = χ+ ln (wr,h,t) + θλ ln
(
1
ψr,t
)
− θ(1− λ) ln (φ− pirψr,t)
ln vr,l,t = χ+ ln (wr,l,t) + θλ ln
(
1
ψr,t
)
− θ(1− λ) ln (φ− pirψr,tRwr,t)
+ ln
(
φ(1+θλ(1−1/Rwr,t))−pirψr,tRr,t(1+θ(1−1/Rwr,t))
φ−pirψr,tRwr,t
) (1.14)
where χ = θ ln
(
θ
1+θ
(1− λ)1−λλλ)− ln(1 + θ) is a constant.
Together with the number and structure of the resident population at time t (Lr,s,t ∀r, s),
fertility and education decisions (nr,s,t, qr,s,t ∀r, s) determine the size and structure of the
native population before migration (Nr,s,t+1 ∀r, s) at time t+ 1. We have the following:{
Nr,h,t+1 = Lr,h,tnr,h,tpr,h,t + Lr,l,tnr,l,tpr,l,t
Nr,l,t+1 = Lr,h,tnr,h,t [1− pr,h,t] + Lr,l,tnr,l,t [1− pr,l,t] ∀r, t. (1.15)
Migration and population dynamics
Given their taste characteristics (captured by ξ), individuals choose the location that
maximizes her/his utility, defined in Equation (1.7). Under the Type I Extreme Value
distribution for ξ, McFadden (1974) shows that the solution to a discrete choice problem
(that is, in our context, a decision to migrate from region r to r∗) is governed by a logit
expression. The emigration rate is given by the following:
Mr∗r,s,t
Nr∗,s,t
=
exp
(
ln vr,s,t+ln(1−xr∗r,s,t)
µ
)
∑
k exp
(
ln vk,s,t+ln(1−xr∗k,s,t)
µ
) = (vr,s,t)1/µ(1− xr∗r,s,t)1/µ∑
k(vk,s,t)
1/µ(1− xr∗k,s,t)1/µ .
Skill-specific emigration rates are endogenous and restricted between 0 and 1. Staying
rates (Mr∗r∗,s,t/Nr∗,s,t) are governed by the same logit model. It follows that the emigrant-
to-stayer ratio (mr∗r,s,t) is governed by the following expression:
mr∗r,s,t ≡ Mr∗r,s,t
Mr∗r∗,s,t
=
(
vr,s,t
vr∗,s,t
)1/µ
(1− xr∗r,s,t)1/µ. (1.16)
Equation (1.16) is a gravity-like migration equation, which states that the ratio of
emigrants from region r∗ to location r to stayers in region r∗ (i.e., individuals born in r∗
who remain in r∗) is an increasing function of the utility achievable in the destination
location r and a decreasing function of the utility attainable in r∗. The proportion of mi-
grants from r∗ to r also decreases with the bilateral migration cost xr∗r,s,t. Heterogeneity
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in migration tastes implies that emigrants select all destinations for which xr∗r,s,t < 1 (if
xr∗r,s,t = 1, the corridor is empty).
Individuals born in region n (respectively a) have the choice between staying in their
region of origin n (respectively a), moving to the other region a (respectively n), or emi-
grating to a foreign country f . Contrary to Hansen and Prescott (2002) or Lucas (2009),
labor is not perfectly mobile across sectors/regions; internal migration costs (xan,s,t and
xna,s,t) capture all private costs that migrants must incur to move between regions. In
line with Young (2013), internal mobility is driven by self-selection, i.e., skill-specific dis-
parities in utility across regions as well as heterogeneity in individual unobserved char-
acteristics (ξ). Overall, if vn,s,t > va,s,t, net migration is in favor of urban areas, but
migration is limited by the existence of migration costs, whose sizes govern the sectoral
misallocations of workers (Rodrik, 2013). Similarly, international migration costs (xaf,s,t
and xnf,s,t) capture private costs and the legal/visa costs imposed by the destination
countries. They are also assumed to be exogenous.
Using (1.16), we can characterize the equilibrium structure of the resident population
at time t: {
Ln,s,t =
Nn,s,t
1+mna,s,t+mnf,s,t
+ man,s,tNa,s,t
1+man,s,t+maf,s,t
+ In,s,t
La,s,t =
Na,s,t
1+man,s,t+maf,s,t
+ mna,s,tNn,s,t
1+mna,s,t+mnf,s,t
+ Ia,s,t
∀s, (1.17)
where Ir,s,t stands for the inflow of immigrants (which only applies to migration from
developing to OECD member states). For simplicity, we assume that the distribution
of immigrants by OECD destination is time-invariant and calibrated on the year 2010.
Equation (1.16) also determines the outflow of international migrants by education level
(Os,t):
Os,t = Mnf,s,t +Maf,s,t (1.18)
=
mnf,s,tNn,s,t
1 +mna,s,t +mnf,s,t
+
maf,s,tNa,s,t
1 +man,s,t +maf,s,t
∀s,
where Nr,s,t is a predetermined variable given by (1.15).
1.3.3 Intertemporal equilibrium
An intertemporal equilibrium for the world economy can be defined as following:
Definition 1.1 For a set {γ, θ, λ, φ, µ} of common parameters, a set {σr, r, κr} of sector-
specific elasticities, a set
{
Ar,t, R
$
r,t, xr∗r,s,t, ψr, pir
}
of country- and region-specific exoge-
nous characteristics, and a set {Nr,s,0} of predetermined variables, an intertemporal equi-
librium is a reduced set {Ar,t, $r,h,t, wr,s,t, nr,s,t, qr,s,t, vr,s,t, Er,t,mr∗r,s,t, Nr,s,t+1, Lr,s,t} of
endogenous variables, which simultaneously satisfies technological constraints (1.4), (1.6)
and (1.12), profit maximization conditions (1.2), utility maximization conditions (1.13),
(1.14) and (1.16) in all countries and regions of the world, and such that the equilibrium
structure and dynamics of population satisfy (1.15) and (1.17).
The equilibrium level of the other variables described above (in particular, `r,s,t, R
`
r,t,
R$r,t, R
w
r,t, Γt as well as urbanization rates and international migration outflows) can
be computed as a by-product of the reduced set of endogenous variables. Note that
equilibrium wage rates are obtained by substituting the labor force variables into the
wage equation (1.2), thereby assuming full employment. By the Walras law, the market
for goods is automatically balanced.
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1.4 Data and parameterization
In this section, we describe our parameterization strategy for 145 developing countries
and for the entire set of 34 OECD countries.12 Our parameterization strategy consists
in calibrating a few common elasticities and a large number of region-specific parameters
in order to (perfectly) match socio-demographic and economic data for the years 1980
and 2010 (including internal and international migrations) and to be in line with official
socio-demographic projections for the year 2040.13 We use all the degrees of freedom of
the data to identify the parameters needed. Consequently, our model is exactly identified
and cannot produce a test of its assumptions. However, it is worth noticing that we
use relatively consensual specifications for the production and migration technologies
and that we test the robustness of our results in the Appendix. We start describing
how we estimate the geographic distribution of skills. Then, the parameterization of the
technological and preference parameters is outlined. More details about the calibration
can be found in Section 1.A.1 in the Appendix. We finally explain the general hypotheses
used to initialize our baseline projections for the 21st century.
Estimating the geography of skills. To construct labor force data by education level
and by sector (Lr,s,t), we follow the four steps described below.
In the first step, we extract population data by age group from the United Nations
Population Division and combine it with the database on educational attainment de-
scribed in Barro and Lee (2013). For the years 1980 and 2010, we proxy the working
age population with the number of residents aged 25 to 60. To proxy the number of
high-skilled workers in each country, we multiply the working age population by Barro
and Lee’s estimates of the proportion of individuals aged 25 and over with tertiary ed-
ucation completed (denoted by Ht). The rest of the working age population is treated
as a homogeneous group of less educated workers. Barro and Lee’s data are available for
143 countries. For the other countries, we make use of estimated data from Artuc¸ et al.
(2015). Note that Barro and Lee (2013) also document the average years of schooling
of the working age population (YoSt), a variable that we use in the third step of our
estimation strategy. We are able to characterize the total number of workers (Σr,sLr,s,t)
and the total number of college-educated and less educated workers (ΣrLr,h,t and ΣrLr,l,t)
by country. The same strategy has been applied to all decades between 1970 and 2010
to compute the between-country index of inequality depicted in Figure 1.1.
In the second step, we split the total population data by region/sector. When it
is possible, we use the share of employment in agriculture, which is available from the
World Development Indicators. This variable is available for 134 countries in 2010 and
for 61 in 1980. However, the same database also provides information on the share of
people living in rural areas, which is highly correlated with the share of employment in
agriculture (correlation of 0.71 in 2010 and 0.75 in 1980). When the share of employment
in agriculture is not available, we predict it using estimates from year-specific regressions
as a function of the share of people living in rural areas. This determines the total number
of workers (ΣsLr,s,t) in both sectors.
The major problem is that, to the best of our knowledge, there is no database docu-
menting the share of college graduates by region or by sector (Hr,t). We estimate these
12With the exceptions of Macao, North-Korea, Somalia and Taiwan, all countries that are not covered
by our sample have less than 100,000 inhabitants.
13Our set of region-specific parameters includes TFP and skill-bias levels, education costs, internal
and international migration costs.
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shares and compare them with nationally representative data from the Gallup World
Polls. More details on the Gallup World Polls are provided in Section 1.A.1 in the Ap-
pendix. To compute these shares, we collect or construct data on the years of schooling
by sector (YoSr,t) and use them to predict the sector-specific shares of college graduates
as a function of YoSr,t. Hence, our third step consists of gathering data on YoSr,t and
imputing the missing values. Gollin et al. (2014b) and Ulubasoglu and Cardak (2007)
provide incomplete data on the countrywide average years of schooling and on the aver-
age years of schooling in agriculture and nonagricultural for different years.14 We have
data for 20 countries around the year 1980 and for 65 countries around the year 2010.
We match these data to the closest year that marks the beginning of the 1980 and 2010
decades. For the missing countries, we take advantage of the high correlation between the
gap in years of schooling, YoSn,t/Y oSa,t, and the average years of schooling in the coun-
try, YoSt. We predict the schooling gap by using estimates from year-specific regressions
of this gap on Y oSt.
15
Finally, in the fourth step, we take advantage of the high correlation between the
average years of schooling and the proportion of college graduates in the labor force at
the national level. We estimate the relationship between these variables, Ht = f(Y oSt),
using Barro and Lee’s data, and then use the estimated coefficients to predict the share
of college graduates in the urban sector, Hr,t = f(Y oSr,t).
16 We then fit the average share
of college graduates from Barro and Lee by adjusting the share of college graduates in
the rural sector.
To validate our estimation strategy, we compute the correlation between the sector-
specific estimated shares of college graduates and the shares obtained from household
surveys. Using the Gallup World Poll data (available for approximately 145 countries),
we can estimate the skill-ratio R`r,t in the number of respondents by country and region
(corrected by sample weights); on average, the correlation between the Gallup sample and
our estimates is equal to 0.70 in the urban region and to 0.73 in the rural region. The same
imputation strategy can be used to identify the sector-specific shares of college graduates
in total employment for all decades between 1970 and 2010. We use it to compute the
within-country index of inequality depicted in Figure 1.1. Additional stylized facts are
provided in Section 1.A.1 in the Appendix.
Technology parameters. The output in each sector depends on the size and skill
structure of employment. Below, we explain how fertility rates are calibrated for each
skill group and for each region/sector. Combining labor force data (Lr,s,t) with fertility
rates (nr,s,t) allows us to quantify the employment levels (`r,s,t) and the total employment
in efficiency unit using (1.11).
To calibrate the set of technological parameters
{
σr, r, κr, R
$
r , Ar,t
}
, we proceed in
two steps. First, we calibrate the parameters affecting the private returns to higher ed-
ucation. For each sector, we combine our estimates for `r,s,t with cross-country data on
the income gap between college graduates and the less educated. This enables us to pa-
rameterize the elasticities of substitution between workers (σr), the relative productivity
of college graduates (R$r ), the magnitude of the skill-biased externalities (κr), and the
14In Gollin et al. (2014b) and Vollrath (2009), the nonagriculture/agriculture ratio of years of schooling
varies between 2.0 or 1.5 in poor countries and is close to 1.0 in rich countries.
15Simple OLS regressions give log Y oSnY oSa = 1.944− 0.744 log Y oS (R2=0.809) in 2010, and log Y oSnY oSa =
1.464− 0.550 log Y oS (R2=0.905) in 1980.
16Simple OLS regressions give logH = −4.804 + 0.279 log Y oS (R2 = 0.496) in 2010, and logH =
−5.133 + 0.306 log Y oS (R2 = 0.575) in 1980.
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scale factors of the skill-bias technology (R
$
r ). In the second step, we focus on the social
returns to education. We use output data by sector and identify the level of total factor
productivity that matches the GDP data by sector. We then investigate the relationship
between TFP and the skill ratio, which enables us to estimate the size of the aggregate
TFP externalities (r) and the TFP scale factors (Ar,t). Figure 1.A2 in the Appendix
summarizes our main findings.
In the first step, we calibrate the elasticity of substitution between college graduates
and less educated workers, relying on existing studies. For the nonagricultural sector,
there is a large number of influential papers that propose specific estimates for indus-
trialized countries (i.e., countries where the employment share of agriculture is small).
Johnson (1970) and Murphy et al. (1998) obtain values for σn of approximately 1.3.
Ciccone and Peri (2005) and Krusell et al. (2000) find values of approximately 1.6, and
Ottaviano and Peri (2012) suggest setting σn close to 2.0. Angrist (1995) recommends a
value above 2 to explain the trends in the college premium in the Palestinian labor mar-
ket. For the agricultural sector, it is usually assumed that the elasticity of substitution
is much larger. For example, Vollrath (2009) or Lucas (2009) consider that labor pro-
ductivity is determined by the average level of human capital of workers (thus assuming
perfect substitution between skill groups). In line with the existing literature, we assume
σn = 2 and σa =∞.
Once the elasticities are chosen, we use sector-specific data on returns to schooling to
calibrate the relative productivity of college-educated workers. In the agricultural sector,
we rule out the possibility of a skill-biased technical change in agriculture (κa = 0),
and assume a linear technology with a constant R$a for all countries and all periods (we
use $a = 0.57). For the nonagricultural sector, we use data on the skill premium and
calibrate R$n as a residual of (1.3). Regressing R
$
n on R
`
n yields an estimate of 0.38. Given
the bidirectional causation relationship between the skill bias and education decisions,
we consider this estimate as an upper bound for the skill-bias externality. In our baseline
projections, we assume that half the correlation is due to the skill-bias externality (i.e.,
κn = 0.19). We calibrate the scale factor R
$
n as a residual from (1.6).
In the second step, we use data on the national gross domestic product (GDP) and
on the agriculture share in value added. We obtain data on output by sector in the
year 2010 and identify the TFP levels (Ar,t) by dividing the sector-specific output by
the quantity of labor in efficiency unit using (1.1). There is a clear positive relationship
between TFP and the share of college-educated workers in both sectors. Regressing the
log of Ar,t on the log of R
`
r,t gives a coefficient of 0.57 in the nonagricultural sector and
0.66 in agriculture. Given the reverse causation relationship between productivity and
the education decision, we consider these estimates as upper bounds for the aggregate
TFP externality. In our baseline scenario, we assume that half the correlation between
TFP and the share of college-educated workers is due to the schooling externality (i.e.,
n = 0.28 and a = 0.33). We calibrate the scale factor An as a residual from (1.4).
Figure 1.A2 in the Appendix shows that these assumptions are consistent with the
macro and microdata. Nevertheless, alternative technological scenarios are considered in
the robustness checks (see Section 1.A.4 in the Appendix).
Preference parameters. The literature indicates some common values of several prefer-
ence parameters. We assign the following values to the parameters that are time-invariant
and equal for all countries: θ = 0.25, λ = 0.5 and φ = 0.14.17 From (1.14) and (1.16), the
17Given the expression in (1.10), this assumption reflects setting the bound of the maximal number of
1.4. DATA AND PARAMETERIZATION 21
scale parameter of the distribution of migration tastes (µ) is the inverse of the elasticity
of bilateral migration to the wage rate. Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga (2013)
find a value between 0.6 and 0.7 for this elasticity. Hence, we use µ = 1.4.
Parameters pir and ψr,t are country- and sector-specific. They govern the fertility and
education decisions. We calibrate them to match the population dynamics between the
years 1980 and 2010, i.e., the transition from the resident population in 1980 and the
native population in 2010. We begin by estimating the size of the before-migration popu-
lation in 2010 by skill group (
∑
rNr,s,2010). The average (national) fertility rate (n1980) is
thus obtained by dividing the total native population of adults in 2010 (
∑
r,sNr,s,2010) by
the total resident population of adults in 1980 (
∑
r,s Lr,s,1980). We also observe the skill
structure of the native population in 2010 (Nr,s,2010), which helps identifying education
decisions in 1980 (q1980). We use the Gallup World Polls and extract the Gallup-based
average number of children per household by region and by skill level for 2010 to proxy
the fertility differentials. We calibrate pir and ψr,t to match nr,s,1980 and q1980. From 2010
onwards, the number of children and education decisions are endogenous.
We then estimate the skill and regional distribution of workers in 1980 and 2010 and
calibrate internal migration costs as a residual from Equation (1.16). For this, we assume
there is only migration from rural to urban regions (i.e., xan,s,t < 1 and xna,s,t = 1).
Similarly, we compute the average utility achievable in OECD destination countries and
calibrate the international migration costs (xaf,s,t and xnf,s,t) as a unique solution from
Equation (1.16) to match the DIOC migration data. Again, more details are provided in
Section 1.A.1.
Baseline trajectory for the 21st century. Our parameter set is such that the model
matches the geographic disparities in income, population and human capital in the year
2010, and their evolution between 1980 and 2010. Our baseline also includes technolog-
ical externalities, assuming that half the correlation between TFP (and skill bias) and
the share of college-educated workers is due to the schooling externality. Alternative
technological and preference scenarios are considered in Section 1.A.4 in the Appendix.
The philosophy of our baseline projection exercise is to predict the future trends in
income, population and human capital if all parameters, with the exception of the TFP
scale factor (assumed to grow at a constant rate of 1.5% per year in all countries) and the
parameters governing access to education, remain constant. More precisely, we constrain
our baseline trajectory to be compatible with official socio-demographic projections for
the year 2040 for each country. The rationale for matching medium-term projections is
that the size and skill structure of the national population in 2040 are determined by
fertility and education decisions in the contemporaneous period (i.e., the years 2010 to
2040). Hence, the reliability of medium-term projections is high, and their consistency
with the economic environment is good. Nevertheless, we let the micro-founded model
predict the sectoral allocation of labor and international migration rates in 2040 as well
as the evolution of socio-demographic variables beyond 2040. The comparison between
our simulations and official projections is discussed in Section 1.5.2.
To match the size and skill structure of the national population in 2040, we allow for
country-specific proportional adjustments in ψr,t (r = a, n) (i.e., the same relative change
in both sectors, keeping ψa,t/ψn,t constant) that minimizes the sum of squared differences
in total population and in its skill structure between the baseline simulations and the
children equal to 7 (i.e., 14 children per couple). See Docquier et al. (2016) for a brief review of studies
using similar parameter values.
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UN projections for the year 2040. Remember ψr,t determines the access to education
in the region. Comparing the new levels of ψr,2010 with those obtained in 1980 (i.e.,
ψr,1980), we identify a conditional convergence process in the access to education. We
see it as a likely consequence of the Millennium Development policy. More precisely, we
estimate two quadratic, region-specific convergence equations, considering the US as the
benchmark frontier:
ln (ψr,t+1/ψr,t) = αr + βr ln
(
ψUSAr,t /ψr,t
)
+ γr
(
ln
(
ψUSAr,t /ψr,t
))2
. (1.19)
We obtain γa = 0.032, γn = 0.046, βa = −0.195 and βn = −0.223, in which all pa-
rameters are highly significant. This quadratic convergence process implies that middle-
income countries converge more rapidly than low-income countries do. For subsequent
years, our baseline scenario assumes a continuation of this quadratic convergence process,
in line with the new Sustainable Development Agenda. Alternative (i.e., more and less
optimistic) convergence scenarios will also be considered in Section 1.5.3.
1.5 Results
Our model is used to investigate the interactions between the current/future distributions
of skills and global inequality worldwide. First, in line with the development accounting
methodology, we only use the (parameterized) technological block of the model and dis-
regard the endogeneity of human capital accumulation. Section 1.5.1 describes a set of
counterfactual experiments that allow identifying the causal impact of skills accumulation
on inequality. More precisely, we quantify the fraction of contemporaneous development
inequality that is explained by differences in the national proportion of highly educated
workers, by their allocation across sectors, and by international migration. Second, our
attention is turned to the determinants of the geography of skills. In Section 1.5.2, we
provide integrated projections of worldwide population, urbanization, human capital and
income per capita for the 21st century. Then, we assess the sensitivity of our projections
to future educational policies (Section 1.5.3) and to future mobility frictions (Section
1.5.4).18 Section 1.5.5 describes the underlying income inequality prospects and discusses
their sensitivity.
1.5.1 How much does the current geography of skills matter for
global inequality?
In line with the development accounting methodology (Jones, 2014), we consider the US
as the base-case economy and proceed with three static counterfactual experiments to
quantify the economic implications of skill accumulation in the year 2010. The advantage
of our two-sector model is that we can separately quantify the development implications
of skill accumulation, of the sectoral allocation of labor, and of international labor mo-
bility. For each country, we first simulate the counterfactual level of national income per
worker (yCF) obtained after transposing the US shares of college-educated workers in each
sector. We then compare it with the observed level (yobs). The second counterfactual
consists of keeping the country-specific share of college-educated residents constant but
18Section 1.A.4 in the Appendix shows that our socio-demographic projections are highly robust to the
size of technological externalities as well as to the way preferences for agricultural and nonagricultural
goods are modeled.
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allocating high-skilled and low-skilled workers across sectors based on their allocation
in the US economy. In the third counterfactual, we keep the country-specific share of
college-educated natives constant but simulate a no-migration scenario (US international
emigration rates are almost nil). The results are depicted in Figure 1.2.
Figures 1.2a and 1.2b give the counterfactual levels of income per capita and the
smoothed growth factor (yCF/yobs) obtained under three technological scenarios after
transposing the US shares of college-educated workers. Under these scenarios, all coun-
tries have the same national fraction of college graduates as the US has and the same
regional shares by educational level. In Figure 1.2a, the bold line shows the observed in-
come levels; countries are ranked by ascending order with respect to the observed level of
income per worker. Most studies in development accounting disregard technological ex-
ternalities (see Jones, 2015) or consider that externalities are small (Caselli and Ciccone,
2014). In contrast, our baseline scenario (solid line) assumes that externality sizes are
equal to 50% of the correlations between human capital and technological characteristics
(i.e., κn = 0.19, κa = 0, n = 0.28 and a = 0.33). The variants (dashed line) assume
no externality, or externalities equal to 100% of the correlations (i.e., κn = 0.38, κa = 0,
n = 0.56 and a = 0.66). Figure 1.2b gives the smoothed growth factor induced by the
counterfactual under the same externality variants.
We show that the geography of skills matters for development, regardless of the size
of technological externalities. In the absence of any externality, transposing the US
educational structure increases income per worker by a factor of 2.5 for countries in the
lowest quartile of the income distribution (i.e., from $5,000 to $12,500). The growth
factor decreases with economic development, as the distance to the technology frontier
gets smaller. This is in line with Jones (2014), who finds a growth factor of 2 for poor
countries with the same elasticity of substitution. As in Jones, the effect is mainly
driven by the fact that high-skilled workers are more productive and by the labor market
complementarity with less educated workers. In addition, our model accounts for the
sector allocation of labor. Transposing the US skill shares and the US sectoral allocation
of workers not only increases the level of education but also increases the size of the
urban (more productive) sector. This is equivalent to raising the average TFP level in
a one-sector model and explains our greater success rate. In our baseline scenario with
conservative externalities, transposing the US skill shares increases income per worker
by a factor of 5 in the poorest countries (i.e., y increases from $5,000 to $25,000) after
transposing the US educational structure. In the full-externality scenario, human capital
almost becomes the single determining factor for economic development. Unsurprisingly,
the size of technological externalities has a strong influence on the global inequality effect
of the geography of skills.19
Figures 1.2c and 1.2d illustrate the role of the sector allocation of skills under the
same externality scenarios. We simulate the effect of transposing the US skill-specific ur-
ban shares (keeping the country-wide share of college graduates at the observed levels).
The baseline scenario is shown as the solid line, while the zero- and the full-externality
scenarios are shown as dashed lines. Under the baseline, transposing the US urban shares
19In unreported simulations, we used the baseline externality scenario (50% of correlations) and in-
cluded one externality at a time. The results are highly sensitive to the aggregate TFP externality
(almost equivalent to the baseline with both externalities). However, the skill-biased externality affects
within-country wage disparities but plays a negligible role in explaining income per capita differentials
(almost equivalent to the no-externality scenario). Directed technical changes slightly exacerbate in-
come disparities across countries (poorest countries are better off in the absence of skill-biased technical
changes, unlike richest countries).
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for each category of worker increases income per worker by a factor of 1.7 in the lowest
quartile of the distribution (i.e., about one third of the total effect identified above).
Transposing the US shares in employment means increasing the urban share from 20% to
95% in the poorest countries. This shock drastically increases the mean levels of produc-
tivity and income. Poor countries are unable to realize these gains because individuals
have no incentives to move due to liquidity constraints, imperfect information, or conges-
tion effects (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Bryan et al., 2014). In line with Rodrik (2013), our
results suggest that internal mobility frictions are responsible for a large misallocation of
workers in poor countries and shows the relevance of a two-sector approach.
Under the same externality scenarios, Figures 1.2e and 1.2f illustrate the role of in-
ternational migration. We simulate the effect of returning all expatriates to their home
country (no-migration scenario). The baseline scenario is shown as the solid line, while
the zero- and the full-externality scenarios are shown as dashed lines. With the excep-
tion of Small Island Developing States (corresponding to the peaks on Figure 1.2e), the
effect of international migration on global inequality is small. On average, returning all
international migrants to origin countries in the bottom quartile of the distribution in-
creases income per workers by a factor of 1.2 in the baseline case (and by a factor of
1.5 with full externalities). This is because average emigration rates to the OECD are
small in developing countries (approximately 5% for college graduates and less than 1%
for the low-skilled). Contrary to the previous experiments, the global inequality response
to international migration is rather limited.20
1.5.2 The changing geography of skills: baseline prospects
Disparities in the level and in the sector allocation of skills explain a significant fraction of
economic inequality across countries. We now turn our attention to the factors governing
the long-term trend in the geography of skills. This section compares our baseline socio-
demographic prospects for the 21st century with the widely used projections of the United
Nations Population Division (the UN medium variant).
The UN projections assume a long-term convergence in fertility, mortality and edu-
cation attainment, and constant immigration flows. Given the high correlation between
socio-demographic and economic variables, the UN medium variant implicitly assumes
income convergence between countries. In the medium term, the UN projections also
predict higher demographic growth in developing countries. These facts are incompatible
with the hypothesis of constant migration flows. In contrast, our micro-founded model
provides consistent projections of fertility, education, migration and income inequality.
As explained above, our baseline projections rely on a minimum of assumptions. Note
that we assume a quadratic, region-specific convergence process in access to education
(i.e., in ψr,t). This implies that regions at an intermediate level of development converge
towards the US frontier more rapidly than do the poor ones. We keep all other parameters
constant, including the medium level of technological externalities.
Prospective results are described in Figure 1.3. The simulated (dashed lines) and
official (continuous lines) trajectories of population, share of college graduates, and share
20Table 1.A1 and Table 1.A2 in the Appendix give a more detailed description of the effect of the
different static counterfactual experiments for the US and for the 15th (Cambodia), 25th (Ghana), 50th
(Tunisia), 75th (Mexico) and 85th (Greece) percentiles of the income distribution. The presentation is
organized as in Jones (2014). Table 1.A1 focuses on the average level of income per worker, while Table
1.A2 distinguishes between the two production sectors.
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Figure 1.2: Geography of skills and income per worker: static counterfactuals
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level of GDP per capita and the respective scenario. Results are depicted for the baseline, zero- and
full-externality scenarios.
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of the urban population are depicted in Figures 1.3a, 1.3c and 1.3e, respectively. Separate
curves are provided for OECD countries, for developing countries, and for the entire
world.21 The cross-country correlations between our simulations (Y-axis) and official
projections (X-axis) for population, share of college graduates, and share of the urban
population for the year 2100 are described in Figures 1.3b, 1.3d and 1.3f, respectively.
Bubbles are proportional to country size (OECD countries in light gray and developing
countries in dark gray). The 45-degree line allows visualizing whether our long-term
simulations are greater or smaller than official projections.
Figures 1.3a and 1.3b show that our baseline trajectory is very much in line with
official socio-demographic projections. Although we only initialize our simulations to be
compatible with the 2040 national population levels, our long-term level of the adult pop-
ulation is almost equal to official projections. Furthermore, the cross-country correlation
between simulated and UN population sizes in the year 2100 equals 0.98.22
Nevertheless, we obtain significant differences when focusing on the evolution of ed-
ucation and urbanization. As far as education is concerned, we are less optimistic than
the United Nations. Figure 1.3c shows that the long-term, worldwide share of college
graduates is smaller than that reflected in official projections. This share increases from
8.8% in 2010 to 17.3% in 2100 in our model, against 21.4% in the UN medium scenario.
Similar differences are obtained for OECD and developing countries. As shown on Figure
1.3d, the cross-country correlation between simulated and UN shares of college graduates
in the year 2100 is large (0.91).23 However, most countries are below the 45 degree line,
and for a large number of small OECD countries, compared with the UN projections,
the simulated shares of college graduates is multiplied by a factor between 0.7 and 0.9.
According to our baseline prospects for the 21st century, the share of college graduates
increases from 20.5% to 48% in OECD countries and from 5.1% to 12.5% in the develop-
ing world. Assuming a continuation of the ongoing convergence in access to education,
the ratio of skill shares between OECD and developing countries increases from 3.3 to
3.8.
Similarly, Figure 1.3e shows that our predicted share of the population living in urban
areas is smaller than the UN projections. The worldwide urban share increases slightly
from 53.0% in 2010 to 58.3% in 2100. These trends are the outcomes of two opposing
forces: the rural/urban fertility differential and the net internal mobility towards cities
(driven by the rising educational attainment). The former is important and imprecisely
modeled in official projections. In Figure 1.3f, the cross-country correlation between
simulated and UN urban shares in the year 2100 equals 0.83.24 Again, most countries
are below the 45-degree line, and for a large number of developing countries, our simu-
lated urban share is multiplied by a factor between 0.5 and 0.8, compared with the UN
one. Comparing OECD member states with developing countries, our baseline prospects
predict fairly stable disparities in urbanization.
These comparisons give suggestive evidence that our stylized model does a good job
in generating realistic and consistent, although less optimistic, projections of population,
human capital, and urbanization for the coming decades. Despite a convergence in access
21The definition of the developing countries follows the official definition of the United Nations. The
remaining 29 countries (not reported) are neither classified as an OECD nor as a developing country.
22The regression line of Figure 1.3b is given by: baseline = −0.33 + 1.02· official (R2 = 0.97).
23The regression line of Figure 1.3d is given by the following: baseline = −0.03 + 0.92· official (R2 =
0.82).
24The regression line of Figure 1.3f is given by: baseline = −0.15 + 1.11· official (R2 = 0.69).
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to education, our baseline scenario neither predicts a fall in human capital inequality
nor a strong convergence in the sector allocation of skills. Importantly, as it is micro-
founded, the model also enables us to identify the key factors that will govern the future
of the world population and global inequality. In particular, we can assess whether the
evolution of population and global inequality is sensitive to future educational policies
(i.e., convergence in the access to education) and geographic mobility costs. In Section
1.A.4 in the Appendix, we show that our socio-demographic prospects are highly robust
to technological externalities and to the structure of preferences.
1.5.3 Sensitivity to education policies
We first assess whether our socio-demographic prospects are sensitive to policies affecting
future access to education. In line with the recent Sustainable Development Agenda, the
baseline scenario assumes a continuation of the quadratic convergence process in educa-
tion costs observed between 1980 and 2010; this implies that middle-income countries
catch up more rapidly than low-income countries do. Figure 1.4 compares the base-
line trajectories of population, education and urbanization with those obtained with a
smaller magnitude of the quadratic convergence (we divide the convergence speed by two
compared to the baseline) or when there is an unconditional, linear convergence process.
Under the linear convergence scenario, the poorest countries are the most prone to
converge. We investigate this possibility by estimating a linear convergence equation for
education cost (instead of a second-order polynomial in the baseline): ln (ψr,t+1/ψr,t) =
αr + βr ln
(
ψUSAr,t /ψr,t
)
. We obtain the following estimates: βa = 0.056 for rural regions,
and βn = 0.074 for urban regions. Compared to the baseline, this scenario predicts faster
human capital accumulation and urbanization in the poorest countries of the world, as
shown on Figures 1.4b, 1.4d and 1.4f. Looking at worldwide aggregates, in the long run,
this implies a significantly smaller population size, a greater share of college graduates
and a greater urban share of the population. Nevertheless, Figures 1.4a, 1.4c and 1.4e
show that these aggregate changes are relatively small due to the small demographic size
of the low-income countries. With the exception of the poorest countries, our projections
are almost identical when using a well-fitted linear or a quadratic convergence model.
In other words, when extrapolating current trends in education costs, socio-demographic
prospects are fairly robust to the specification of the estimated convergence process.
However, if we assume a slow-down of convergence (i.e., if we divide by two the
convergence speed), it drastically affects the geography of skills and long-term population
growth. In the developing world, the proportion of college graduates and the share of the
urban population stagnate after 2040. The long-term level of the population is 20% to
25% greater than in the baseline. These changes are noticeable in all developing countries,
including the largest ones (see Figures 1.4b, 1.4d and 1.4f). Hence, Figures 1.4a, 1.4c and
1.4e show that the changes in the size and skill structure of the world population are
important. In line with the Sustainable Development Agenda, our results suggest that
policies targeting access to all levels of education and education quality are vital to reduce
the demographic pressures and to stimulate human capital accumulation.25
25Changing demographic shares have drastic implications in terms of immigration and emigration (see
Table 1.A2 in Appendix 1.A.2). In the half-convergence scenario, the number of international migrants
increases by 22% compared to the baseline, due to the larger population in developing countries.
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Figure 1.3: Comparison of the baseline trajectory with official projections by the UN
Notes: The left panel reports the projected population size, the share of college educated workers, and
the share of urban population for the baseline and for offical projections (UN medium variant). Results
are depicted for the worlwide averages, for countries in the OECD and for developing countries (DEV).
The right panel compares the simulated levels in 2100 with official projections. Bubbles are proportional
to country size.
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Figure 1.4: Sensitivity to educational policies
Notes: This figure reports the projected population size, the share of college educated workers, and
the share of urban population for the baseline and the respective counterfactual scenario. The ”lin.
conv.” scenario assumes a monotonic convergence in ψr,t. The ”50% conv.” scenario assumes a slower
conditional convergence process.
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1.5.4 Sensitivity to mobility constraints
We now investigate whether our socio-demographic prospects are sensitive to future mo-
bility frictions. The baseline scenario assumes constant international and internal migra-
tion costs in the future. It predicts that the international migration pressures drastically
intensify in the OECD countries (see Table 1.A1 in Appendix 1.A.2). We consider here
an extreme no-international migration scenario for the future (xrf,s,t = 1 after 2010).
In the same vein, our static experiments suggest that internal mobility frictions drasti-
cally affect the (mis-)allocation of workers between sectors. We consider a no-internal
migration scenario with maximal frictions (xan,s,t = 1 after 2010). Figure 1.5 compares
the baseline trajectories of population, education, and urbanization with those obtained
without international or internal mobility.
In line with the static development accounting exercise, we find that international
migration has limited (and often negligible) effects on aggregated socio-demographic
prospects (Figure 1.5a, 1.5c and 1.5e). In the no-migration scenario, Figure 1.5d shows
that the share of college-educated workers increases in developing countries and that the
effect is particularly strong in the poorest countries in which emigrants are highly posi-
tively selected. However, in general, the trend is mostly governed by small countries (and
small developing islands in particular), exhibiting large emigration rates. The effect is
small in large countries.26 Comparing OECD member states with developing countries,
the ratio of skill shares in the year 2100 reaches 3.4 (instead of 3.8 in the baseline), but
this change is mostly due to the decrease in human capital in OECD countries. Figures
1.5e and 1.5f show that the urbanization responses are small, except in OECD countries.
This is because immigrants to OECD countries usually reside in urban regions. As far
as population is concerned, the no-migration scenario predicts a substantial decrease in
the size of the population in Western economies, which is completely balanced out by an
increase in developing countries.
The socio-demographic effects of internal mobility are greater. Preventing the move-
ment of people from rural to urban areas has larger implications for human capital accu-
mulation in large countries (access to education is better in cities), for the continuation
of the urbanization process, and for population growth. Without internal mobility, the
long-term level of the population increases by 16% in the developing world, the share
of college graduates peaks at 10%, and the urban share declines by half compared to
the baseline. This confirms that internal mobility frictions are important to reduce the
demographic pressures and to boost human capital accumulation worldwide. Without
internal mobility, the long-term ratio of skill shares between OECD member states and
developing countries reaches 4.3 (instead of 3.8 in the baseline), and the sector allocation
of skills drastically deteriorates in the developing world.
1.5.5 The geography of skills and geography of income
This last section connects the results of the static development accounting experiments
with our socio-demographic prospects. Our static analysis shows that global inequality
is influenced by the geography of skills. The prospective part shows that a continuation
of ongoing trends should neither lead to a drastic fall in human capital inequality nor
26Migration barriers can also affect an individual’s incentives to acquire higher education. However,
Docquier and Machado (2016) and Delogu et al. (2018) numerically demonstrate that the latter brain
gain mechanism has little impact on the world distribution of skills.
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Figure 1.5: Sensitivity to mobility constraints
Notes: This figure reports the projected population size, the share of college educated workers, and
the share of urban population for the baseline and the respective counterfactual scenario. The scenario
”no intl.” refers to the scenario with prohibitively high international migration costs (xrf,s,t = 1) after
2010. The scenario ”no internal” refers to the scenario with prohibitively high internal migration costs
(xan,s,t = 1) after 2010.
32 CHAPTER 1. THE GEOGRAPHY OF SKILLS AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY
to strong improvement in the sector allocation of skills.27 Nevertheless, the geography
of skills can be affected by public policies affecting education and labor mobility. We
now examine how these policies impact the world distribution of income. Our baseline
prospects involve a variation of the Theil index of income inequality from 0.81 in 1980
to 1.14 in 2100 (see Figure 1.A3a in Appendix 1.A.3). Figure 1.6 illustrates this result
and analyzes its sensitivity to education and mobility policies. The left panel depicts
the trajectory of the average level of income per capita in the OECD member states, in
developing countries and in the world. The right panel depicts the sensitivity of the Theil
index of income inequality.
Figures 1.6a and 1.6b show the sensitivity of the world distribution of income to
education policies. Compared to the baseline, the Theil index is unsurprisingly smaller
when we assume linear convergence in the access to education and greater when we divide
the coefficients of the quadratic convergence equation by two. However, as illustrated in
Figure 1.6a, the trajectory of income per capita in all regions is not greatly affected by the
convergence assumption. Variations in the Theil index are rather mechanical and linked
to the construction of the index: the variations are mostly explained by the changing
demographic shares of the developed and developing world (as illustrated in Figure 1.4a).
Figures 1.6c and 1.6d show the sensitivity of the world distribution of income to
future mobility frictions. Preventing people from migrating internationally markedly
reduces the world GDP (as it prevents individuals to move from low-productivity to high-
productivity countries) and reduces global income inequality. However, Figure 1.6c shows
that it has a negligible effect on income per capita in the developing world. In other words,
development prospects are robust to future international migration barriers.28 Again, the
effect on global inequality is rather mechanical and linked to the construction of the Theil
index: cutting migration decreases the demographic share of industrialized countries and
increases the share of developing countries. In contrast, the level of income per capita
in developing countries is more sensitive to internal migration policies. Preventing rural-
to-urban migration reduces income and drastically increases the Theil index of income
inequality. In line with our static numerical experiments, internal mobility frictions can
induce a large misallocation of workers in poor countries (Rodrik, 2013). Policies targeting
sustainable urban development are vital to reduce the demographic pressure and global
inequality.
Section 1.A.4 in the Appendix demonstrates that these conclusions are highly robust
to the modeling assumptions. If we change the size of technological externalities or if we
consider that agricultural and nonagricultural goods are imperfect substitutes, as in Bop-
part (2014), we obtain similar trajectories for the Theil index of income inequality. The
size of technological externalities affects the levels of income per capita in developing and
developed countries but has negligible effect on inequality. The structure of preferences
has little effect on the levels of income per capita and on its distribution.
27The results reported in Appendix 1.A.3 indicate that the Theil index of human capital inequality
remains almost stable over the 21st century. It ranges from 0.63 in 1980 to 0.56 in 2100.
28We are aware that the real contribution of international migration to development might be under-
estimated here, as the model disregards diaspora externalities (Docquier and Rapoport, 2012) and the
link between education decisions and migration prospects.
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Figure 1.6: Implications for global income inequality
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter analyzes the root drivers of the geographic distribution of skills and its ef-
fect on current and future development disparities. We use a multi-country, two-sector,
two-class, dynamic model of the world economy that endogenizes population growth,
human capital formation and income in all countries and regions. We consider various
sizes for technological externalities, alternative structures of preferences, as well as sce-
narios of access to education, internal and international mobility. Overall, we argue that
the geography of skills explains a non-negligible fraction of development disparities be-
tween countries and regions. An important part of this effect is due to disparities in the
(national) average level of schooling. Nevertheless, when considering the bottom quar-
tile of the income distribution, one third of the total effect is due to disparities, which
result from internal mobility frictions, in the sector allocations of workers. Compared
to results from the standard, one-sector development accounting model, taking into ac-
count within-country disparities in human capital reinforces the role of the geographic
allocation of skills. However, although migrants are positively selected in terms of their
education level, international migration has little effect on the world distribution of skills
and income.
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Assuming a continuation of the ongoing convergence process in the access to school-
ing, we provide unified projections of socio-demographic and economic variables for the
21st century. Our baseline prospects show fairly stable disparities in the world’s distribu-
tion of skills and slow urbanization in developing countries. This implies that the future
geography of skills per se is unlikely to bring down global income inequality if access to
education does not converge faster than it has over the last 30 years. On the contrary,
increasing inequality occurs if the speed of convergence in education cost decreases or if
internal mobility frictions increase. In line with the Sustainable Development Agenda,
our analysis clearly suggests that policies targeting access to all levels of education, ed-
ucation quality and sustainable urban development are vital to reduce the demographic
pressure and global inequality. These conclusions are highly robust to the technological
and preference assumptions and to future international migration policies.
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Calibration details
Data from the Gallup World Polls. – The data sources used to parameterize our model
are described in Section 1.4. To identify the structure of income, fertility and migration
intentions by region and by skill level, we use individual data from the Gallup World Poll
(GWP) surveys. GWP covers about 150 countries between the years 2007 and 2016. For
the majority of countries, the data are collected through face-to-face interviews. In some
cases, interviews were conducted through phone calls. On average, the sample includes
about 1,000 randomly selected respondents per year and per country. Data weighting is
used to ensure a nationally representative sample for each country and is intended to be
used for calculations within a country. To construct post-stratification weights, Gallup
uses population statistics by gender, age, education or socioeconomic status, and region.
The sampling frame is such that GWP data are representative of the entire population
aged 15 and over (including populations from rural areas). However, in line with our
model and with the macro databases used in the calibration, we only consider individuals
aged 25 to 64. We aggregate the available 10 waves and assume they correspond to the
year 2010 of our model. Hence, our income, fertility and migration intention proxies are
drawn from about 10,000 responses per country.
Estimated geography of skills. – Figure 1.A1 characterizes the geography of skills in
the year 2010, and describes the worldwide evolution of urbanization and human capital
between 1970 and 2010. Figure 1.A1a shows that the urban share of college graduates
is larger than the rural share in all countries. This is particularly true in poor countries.
In line with Gollin et al. (2014b), Figure 1.A1b shows that the gap between regions
decreases with the economy-wide proportion of college graduates. Figure 1.A1c shows
that the college-educated minority is predominantly and increasingly employed in the
nonagricultural sector. As far as less educated workers are concerned (i.e., the large
majority of people in the world), the fraction of them employed in the nonagricultural
sector increased from 37.8% in 1970 to 50.5% in 2010. Figure 1.A1d is the mirror image
of Figure 1.A1c: it depicts the evolution of the share of the college graduates in the
labor force of each sector. On average, the world average proportion of college graduates
increased from 2.4% to 8.8% between 1970 and 2010. In relative terms, the rise is greater
in agriculture (from 1.1% to 3.9%) than in nonagriculture (from 4.6% to 13.1%). In
absolute terms, the magnitude of the change is reversed; the small share of college-
educated professionals and technicians in agriculture limits the capacity for innovation
in poor countries (as argued in World Bank, 2007).
Technology parameters. – Figure 1.A2 provides stylized facts on technological differ-
ences across countries, and summarizes the main findings of our calibration strategy. In
line with the existing literature, we assume σn = 2 and σa = ∞. Once the elasticities
are chosen, we use sector-specific data on returns to schooling to calibrate the relative
productivity of college-educated workers. In the agricultural sector, we use the Gallup
World Polls and compute the average household income per adult member as a function of
the education level of the household head. As a proxy for the wage ratio in rural regions
(Rwa,t), we divide the average income of households with a college-educated household
head by the average income of households with a less educated household head. Combin-
ing (1.3) and (1.6), the elasticity of Rwa to R
`
a is equal to κa − 1/σa. Assuming σa = ∞,
this elasticity boils down to κa. Figure 1.A2a shows that the correlation between R
$
a and
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Figure 1.A1: Additional stylized facts on the geography of skills
Notes: In Figure 1.A1a and 1.A1b, bubble sizes are proportional to the population of the country.
R`a is virtually nil. We thus rule out the possibility of skill-biased technical change in
agriculture (κa = 0), and assume a linear technology with a constant R
$
a for all countries
and all periods. The value of R$a is given by the population-weighted average of R
w
a ,
leading to $a = 0.57. We use this value for all countries and assume it is time-invariant.
As for the nonagricultural sector, we use data on the wage ratio from Biavaschi et al.
(2016) for 143 countries.29 We calibrate R$n using (1.3). Regressing R
$
n on R
`
n yields a
correlation of 0.38. Given the bidirectional causation relationship between the skill bias
and education decisions, we consider this estimate as an upper bound for the skill-bias
externality. In our baseline projections, we assume that half the correlation is due to
the skill-bias externality (i.e., κn = 0.19). Alternative scenarios are also considered in the
simulation section. We calibrate R
$
n as a residual from (1.6). Again, from (1.3) and (1.6),
the elasticity of the Rwn to R
`
n is equal to κn−1/σn, which is equal to -0.37. Figure 1.A2b
29For the missing countries we predict the wage ratio using the estimated relationship between the log
wage ratio on the log skill ratio.
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shows that this elasticity is in line with the Gallup data on income per adult member.
In the second step, we use data on national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for all
countries from the Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agri-
culture (USDA).30 Data on the agriculture share in the value added are taken from
the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAOSTAT).31 We construct data on
output by sector in the year 2010, and identify the TFP levels (Ar,t) by dividing the
sector-specific output by the quantity of labor in efficiency unit using (1.1). There is
a clear positive relationship between TFP and the share of college-educated workers in
both sectors. Indeed, regressing the log of Ar,t on the log of R
`
r,t gives a coefficient of
0.57 in the nonagricultural sector, and 0.66 in agriculture, as shown in Figures 1.A2c and
1.A2d. Given the reverse causation relationship between productivity and education de-
cision, we consider these estimates as upper bounds for the aggregate TFP externality. In
our baseline scenario, we assume that half the correlation between TFP and the share of
college-educated workers is due to the schooling externality (i.e., n = 0.28 and a = 0.33).
Alternative scenarios are also considered in the simulation section. We calibrate An as a
residual from (1.4).
Let us make two remarks on the calibration of the technology. First, Figure 1.A2e and
1.A2f show the distribution of Ar and Ar in the agricultural and nonagricultural sector
and for the year 2010. These distributions are relatively similar, meaning that a large
fraction of TFP differences is explained by exogenous determinants. Remember that we
assume a TFP externality equal to half of the correlation between TFP and the skill ratio.
Second, the methodology used to calibrate the TFP parameters can be also used for the
year 1980. Comparing the calibrated scale factors (An) in 1980 and 2010, we obtain a
high correlation of 0.78 and no sign of convergence or divergence (i.e., log changes in An
are not significantly correlated with their initial level). It follows that we can reasonably
consider these scale factors as time-invariant in our numerical experiments.
Preference parameters. – We assign the following values to the parameters that are
time-invariant and equal for all countries: θ = 0.25, λ = 0.5 and φ = 0.14.32 From (1.14)
and (1.16), the scale parameter of the distribution of migration tastes (µ) is the inverse
of the elasticity of bilateral migration to the wage rate. Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas
Moraga (2013) find a value between 0.6 and 0.7 for this elasticity. Hence, we use µ = 1.4.
Let us now explain how we calibrate the values of pir and ψr,t. These two parame-
ters are country- and sector-specific, and affect the fertility and education decisions. We
calibrate them to match the population dynamics between the years 1980 and 2010, i.e.,
the transition from the resident population in 1980 and the native population in 2010.
We begin by estimating the size of the before-migration population in 2010 by skill group
(
∑
rNr,s,2010). We do this by adding the number of international migrants by region and
skill level to the respective number of high-skilled and low-skilled workers by region of
our basic data set, the after-migration population (Lr,s,2010). For simplicity, we focus on
international migration to OECD countries only. From the Database on Immigrants in
30For a few missing observations we impute values by making use of the Maddison database and data
from the World Bank.
31For a few missing observations we impute values by making use of data from the World Bank. Since
data is volatile for several countries, the average of five data points around the data point of interest is
used.
32Given the expression in (1.10), this assumption reflects setting the bound of the maximal number of
children equal to 7 (i.e., 14 children per couple). See Docquier et al. (2016) for a brief review of studies
using similar parameter values.
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Figure 1.A2: Calibration of the technological parameters in 2010
Notes: In Figure 1.A2a-1.A2d, bubble sizes are proportional to the population of the country. Figures
1.A2e and 1.A2f assume that the elasticity of TFP or skill bias to the skill ratio is equal to 50% of the
correlation between these variables.
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OECD and non-OECD countries (DIOC), we extract the number of emigrants by educa-
tion level to OECD countries for all countries in our sample and for the year 2010. The
DIOC does not identify the region of origin of migrants (urban versus rural). However,
for the majority of countries in our sample, skill- and region-specific information on the
desire to emigrate can be extracted from the Gallup World Polls. Assuming the structure
of migration aspirations is reflected in actual emigration stocks, we split the number of
emigrants to OECD countries by region of origin and by education level.33 The average
fertility rate (n1980) is thus obtained by dividing the total native population of adults in
2010 (
∑
r,sNr,s,2010) by the total resident population of adults in 1980 (
∑
r,s Lr,s,1980).
34
Moreover, our calibration requires data on the skill- and region-specific fertility for each
country. By construction, we have nt ≡
∑
r,s Lr,s,tnr,s,t/
∑
r,s Lr,s,t. We use the Gallup
World Polls and extract the Gallup-based average number of children per household by
region and skill level for 2010.35 We compute the fertility of the college educated work-
ers by fitting the sector-specific low/high-skilled fertility differentials from the Gallup
database. In this way, we obtain the fertility rates for each country for the year 1980.
From 2010 onwards, the number of children is endogenous.
The last moment to fit in the procedure is the number of internal migrants between the
years 1980 and 2010. Two factors may determine the difference in the evolution of skills in
both sectors. First, this evolution may be brought about by the differences in educational
prospects (given the already computed fertility differential). Second, it might be caused
by the selectivity of rural-to-urban migrants. We decided to pin down the first of the
two factors. This draws on the different probabilities to become high-skilled in urban
and rural areas. These probabilities are calibrated by assuming a log-normal distribution
of years of schooling in both sectors. The location parameters simply match the mean
years of schooling in rural/urban areas, while the dispersion parameter is identical across
sectors and is set to fit the country-specific share of high-skilled individuals (defined as
the percentage of population with more than 17 years of schooling). Finally, the quested
ratio of probabilities is the quotient of two respective probabilities of obtaining more than
17 years of schooling, derived from region-specific distributions. We set the ratio of the
probabilities so that net internal migration is computed as a residual in the model. We
arbitrary impose that the process of urbanization is the dominant one (which is the case
in almost all countries). The matched number represents the net migration from rural
to urban region. The net internal migration is then the difference between the ”before-
migration” population (Nr,s,2010) in 2010 and the sum of the resident population and
the international migrants (
∑
r,s(Lr,s,2010 + Mrf,s,2010)) in 2010. In this way, the model
perfectly matches the skill and regional distribution of workers in 1980 and 2010.
From Equation (1.13), the fertility rate in the model depends on the product of pirψr,t.
Once fertility rates are matched we are able to identify the product pirψr,t. We then
calibrate pir and ψr,t in order to match the educational structure of the native population
in 2010, imposing the given value to the ratio of probabilities of becoming high-skilled
across regions. Figures 1.A3a and 1.A3b show the distributions of pir, ψr,t for the two
regions. Figure 1.A3a depicts the distributions for two periods (1980 and 2010). The
33Bertoli and Ruyssen (2016) show that aspirations to emigrate are correlated with emigration flows
within five years.
34There is no mortality in the model. The average fertility rate at time t, nt, should be seen as a net
population growth rate. Note that the average fertility rate is not affected by internal migration, so that
we need to only account for international migration at this stage.
35We only include countries with at least ten respondents. When data are missing, crude birth rates
from the World Health Organization are used.
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Figure 1.A3: Calibration of the preference parameters in 1980 and 2010
distribution of pir is stable over time. As far as ψr,t is concerned, the mean levels decreased
between 1980 and 2010, reflecting expansive education policies that can be related to the
Millennium Development Goals. As for internal migration costs, we assume there is only
migration from rural to urban regions (i.e., xan,s,t < 1 and xna,s,t = 1). We obtain internal
migration costs for rural-urban migration from Equation (1.16). Figure 1.A3c shows that
moving costs are usually smaller for highly educated workers than for the less educated.
In order to determine the international migration costs (xaf,s,t and xnf,s,t), we begin by
retrieving the utilities achievable abroad. We set these utilities equal to the skill-specific
weighted average utilities of the OECD countries. The weights consist in the respective
population sizes of the OECD countries. We then obtain the international migration costs
from Equation (1.16). In line with Figure 1.A3c, Figure 1.A3d shows that international
migration costs are smaller for college-educated workers.
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1.A.2 The geography of skills and current income inequality -
static experiments
In Section 1.5.1, we consider the US as the base-case economy and proceed with three
static counterfactual experiments to quantify the role of skills accumulation in the year
2010. Figure 1.2 in the main text describes the changes in income per capita induced by an
increase in the average skill level, or by a better geographical allocation of national skills.
Results are presented in a different manner in the development accounting literature.
For example, Jones (2014) uses the concept of success rate (SR), defined as the share of
the income ratio explained by the counterfactual. In other words, SR equals one minus
the counterfactual-to-observed ratio of income with the US (i.e., $100,000 per year).
Equivalently, the success rate measures the national income loss due to the lower level of
human capital and/or to the sectoral allocation of workers when compared to the US:
SR = 1− yUS/yCF
yUS/yobs
=
yCF − yobs
yCF
.
In development accounting studies, the success rate is usually provided for selected
countries located at various percentiles of the income distribution. Table 1.A1 describes
our static simulation results likewise. This table also reports the Theil index for each of
the counterfactual experiments. For the baseline, the Theil index takes a value of 0.744.
In case the US shares are transposed, the value falls to 0.354. If the US urban shares are
transposed, the index takes a value of 0.607. With the repatriation of emigrant workers
the Theil index is very similar to the baseline with a value of 0.735. Finally, Table 1.A2
decomposes the aggregate results by sector.
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Table 1.A1: Geography of skills and income per worker in 2010
15th 25th 50th 75th 85th Theil
(Cambodia) (Ghana) (Tunisia) (Mexico) (Greece) Index
I. Observed levels and ratios of income per worker
Income pw 2,018 3,651 9,032 20,761 55,262 0.744
US/ctry ratio 50.7 28.0 11.3 4.9 1.9 -
II. Counterfactual: Transposing the US skill shares in each sector
Income pw 16,010 13,709 19,968 34,968 63,328 0.354
US/ctry ratio 6.4 7.5 5.2 2.9 1.6 -
Success 0.873 0.732 0.544 0.402 0.121 0.525
III. Counterfactual II with exogenous TFP (Ar) and exogenous skill bias (R
ω
r )
Income pw 5,300 5,932 9,186 21,936 42,087 0.488
US/ctry ratio 16.9 15.1 9.7 4.1 2.1 -
Success 0.668 0.463 0.141 0.174 -0.146 0,345
IV. Counterfactual II with full TFP externality (Ar) and full skill bias externality (R
ω
r )
Income pw 58,737 37,430 50,151 61,843 103,421 0.267
US/ctry ratio 2.1 3.3 2.5 2.0 1.2 -
Success 0.958 0.881 0.781 0.592 0.350 0.642
V. Counterfactual: Transposing the US urbanization share
Income pw 4,681 4,028 10,007 20,785 54,482 0.607
US/ctry ratio 22.0 25.6 10.3 5.0 1.9 -
Success 0.566 0.087 0.091 -0.006 -0.021 0.184
VI. Counterfactual V with exogenous TFP (Ar) and exogenous skill bias (R
ω
r )
Income pw 3,469 3,490 6,377 16,259 37,709 0.594
US/ctry ratio 25.2 25.1 13.7 5.4 2.3 -
Success 0.503 0.106 -0.211 -0.092 -0.253 0.202
VII. Counterfactual V with full TFP externality (Ar) and full skill bias externality (R
ω
r )
Income pw 6,351 4,710 15,740 26,678 79,050 0.626
US/ctry ratio 19.1 25.8 7.7 4.6 1.5 -
Success 0.623 0.080 0.319 0.076 0.170 0.159
VIII. Counterfactual: Repatriation of emigrant workers
Income pw 2,481 4,164 9,789 22,911 57,745 0.735
US/ctry ratio 41.8 24.9 10.6 4.5 1.8 -
Success 0.176 0.112 0.065 0.082 0.031 0.012
IX. Counterfactual VIII with exogenous TFP (Ar) and exogenous skill bias (R
ω
r )
Income pw 1,290 2,988 5,815 17,750 38,584 0.772
US/ctry ratio 68.1 29.4 15.1 5.0 2.3 -
Success -0.343 -0.049 -0.334 -0.004 -0.230 -0.038
X. Counterfactual VIII with full TFP externality (Ar) and full skill bias externality (R
ω
r )
Income pw 4,775 5,855 16,495 29,606 86,428 0.707
US/ctry ratio 25.6 20.9 7.4 4.1 1.4 -
Success 0.495 0.254 0.345 0.162 0.236 0.049
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Table 1.A2: Productivity by sector - development accounting
15th 25th 50th 75th 85th 99th
(Cambodia) (Ghana) (Tunisia) (Mexico) (Greece) (US)
I. Observed levels and ratios of income per worker
Income pw (n) 7,169 5,020 12,904 25,726 68,259 125,133
Income pw (a) 807 1,987 1,707 4,310 15,026 10,214
US/ctry ratio (n) 17.5 24.9 9.7 4.9 1.8 1.0
US/ctry ratio (a) 12.7 5.1 6.0 2.4 0.7 1.0
College grads in n 0.036 0.030 0.105 0.148 0.297 0.326
II. Counterfactual: Transposing US skill shares in each sector
Success (n) 0.624 0.671 0.458 0.378 0.060 -
Success (a) 0.743 0.726 0.548 0.468 0.385 -
III. Counterfactual II with exogenous TFP (Ar) and exogenous skill bias (R
ω
r )
Success (n) 0.032 0.371 -0.011 0.151 -0.206 -
Success (a) -0.136 0.139 -0.103 0.060 0.091 -
IV. Counterfactual II with full TFP externality (Ar) and full skill bias externality (R
ω
r )
Success (n) 0.873 0.845 0.737 0.569 0.293 -
Success (a) 0.942 0.913 0.815 0.699 0.585 -
V. Counterfactual: Transposing the US urbanization share
Success (n) -0.286 -0.132 -0.085 -0.051 -0.096 -
Success (a) 0.121 0.143 0.175 0.178 0.305 -
VI. Counterfactual V with exogenous TFP (Ar) and exogenous skill bias (R
ω
r )
Success (n) -0.458 -0.074 -0.436 -0.129 -0.325 -
Success (a) -0.267 -0.010 -0.207 0.021 0.074 -
VII. Counterfactual V with full TFP externality (Ar) and full skill bias externality (R
ω
r )
Success (n) -0.133 -0.193 0.181 0.022 0.094 -
Success (a) 0.390 0.273 0.436 0.337 0.478 -
VIII. Counterfactual: Repatriation of emigrant workers
Success (n) 0.090 0.116 0.019 -0.027 -0.006 -
Success (a) 0.136 0.151 0.110 0.035 0.103 -
IX. Counterfactual VIII with exogenous TFP (Ar) and exogenous skill bias (R
ω
r )
Success (n) -0.461 0.009 -0.394 -0.118 -0.283 -
Success (a) -0.267 -0.010 -0.214 -0.041 0.046 -
X. Counterfactual VIII with full TFP externality (Ar) and full skill bias externality (R
ω
r )
Success (n) 0.434 0.211 0.309 0.056 0.211 -
Success (a) 0.411 0.286 0.348 0.105 0.157
Notes: Tables 1.A1 and 1.A2 give the level of income per worker of Cambodia, Ghana, Tunisia, Mexico,
and Greece for the baseline and the respective counterfactual scenario. Part I reports the observed level
of income per worker and the US-to-country ratio. Part II reports the income levels and ratios obtained
if the US shares were observed in each sector. Part V reports the income levels and ratios obtained
if the US urbanization share was transposed. Part VIII reports the income levels and ratios obtained
if emigration rates were nil. The remaining parts are variants of the respective scenario with different
assumptions on the technological externalities. For each simulation, the success rate is the share of the
wage ratio explained by the counterfactual, i.e., one minus the counterfactual-to-observed ratio of income
differential with the US (in columns (2)-(6)), and one minus the counterfactual-to-observed ratio of Theil
index (in column (7)).
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1.A.3 Baseline prospects: geopolitical implications
We examine the main geopolitical implications of the baseline projections described in
Section 1.5.2. The model does not predict convergence in income per worker and in the
share of college graduates across countries. The Theil index of human capital inequality
remains almost stable over the 21st century. It ranges from 0.63 in 1980 to 0.5 in 2100
as illustrated in Figure 1.A4b. Similarly, income per capita does not converge. On the
contrary, the Theil index of income inequality varies from 0.81 in 1980 to 1.02 in 2100 as
depicted in Figure 1.A4a.
Figure 1.A4c depicts the evolution of the region/continent shares in the worldwide
working-age population. The share of sub-Saharan Africa increases from 7.2% in 1980
to 34.0% in 2100. The share of OECD countries decreases from 25.8% to 13.0% over the
same period of time. In addition, the OECD share in the college-educated population
shrinks markedly, as illustrated in Figure 1.A4d. This is caused by the progress in higher
education in the other regions, in particular in Asia, and by the rise of the demographic
share of the developing world. Figure 1.A4e shows that the speed of urbanization is faster
in Africa than in the other regions. Finally, Figure 1.A4f depicts the evolution of income
shares. The OECD income share decreases by more than 13 percentage points (from
77.4% in 1980 to 64.1% in 2100) whereas the Asian share increases from 9.1% to 17.0%
over the same period.
Table 1.A3 describes the international migration implications of our baseline pro-
jections. Assuming constant migration policies, we predict slight decreases in future
emigration rates from the OECD member states. On the contrary, emigration rates from
Latin America, from the Middle East and North Africa, from sub-Saharan Africa and
from Asia increase. This is due to the rising share of college-educated workers (the most
mobile individuals) in the population. Given its rising share in the world population,
sub-Saharan Africa is responsible for drastic changes in worldwide migration pressures.
As a result, the proportion of foreigners increases in European countries. In particular,
the average immigration rate to the EU15 is expected to rise from 13.6% in 2010 to
21.2% in 2100. This is explained by four factors: (i) Europe is the main destination
for African emigrants; (ii) the demographic ratio between Africa and Europe increases
sharply; (iii) college-educated workers are more mobile than the less educated and the
rise in African human capital has limited effects on income disparities between Africa
and Europe; (iv) urbanization increases and international migration costs are lower for
urban citizens than for villagers. Reinforcement of immigration restrictions are likely to
be observed in European countries to curb the migration pressure; their implications are
investigated in Section 1.5.4. Note that the share of immigrants increases less drastically
in the US (from 16.0% to 19.2%), Australia (from 24.9% to 25.9%) and Canada (from
18.7% to 25.0%).
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Figure 1.A4: Global inequality and regional shares (1980-2100)
Notes: This figure reports the Theil index of income inequality, the Theil index of inequality in the share
of skilled workers, the regional shares of global labor force, high-skilled workers, urban workers and GDP.
In Figures 1.A4c-1.A4f countries are exclusively and completely assigned to one of six groups: OECD,
Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Asia and Others
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Table 1.A3: Projections of immigration and emigration rates
Baseline scenario Half Linear No internal
2010 2040 2070 2100 2100 2100 2100
Emigration rates (as percent of native population)
OECD 4.3 4.4 4.2 3.7 3.9 4.0 3.7
LAC 3.9 4.5 4.9 5.2 5.4 5.1 6.1
SSA 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.7 2.2 7.2
MENA 2.9 3.6 3.8 3.9 3.8 4.0 4.9
Asia 1.1 1.4 1.8 2.1 1.9 2.0 1.6
Others 13.9 15.1 16.0 16.3 16.6 16.8 17.1
Immigration rates (as percent of resident population)
EU 12.1 16.1 18.7 20.1 21.8 20.5 29.4
EU 15 13.6 17.7 20.1 21.2 22.9 21.6 30.4
GER 15.0 19.0 21.2 22.0 24.0 22.6 32.4
FRA 12.2 15.9 18.4 19.7 21.3 20.1 28.9
GBR 14.6 20.0 23.2 24.4 25.4 24.4 30.0
ITA 10.9 14.5 16.9 18.3 20.4 19.0 29.5
ESP 14.0 17.3 19.1 19.8 21.7 20.4 29.2
USA 16.0 18.6 19.5 19.2 21.0 19.8 27.3
CAN 18.7 23.0 24.9 25.0 25.8 24.9 29.2
AUS 24.9 27.0 26.9 25.9 27.3 26.2 32.9
Notes: The upper part of the table gives the share of emigrants in the total native population for the
OECD, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Middle East and North
Africa (MENA), Asia, and Others. The bottom part of the table gives the share of immigrants in
the working-age population for the European Union (EU), the 15 countries of the European Union
(EU 15), Germany (GER), France (FRA), Great Britain (GBR), Italy (ITA), Spain (ESP), the United
States (USA), Canada (CAN), and Australia (AUS). The first to fourth columns give the respective
values for the baseline scenario for the years 2010-2100. Column ”Half” gives the respective values for
the counterfactual scenario where the coefficients of the (baseline) quadratic convergence equation are
divided by two for the year 2100. Column ”Linear” gives the respective values for the counterfactual
scenario with the linear convergence in education costs for the year 2100. Column ”No internal” gives
the respective values for the counterfactual scenario with no internal mobility for the year 2100.
1.A.4 Sensitivity to technological externalities and to the pref-
erence structure
We assess the sensitivity of our socio-demographic projections to modeling assumptions.
Firstly, we assess the extent to which technological externalities influence our socio-
demographic and income projections. The static counterfactual experiments conducted
in Section 1.5.1 show that the effect of human capital on global inequality quantitatively
depends on the size of technological externalities.
Figure 1.A5 compares the baseline trajectories of population, education and urban-
ization with those obtained without or with full externalities. The evolution of socio-
demographic variables is highly robust to the technological environment. The only excep-
tion is the share of college graduates in OECD countries, which depends on the intensity
directed technical change. With full externalities, the skill premium and the cost of ed-
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ucation increase. This makes access to education more difficult for poor households. At
the world level, technological externalities have a negligible effects on future demographic
pressures, urbanization and human capital accumulation.
Secondly, we challenge the assumption of homogenous consumption goods produced
across sectors and of the homothetic preference structure. It is well documented in
the macroeconomic literature on structural change that relative prices (Ngai and Pis-
sarides, 2007) and income effects (Foellmi and Zweimu¨ller, 2008) can influence consump-
tion choices and welfare. In our framework, urbanization and human capital accumulation
affect the quantity of goods produced in the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors, with
potential implications on relative prices. In particular, if the relative price of agricultural
goods increases, this may attenuate the process of urbanization and increasing access to
education.
To investigate this mechanism, we extend our model and rely on the preference struc-
ture described in Boppart (2014). In each region, we assume that the utility of total
consumption is a nonlinear transformation of the quantity of agricultural (car,s,t) and
nonagricultural (cnr,s,t) goods produced in the country: cr,s,t = (c
a
r,s,t)
α + cnr,s,t. We thus
disregard trade, which would attenuate the average relative price variations. More pre-
cisely, consumption of agriculture goods is subject to diminishing marginal utility, as long
as α ∈ (0, 1). Knowing that each good is characterized by a separate price level (with
pa serving as a numeraire in each country), and the total consumption expenditure is
labeled by cr,s,t (as in Equation (1.10)), one can solve for the share of each good in the
consumption basket, e.g. for the agricultural good: car,s,t/cr,s,t = α
1
1−α (pnr,t)
1
1−α c−1r,s,t. The
latter resembles Equation (20) in Boppart (2014), which is then structurally estimated
to retrieve the value of α. According to his regressions, α ≈ 0.67, which we take as
the reference value of the non-homotheticity parameter in individuals’ utility. We also
consider a scenario with a smaller substitutability between goods (i.e., α = 0.50).
Figure 1.A6 compares the baseline trajectories of population, education and urban-
ization with those obtained with imperfectly substitutable goods and non homothetic
preferences (using α = 0.67 and α = 0.50). Again, the evolution of socio-demographic
variables is highly robust to preferences. At the world level, accounting for imperfect
substitution as in Boppart (2014) has negligible effects on future demographic pressures,
urbanization and human capital accumulation.
On Figure 1.A7, we illustrate the effect of our modeling assumption on income in-
equality. Figures 1.A7a and 1.A7b assess the sensitivity of the income distribution to
the size of technological externalities. We find that the size of technological externalities
affects the trajectory of income per capita in developing and developed countries, but
has negligible effect on income inequality. Figures 1.A7c and 1.A7d assess the sensitivity
of global inequality to the structure of preferences. Assuming imperfectly substitutable
goods and non-homothetic preferences has little effect on the levels of income per capita
and on the Theil index.
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Figure 1.A5: Sensitivity to technological scenarios
Notes: This figure reports the projected population size, the share of college educated workers, and the
share of urban population for the baseline and the respective counterfactual scenario. The scenario ”no
ext.” refers to the scenario with no technological externalities. The scenario ”full ext.” refers to the
scenario with full technological externalities.
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Figure 1.A6: Sensitivity to preference structures
Notes: This figure reports the projected population size, the share of college educated workers, and
the share of urban population for the baseline and the respective counterfactual scenario. The scenario
”alpha=0.67” refers to the scenario with imperfectly substitutable goods and non homothetic preferences
and a value of 0.67 for α. The scenario ”alpha=0.5” refers to the scenario with imperfectly substitutable
goods and non homothetic preferences and a value of 0.5 for α.
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Figure 1.A7: Income inequality prospects under alternative modeling assumptions
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Chapter 2
Climate change, inequality, and
migration
Abstract1
This chapter investigates the long-term effects of climate change on labor migration at
various spatial scales (local, interregional and international). Based on the model devel-
oped in the previous chapter, we build a two-sector, two-class, intertemporal model of
the world economy that accounts for the effects of climate change. For each country, we
endogenize the effect of rising temperature and sea levels on population and productivity
growth, education decisions, income inequality, extreme poverty and mobility decisions.
Climate change creates conditions that are conducive to increasing urbanization and in-
ternational migration from developing to rich countries. In our median scenario (+2.09◦C,
+1.1m), we predict that climate change induces voluntary and forcibly displacements of
about 120 million adult workers in the course of the 21st century. Nevertheless, under
current migration laws and policies, most of these workers will move short distances, and
only 19% of them will opt for long-haul migration to OECD destinations. Climate change
has limited effects on international emigration and immigration rates, even when consid-
ering more extreme scenarios. Larger amounts of internal and international migrations
can be obtained when adding direct utility losses and conflicts over resources, two effects
that are more uncertain and harder to quantify.
Keywords: human capital, migration, climate change, inequality
JEL codes: E24, J24, O15
2.1 Introduction
There is strong evidence that the global mean surface temperature of the world has
increased since the beginning of the 19th century, and that the process has accelerated
since 1980. Temperatures are expected to increase by 1 to 3◦C over the 21st century, and
recent studies suggest that, once adding an increment from storm surge, the sea level is
1This chapter is coauthored with Micha l Burzyn´ski, Fre´de´ric Docquier and Jaime de Melo. We thank
the Agence Franc¸aise de De´veloppement for its financial support (convention IRS/ECO/437-2017) as
well as Michel Beine, Simone Bertoli, Franc¸ois Gemenne, Fabio Mariani and Katrin Millock for their
helpful suggestions and comments.
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expected to rise by 1 to 2 metres by 2050 (e.g., Rigaud et al., 2018). Global warming and
sea level rise are two major ingredients of long-term climate change (henceforth CLC),
which will alter ecosystems and affect several economic outcomes such as productivity,
health, drudgery of work, conflicts, and more (see Dell et al., 2014). Damages will
vary across space because the economic effects of temperature are nonlinear (i.e., initial
temperature matters) and countries are heterogeneously exposed to sea-level rise. Low-
latitude countries that have contributed the least to CLC will be the most adversely
affected. Hence, migratory pressures, both internal and international, will presumably
be strongest in poor countries and are sometimes portrayed as a first-order adaptation
mechanism to CLC. The scant evidence from past episodes suggests, however, that the
scale and type of mobility responses are uncertain and context-specific.
This chapter studies the long-term effects of CLC on migration. For the first time, we
use the state-of-the-art tools of the migration literature to model the long-term mobility
responses to CLC at various spatial scales, and their interactions with global inequality
and extreme poverty over the 21st century. The existing literature has mostly looked at
the short-term impacts of fast-onset variables (e.g., storms, hurricanes, torrential rains,
floods, landslides, etc.), as opposed to long-run CLC or slow-onset variables (e.g., tem-
perature trends, desertification, rising sea level, coastal erosion, etc.).2 Long-run extrap-
olation of these estimates is questionable,3 and there is very little theoretical modeling
of the population and economic consequences of CLC. Contrary to existing studies, our
forward-looking, general equilibrium model covers the world economy and accounts for
the economic and socio-demographic contexts in which mobility decisions are made. We
model migration decisions as the outcome of a micro-founded, random utility model, and
jointly account for the main migration mechanisms mentioned in the literature. Increases
in temperature affect income and incentives to migrate (as in Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg,
2015, or Shayegh, 2017), and the rising sea level forces people and activities to move (as
in Rigaud et al., 2018). In more extreme scenarios, we also consider that CLC may cause
direct utility costs (linked to health or to the drudgery of work) and conflicts over re-
sources. In addition, our migration technology is parameterized to match international
and urbanization data of the last 30 years.4 In our framework, geography matters: each
one of 179 countries is populated by two types of agents (college graduates and the less
educated) living in two regions (agriculture and non-agriculture) and heterogeneously af-
fected by sea level rise (flooded and unflooded areas). The model also endogenizes the
productivity, fertility, and education responses to CLC which, together with skill-specific
migration decisions, govern the evolution of human capital and income inequality. Such a
unified model is helpful for quantifying the long-run demographic and economic responses
to CLC and their sensitivity.
We contribute to the growing literature on the linkages between CLC and migration.
As explained above, existing studies are mostly empirical and focused on responses to
extreme weather shocks. Recent reviews of the literature are provided in Perch-Nielsen
2Note that in the long-run, there is a correlation between the slow-onset indicators and the frequency
of fast-onset shocks.
3Although it has been documented that the 20C rise in temperatures during the Medieval warm
period between the 9th and 14th centuries resulted in large relocation of people and economic activity
(Fagan, 2008), the world has changed and it is difficult to draw causal inference about long-run effects
from the past 30 years because global warming has been modest and migration restrictions have gradually
increased.
4Using backcast exercises, Dao et al. (2017) demonstrate that such a model fits the past international
migration trends very well.
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et al. (2008), Piguet et al. (2011), Millock (2015), Berlemann and Steinhardt (2017)
or Cattaneo et al. (2018).5 The meta-analysis in Beine and Jeusette (2018) reveals a
diversity in methodological choices in empirical studies. They identify four important
methodological choices, namely (i) the measurement of the dependent variable,6 (ii) the
decision to include or exclude indirect effects of CLC,7 (iii) the analytical specification
of the transmission technology,8 (iv) and the identification strategy. Methodological di-
versity is reflected in the heterogeneity of findings. While CLC has consistently emerged
as a potent driver of internal migration (Piguet et al., 2011; Barrios et al., 2006; Ku-
bik and Maurel, 2016; Dallmann and Millock, 2013; Henderson et al., 2017), its effect
on international migration is not consensual. Some studies find important international
migration outflows that are directly associated to weather shocks (Coniglio and Pesce,
2015; Backhaus et al., 2015; Cai et al., 2016) or indirectly induced by CLC-driven pres-
sures on income in urban areas (Marchiori et al., 2012, 2015; Beine and Parsons, 2015).
Others attempt to explain why migration responses are small, and even why migration
does not respond or responds negatively to climate shocks (Black et al., 2011; Black et
al., 2013; Cattaneo et al., 2018).9 Overall, using empirical approaches to predict the
migration responses to global warming poses three major problems. Firstly, difficulties
in identifying a clear-cut effect are due to the fact that climate variables closely interact
with the other economic and political drivers of migration. Secondly, mobility decisions
are context-specific and can be influenced by a large number of factors that vary across
regions and countries (such as the country size, the level of economic development, the
political context or some cultural characteristics). Thirdly, the effects of CLC have not
yet fully materialized.
In light of these limitations, we propose an alternative, micro-founded approach that
includes a spatial dimension. Our study is part of an incipient literature pioneered by
Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2015) (henceforth DRH) who investigate the economic costs
of CLC by modeling the interaction of mobility and production changes in the continuous
space.10 Unlike DRH, our approach distinguishes between two regions, agriculture and
nonagriculture, to accommodate empirical estimates that show consistently that the im-
5Earlier studies show that millions of people will be forcibly displaced in the future as a result of
climate change (Gemenne, 2011; Piguet et al., 2011). In response to the diversity of findings across
studies, the paradigm has gradually changed with recent studies seeing migration as an adaptation
strategy among several others (not the least costly one).
6Some studies focus on international migration (to all countries or to selected destinations) while
others tackle internal migration and urbanization (Henderson et al., 2017)
7An indirect link is identified when climate variables affect mobility decisions through other variables
such as changes in productivity and income (Marchiori et al., 2012; Beine and Parsons, 2015), or conflicts
over resources (Miguel et al., 2004; Gleditsch, 2012).
8The literature distinguishes between monotonic or unconditional specifications (i.e., models capturing
responses that are independent of the context), and conditional specifications that allow the eventual
outcome to depend on socioeconomic and political characteristics of the individuals, households or regions
exposed to climatic events.
9Cattaneo and Peri (2016) report that a gradual increase in the level of temperature reduces migration
outflows from poor countries due to the presence of financial constraints. Bazzi (2017) finds similar results
on Indonesia, as well as Findley (1994) on Mali. On the contrary, Jayachandran (2006), Gray and Mueller
(2012), Mueller et al. (2014) find that landless households respond more than the wealthy ones in India,
Pakistan and Bangladesh, respectively.
10In DRH all equilibria are spatially symmetric with prices and factor allocations identical for all
locations at a given latitude. Desmet, Nagy and Rossi-Hansberg (2018) model the mobility of people
and the dynamics of income inequality at a more detailed spatial scale (1x1 degree cells across the globe),
but disregard CLC.
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pact of CLC on productivity will be greater in agriculture than in manufacturing. We are
looking for first-order effects of CLC on people and countries in a framework that takes
into account that the (endogenous) geography of skills affects migration decisions through
differences in incentives, fertility decisions, and migration costs. Another related study is
Shayegh (2017), which models the effect of CLC on fertility rates, income inequality and
human capital accumulation in developing countries. He assumes the probability to emi-
grate is skill-specific and increasing in temperature without microfoundations. As to the
effects of CLC, DRH and Shayegh (2017) model the effect of the change in temperature
on productivity. We also account for sea-level rise - about which scientific consensus is
strong - which affects countries differentially, and we implement additional mechanisms of
transmission such as direct utility losses and conflicts. The emphasis on migratory mech-
anisms comes at a cost. In our model, unlike the macro models of Nordhaus (2000) and
DRH, CO2 emissions are exogenously subsumed in the simulation scenario rather than
as a result of mitigation decisions included in the model. There are two reasons for this.
Firstly, the effects of population change on the concentration of greenhouse gas and global
mean temperature are highly uncertain. As discussed in the next section, projections of
mean air temperature levels strongly vary across models for a given emissions scenario.
Secondly, Shayegh (2017) shows that endogenizing the CLC response to migration has a
negligible impact on the overall results given the small number of migrants compared to
the whole population. We assume that CLC and its directs impacts are exogenous to the
economies under investigation.
Our simulations reveal that CLC induces small positive effects on the worldwide aver-
age level of income per worker but makes the world distribution of income more unequal.
Workers employed in countries located below the 35th parallel suffer income losses, par-
ticularly those employed in agriculture. CLC also increases world extreme poverty at
both extensive and intensive margins. Coupled with the fact that the rising sea level in-
duces forced displacements, CLC creates conditions that are conducive to increasing urba-
nization and international migration. Our Intermediate CLC scenario assumes +2.09◦C
and a 1.1m rise in the sea level. It accounts for climate-driven productivity losses and
forced displacements. Compared to a constant climate scenario, the worldwide number of
working-age movers increases by 120 million in the course of the 21st century. Compared
to Rigaud et al. (2018), we find similar levels of climate migration but offer additional
insight on the type of migration. In particular, when considering forced displacements
and productivity effects, we find that far more climate migrants will move within their
own countries than across borders: 66% of movers relocate within their region and 15%
migrate from rural areas to cities. Hence, only 19% opt for long-haul migration to an
OECD destination country. CLC increases the world proportion of international migrants
by 0.2 percentage points in the long-run. This only corresponds to 1/20 of the no-CLC
worldwide migration rate, and to 1/5 of the gradual increase predicted for the 21st cen-
tury. The latter trend is mostly driven by demographic imbalances between developing
and rich countries, and by the education trends. These effects increase less than propor-
tionately if the rise in temperature is twice as large (i.e., +4◦C in the 21st century): the
number of movers reaches 185 millions, including 27% of long-haul migrants. In addi-
tion, a relaxation of immigration restrictions for migrants originating from the countries
incurring the largest CLC-driven income losses has limited effects on extreme poverty
headcounts and on poverty depth. Our results for international migration are highly
robust to the scale of the sea level rise. This is due to the fact that forcibly displaced
people essentially move locally. However, two major sources of uncertainty surround our
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projections. Our numerical experiments reveal that conflicts over resources could become
a key determinant of climatic migration pressures, and that direct utility losses due to
CLC have potentially important effects on internal and international migration.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 illustrates the heteroge-
neous implications that CLC induces for the world economy. Section 2.3 describes our
two-sector, two-class model and explains its parameterization. Section 2.4 presents our
results. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Heterogeneous effects of CLC
In this section, we show that low-latitude countries in general, and their rural regions in
particular, will be the most adversely affected by CLC. This implies that CLC creates
conditions that are conducive to increasing urbanization and international migration from
developing to rich countries. In Section 2.2.1, we define three moderate climate scenarios
that combine future variations in global temperature and sea levels. Then, Section 2.2.2
discusses two direct transmission channels - changes in total factor productivity and forced
displacements - through which CLC affects the world economy and the migration decisions
of people. These channels will be accounted for in the overlapping generations model
described in Section 2.3. Note that more extreme climate scenarios and two additional
channels of transmission - direct utility losses and conflicts, which are more uncertain
and more difficult to quantify - will be considered in Section 2.4.2.
2.2.1 Moderate climate scenarios
Most analysts predict that CLC will lead to a gradual rise in the mean surface-temperature
and in the sea level over the 21st century. Uncertainty about CLC, about damages, and
about the interaction between CLC and damages is large.11 To take this into account,
we define three moderate scenarios referred to as:
• CLC-Minimalist. – This scenario involves a rise of +0.09◦C in temperature and
+0m in sea level over the 21st century.
• CLC-Intermediate. – This scenario involves a rise of +2.09◦C in temperature and
+1.1m in sea level over the 21st century.
• CLC-Maximalist. – This scenario involves a rise of +4.09◦C in temperature and
+1.3m in sea level over the 21st century.
We consider these changes as exogenous in our model. We thus disregard the endo-
geneity of CLC, which is comprised of uncertain links between CLC, economic activity
and CO2 emissions. The scenario selection is discussed below.
11Stern (2013) reports that since an increase of +3◦C (likely to occur when concentrations increase
from the current 400ppm to 750ppm) has not been experienced for around 3 million years, we are in
uncharted territory when it comes to modeling these likely effects. He lists the effects that might emerge
strongly at +3◦C. Schelling (2007) remarked about the climate sensitivity parameter (S) which defines
the equilibrium surface warming from a doubling of the stock of CO2 emissions that ”for a quarter of a
century, the range of uncertainty [about S] has been a factor of 3”. This uncertainty comes out clearly
in the range of damage changes produced by the same warming scenario in the different climate models
reviewed by Burke et al. (2015).
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Projections of temperature. – We follow three steps to construct our projections of
temperature levels. In a first step, we collect raw data on monthly temperature levels
and projections from the Climate Change Knowledge Portal (CCKP) of the World Bank
Group. Our variable of interest is the near surface monthly mean air temperature level.
Figure 2.1a illustrates the cross-country relationship between mean surface-temperature
and latitude in 2010. Bubble sizes are proportional to the working-age population in each
of the 179 countries included in the model. Temperature levels are negatively correlated
with latitude.
As for temperature projections, they are organized in 20-year climatological windows
for the years 2020-2039, 2040-2059, 2060-2079, and 2080-2099. The CCKP projections
are obtained from the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) distri-
bution (Taylor et al., 2012) which distinguishes between several scenarios for the Rep-
resentative Concentration Pathways (RCP) (Moss et al., 2010). The median-emission
scenario is called RCP-4.5. In addition, for each RCP, the CCKP provides data for 16
models obtained from different research institutes. When these models are ranked by
ascending order of the yearly temperature anomaly for the fourth 20-year climatological
window of 2080-2099, the medium resolution model of the Institut Pierre Simon Laplace
(the ipsl cm5a mr variant) takes the 8th (median) position in RCP-4.5. We select this
ipsl cm5a mr variant as our Intermediate scenario.
This Intermediate scenario predicts that the temperature levels increase gradually
in all countries, and that the mean surface temperature of the world will increase by
2.09◦C over the 21st century. Figure 2.1b plots the 2010-2100 variation in the average
of our monthly levels of temperature by degree of latitude for the 179 countries. For
most countries this difference takes a positive value between 0◦C and 4◦C.12 Overall, the
correlation between latitude and the predicted temperature change is small. Hence, most
countries will experience an increase in temperature, and all country types (small and
large, rich and poor) will be affected with a similar intensity.13
In the Minimalist scenario, we start from the Intermediate and uniformly decrease the
temperature by 2◦C in all countries, which basically shifts the estimated curve downwards
by 2◦C in Figure 2.1b. Hence, this scenario predicts that the mean surface-temperature
will increase by 0.09◦C over the 21st century, virtually implying the absence of global
warming. The Minimalist scenario roughly corresponds to the most optimistic variant
under RCP-2.6. Similarly, the Maximalist scenario uniformly increases the temperature
by 2◦C in all countries, which shifts the estimated curve upwards by 2◦C. Hence, it
predicts that the mean surface-temperature will increase by 4.09◦C. The Maximalist
scenario roughly corresponds to the median variant under RCP-8.5.
Sea level rise (SLR). – Potentially, the second most serious impact of long-term CLC
is the rise in the sea level. According to IPCC (2014), millions of individuals living at an
altitude of less than one meter will be affected during the 21st century. Predicting changes
in sea level is difficult, because the dynamics of ocean heat uptake and ice sheets/glaciers
are poorly understood. Still, Vermeer and Rahmstorf (2009) developed a methodology
that links global SLR (on time scales of decades to centuries) to global mean temperature.
12Figure 2.1b depicts the temperature difference for values between -2◦C and +10◦C. Three outliers
are not depicted: Russia and Canada include large territories in the northern hemisphere and exhibit
high negative differences, Nepal has high levels of altitude and exhibits very large positive differences.
13In Appendix 2.A.1, we discuss how raw temperature levels are adjusted to account for within-country
disparities in temperature and population density, and how climate windows are linked to the time periods
of our overlapping generations model.
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Figure 2.1: Intermediate CLC scenario (2010-2100)
Notes: Latitude (geographic coordinate) is measured on the X-axis and bubble sizes are proportional to
the population aged 25-64 in the year 2010.
They estimate the SLR for each global temperature scenario of the IPCC involving a
global temperature change above 2◦C. The estimated relationship between the sea-level
variation (SLR) and the global change in the mean surface-temperature (∆T ) is concave
if SLR is forced to be equal to zero for ∆T = 0, and almost linear if SLR(0) is not
specified.14
In the Intermediate temperature scenario (+2.09◦C), this curve implies that the sea
level is expected to rise by 1.1m. Given the gradual change in temperature in our baseline
scenario, the sea level is predicted to rise by 0.78m in 2040, by 0.99m in 2070 and by 1.1m
in 2100. In another study, DeConto and Pollard (2016) model the impact of Antarctic
ice cap on overall SLR. In their reference estimation, they find changes which closely
correspond to our projections: under the RCP-4.5 scenario, they predict a mean elevation
of 1.05m and a confidence interval of ±0.30m, which is very similar to our Intermediate
scenario.
In the Minimalist scenario, we assume a constant sea level. Remember this scenario
also involves constant mean surface temperature. Although it can be considered as unre-
alistic and extreme, we use it as a no-CLC point of reference. In particular, the difference
between the Intermediate and the Minimalist scenario gives valuable information about
the mean expected effects of CLC.
In the Maximalist scenario, the mean surface temperature increases by 4.09◦C. Using
the estimated relationship of Vermeer and Rahmstorf (2009), this involves a 1.3m SLR
by 2100 (0.97m in 2040 and 1.18m in 2070). More extreme scenarios will be considered
in Section 2.4.2.
14It is very well proxied using a log-linear function: SLR = 0.89 + 0.3 ln(∆T ); the R-squared of this
regression equals 0.985. The shape of the function and the proxied observations are depicted in Figure
2.A1b in the Appendix.
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2.2.2 Damage functions
The “damage function” is central to estimating the potential economic implications of
global temperature and sea-level variations. Two channels of transmission are system-
atically accounted for in our simulations. Firstly, we allow changes in temperature to
affect the level of TFP in agriculture and in nonagricuture.15 Secondly, SLR induces
forced displacement of people. This leads to substantial costs as flooded areas are usually
the most densely populated areas in a region.16 More extreme scenarios involving direct
utility losses and conflicts over resources will be considered later. Figure 2.2 illustrates
the heterogeneous TFP responses to CLC, which are treated as exogenous shocks in our
model. Figure 2.3 shows the country-specific shares of population living under 1.1m and
between 1.1 and 1.3m as of the year 2010. Although these shares differ from the long-run
(endogenous) population shares which will be impacted in the course of the 21st century,
they give an indication of the scale of forced displacements induced by SLR.
Temperature and productivity. – To model the effect of temperature, we follow DRH
who estimate an inverted-U shaped relationship between temperature (T ) and total factor
productivity in agriculture and in the manufacturing sector. They include a quadratic
scale factor Gr(T ) in the TFP of sector r that depends on the level of temperature. It
can be expressed as:
Gr(T ) = max
{
g0r + g1rT + g2rT
2; 0
}
where (g0r, g1r, g2r) is a triplet of sector-specific parameters, and r = (a, n) denotes agri-
culture (a) and nonagriculture (n). If g1r > 0 and g2r < 0, the ideal temperature in
sector r is given by T ∗r = − g1r2g2r . The level of TFP increases with temperature in regions
with average temperature below T ∗r ; it decreases with temperature in warmer regions.
Agronomic studies have been used to calibrate the quadratic relationship between
TFP and temperature in agriculture (Mendelsohn et al., 1994; Le, 2010; Lobell and
Burke, 2010). To account for the possibility of adapting to climate change by switching
between crops, DRH estimate the envelope of the quadratic relationships obtained for
different crops. This gives (g0a, g1a, g2a) = (−2.24, 0.308,−0.0073), which implies an
optimal temperature T ∗a of 21.1
◦C. It also implies that agricultural yields are nil when
temperature Ta is below 9.4
◦C or greater than 32.9◦C. Figure 2.2a shows the relationship
between temperature and agricultural productivity, after normalizing the maximal level
of productivity to unity and smoothing Ga(T ) using a Gaussian function to avoid zero-
productivity levels.
To estimate the quadratic relationship in the nonagricultural sector, DRH use data
on population density (a proxy for economic development) by latitude. They consider
1,000 bands of 9.6km each, and estimate the relationship between (smoothed) levels of
population density and temperature. They obtain (g0n, g1n, g2n) = (0.3, 0.08,−0.0023),
15In unreported results, we also accounted for the potential productivity losses due to the rising sea
level. We used the NASA database and estimate of the fraction of land that could be flooded. Using
population and land data, we compared the density of people in flood-risk areas and in the rest of the
region and assume, in line with Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2015), that disparities in population density
reflect disparities in total factor productivity. For each country, we produced region-specific estimates of
the productivity loss caused by the sea-level rise. These productivity losses are small (in countries with
access to the sea, we obtained an average loss of 1.2% in rural regions and of 0.7% in rural regions), either
because the share of population located in flooded areas is small, or because productivity differences are
small. For this reasons, this mechanism is not included in the model.
16On average, low elevation coastal zones (situated at an altitude of less than ten meters) account for
2.2% of dry land and 10.5% of the world population (see McGranahan et al., 2007).
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which gives an optimal temperature T ∗n of 17.4
◦C. The quadratic is compatible with the
findings of Dell and Jones (2014) who show that, on average, industrial output decreases
by 2% for a 1◦C increase in temperature; it is also compatible with specialization and
trade patterns by level of latitude. Although the curve is flatter than in agriculture,
nonagricultural productivity is nil when temperature Tn is below -3
◦C or greater than
38◦C. Figure 2.2b shows the relationship between temperature and nonagricultural pro-
ductivity, after normalizing the maximal level of productivity to unity and smoothing
Gn(T ) using a Gaussian function to avoid zero-productivity levels. For each country and
period, we plug the monthly population-weighted levels of temperature in the period t,
Tm,t, in Ga(.) and Gn(.). We then compute the averages of these TFP levels for each
period t:
Gr,t =
1
12
12∑
m=1
Gr(Tm,t).
Remember that expected variations in temperature are poorly correlated with latitude
(see Figure 2.1b). Nevertheless, the current level of temperature is highly correlated with
latitude (see Figure 2.1a): countries above the 35th parallel have average temperature
levels under 20◦C, while countries at lower latitude have a higher average temperature.
Hence, the very same variation in temperature will induce dramatically different effects
on productivity. Figure 2.2c depicts the predicted percentage variation in agricultural
productivity by latitude caused by the change in temperature between 2010 and 2100 in
the Intermediate scenario. On average, agricultural productivity decreases by 20-25% in
countries close to the equator, and increases by 10-15% at high latitudes. Figure 2.2d
shows the corresponding damage function in the nonagricultural sector. On average,
nonagricultural productivity decreases by 10-15% in countries close to the equator, and
slightly increases at high latitude levels.17
Figure 2.2e and 2.2f compare the variation in productivity implied by the Maximalist
(with respect to the Intermediate) with those implied by the Intermediate scenario (with
respect to the Minimalist). These pairwise comparisons allow visualizing the effect of a
2◦C increase in temperature on productivity starting from different initial temperature
levels. Figure 2.2e depicts the effect of the variations in temperature on agricultural pro-
ductivity. Compared to the Minimalist (no CLC) scenario, the Intermediate (+2.09◦C)
induces a productivity loss of 20% in countries close to the equator, and a gain of 25%
at high latitudes. And compared to the Intermediate, the Maximalist scenario (another
+2◦C) results in slightly greater losses. Figure 2.2f focuses on non-agricultural produc-
tivity. Compared to the Minimalist scenario, the Intermediate (+2◦C) induces a produc-
tivity loss of 10-15% in countries close to the equator, and a gain of 5% for countries at
high latitudes. Compared to the Intermediate, the Maximalist scenario results in similar
damages.
SLR and forced displacements. – To proxy the number of people affected by SLR, we
need to determine the fraction of the population living in low-lying coastal areas. We use
the NASA database on the distribution of the population by elevation, by country and
by region type (urban versus rural). We assume rural regions are totally specialized in
agriculture and urban regions only produce nonagricultural goods. For each country, we
produce region-specific estimates of the fraction of population living under 1.1m using a
4-parameter interpolation of the NASA data. The world map in Figure 2.3a illustrates
17Both graphs include the 3-order polynomial trend, which gives an R-squared of 0.33 for the agricul-
tural sector and 0.41 for the nonagricultural sector.
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Figure 2.2: CLC and TFP by latitude
Notes: On Figure 2.2c to 2.2f, latitude (geographic coordinate) is measured on the X-axis, percentage
deviations are measures on the Y-axis, and bubble sizes are proportional to the population aged 25-64
in the year 2010. We measure deviations as (Intermediate-Minimalist)/Minimalist on Figure 2.2e and
(Maximalist-Intermediate)/Intermediate on Figure 2.2f.
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the resulting percentage of the population by country in the year 2010 living in low-lying
areas. About 70 million people aged 25 to 64 were living under 1.1m in that year. They
will be close to 80 million in 2040. On the map, countries are grouped into ten bins, each
bin corresponding to a population share living in low-lying areas. In a few countries the
percentage of population living below 1.1m is larger than 10%. This is the case for less
than 7.3% of the countries. For less than 19% of the countries the percentage value is
larger than 5%.
Overall, the map shows that the more affected countries are not necessarily the poor-
est. SLR mostly affects countries with a large share of population located along the
coasts of all seas and oceans, or in the major river deltas and estuaries. The percentage
value equals 89.1% in the Netherlands. This share is large in South Asian and East Asian
countries. Some Pacific islands situated a few centimeters above sea level (e.g., Tuvalu,
Kiribati) are in a position of extreme vulnerability. This indicates that both rich and
poor countries would be adversely affected by a SLR. It would certainly be an exaggera-
tion to consider that these roughly 80 million individuals will all migrate internationally
in the near future. Some of them will move to another region or country. Others will
relocate within the same region or invest to build sea defences (especially in high-income
countries).
Finally, Figure 2.3b depicts the share of the population living between 1.1 and 1.3m
of elevation in 2010. As in Figure 2.3a, countries are grouped by the size of their share
into ten groups. Overall, the population share is small. The share is smaller than 10% in
all countries, and exceeds 5% only in a handful of countries. The largest share is obtained
in the Netherlands, with a value equal to 8%.
2.3 Model
We construct an overlapping generations model of the world economy that depicts a set
of countries and regions populated by two period-lived agents (children and adults). One
period is meant to represent the active life of one generation (30 years) and we ignore
the retirement period for simplicity. There are two types of adults at each period, with
s = (h, l) denoting college-educated workers (h) and the less educated (l). In virtually
all countries, college graduates are more migratory than the less educated.
Our framework is similar to Delogu et al. (2018) but relies on different technological
assumptions, and includes two sectors/regions with heterogeneous productivity, with r =
(a, n) denoting agriculture (a) and nonagriculture (n), in each country. For simplicity, we
assume that firms in both sectors produce the same good. Contrary to DRH or Shayegh
(2017), we thus disregard variations in the relative price of the agricultural good, and
we normalize the price of the single good to unity. In theory, changes in relative price
can mitigate or reinforce the effect of CLC. DRH show that CLC has uncertain effects
on the relative price because it induces a rise in agricultural productivity in the North
and a decline in the South.18 In addition, the previous chapter shows that responses to
productivity and migration policy reforms are quantitatively similar when considering
18Considering goods as heterogeneous in a small open economy context, variations in the relative price
of the agricultural good can mitigate or reinforce the urbanization process. It mitigates it if CLC decreases
the share of agriculture in the world total output (i.e., if the output loss in low-latitude countries exceeds
the output gain in the North). In the benchmark scenario of DRH (Figure 4), changes in relative price
are small. If the relative price of agricultural goods increases, the migration responsiveness predicted by
our model can be considered as an upper-bound.
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Figure 2.3: Forced displacements in the moderate scenarios
Notes: Own calculations based on NASA population data.
that agricultural and nonagricultural goods are identical or imperfect substitutes as in
Boppart (2014).
Compared to Chapter 1, our model in this chapter formalizes the link between CLC
and the productivity gap between regions. We add another source of heterogeneity. Each
region consists of two areas of time-varying size, with b = (f, d) denoting the flooded area
(f) and the unflooded/dry area (d). The model endogenizes the levels of productivity of
both sectors/regions as a function of the level of temperature, of rising sea level, and of
the average level of schooling of the resident workers. There is no economic activity and
no one can live in the flooded area.
Adults are the only decision makers. They maximize their well-being and decide where
to live, how much to consume, and how much to invest in the quantity and quality of their
children. As far as the location decision is concerned, each new adult decides whether to
stay in the region where he grew up (if the area of birth does not get flooded), to move
locally within the same region (if the area of birth gets flooded), to emigrate to the other
region within the same country, or to emigrate abroad. This choice depends on economic
disparities between regions and countries, on moving costs, on the area type, as well as on
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the direct effect of temperature on utility. Fertility and education decisions are governed
by a warm-glow motive. Adults directly value the quality and quantity of children. It
follows that the dynamic structure of the model is totally recursive. In this section, we
describe our technological and preference assumptions, we derive the profit- and utility-
maximization conditions, and we define the world-economy intertemporal equilibrium.
2.3.1 Technology
Production is only feasible in the unflooded area of each region r. We assume that output
is proportional to labor in efficiency units.19 Each country is characterized by a pair of
CES (constant elasticity of substitution) production functions with two types of labor
(as in Gollin et al., 2014b, or Vollrath, 2009). The output level in region r at time t is
given by:
Yr,t = Ar,t
(∑
s
ηr,s,t`
σr−1
σr
r,s,t
) σr
σr−1 ∀t, r, (2.1)
where Ar,t denotes the productivity scale factor in sector r at time t (referred to as
TFP henceforth), ηr,s,t is a sector-specific variable governing the relative productivity of
workers of type s (such that ηr,h,t + ηr,l,t = 1), and σr is the sector-specific elasticity of
substitution between the two types of worker. The number of adult workers of type s
employed in region r at time t is denoted by `r,s,t, which differs from the total population,
Lr,s,t (as explained below)
Wage rates are determined by the marginal productivity of labor and there is no
involuntary unemployment. This yields:
wr,s′,t = Ar,t
(∑
s
ηr,s,t`
σr−1
σr
r,s,t
) 1
σr−1
ηr,s′,t`
−1
σr
r,s′,t ∀s′, t, r. (2.2)
It follows that the wage ratio between high-skilled and low-skilled workers in region
r is given by:
Γwr,t ≡
wr,h,t
wr,l,t
= Γηr,t
(
Γ`r,t
)−1
σr ∀t, r, (2.3)
where Γ`r,t ≡ `r,h,t`r,l,t is the skill ratio in the labor force of region r at time t, and Γ
η
r,t ≡ ηr,h,tηr,l,t
measures the skill bias in relative productivity.
Two types of technological externality are factored in. First, we assume that the
TFP level in each sector depends on the level of temperature and on the average level of
schooling of workers. We have:
Ar,t = γ
tArG(Tr,t)Z(Γ
`
r,t) ∀t, r, (2.4)
where γt is a time trend in productivity which is common to all countries (γ > 1), Ar
is the exogenous component of TFP in region r (reflecting exogenous factors such as the
proportion of arable land, soil fertility, land ruggedness, etc.), G(Tr,t) is the inverted-U
shaped function of temperature described in Section 2.2.2, and Z(Γ`r,t) a simple Lucas-type
aggregate externality (see Lucas 1988) capturing the fact that college-educated workers
facilitate innovation and the adoption of advanced technologies. We assume Z(Γ`r,t) =
19Such a model without physical capital features a globalized economy with a common international
interest rate. This hypothesis is in line with Kennan (2013) or Klein and Ventura (2009) who assume
that capital ”chases” labor.
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Γ`r,t
)r
is a concave function of the skill-ratio in the resident labor force, where r ∈ (0, 1)
is the sector-specific elasticity of TFP to the skill-ratio in sector r.
Second, we assume a directed, skill-biased technical change. As the technology im-
proves, the relative productivity of college-educated workers increases, and this is par-
ticularly the case in the nonagricultural sector (Acemoglu, 2002; Restuccia and Vanden-
broucke, 2013). For example, Autor et al. (2003) show that computerization is associated
with declining relative industry demand for routine manual and cognitive tasks, and in-
creased relative demand for nonroutine cognitive tasks. The observed relative demand
shift favors college versus non-college labor. We write:
Γηr,t = Γ
η
r
(
Γ`r,t
)κr ∀t, r, (2.5)
where Γ
η
r is an exogenous term, and κr ∈ (0, 1) is the sector-specifc elasticity of the
skill-bias to the skill-ratio in sector r.
2.3.2 Preferences
The number of new native adults of type s at time t is denoted by Nr,s,t. Depending on
the elevation structure of the region and on the sea-level rise, part of the region may be
flooded at the beginning of the period. If so, a fraction Θr,t of the native population is
forced to leave. We denote the number of forcibly displaced people by N fr,s,t = Θr,tNr,s,t,
and the rest of the native population as Ndr,s,t = (1−Θr,t)Nr,s,t. Only the latter may decide
not to move. New adults make consumption, fertility, education and migration decisions
in early adult life. As illustrated on Figure 2.4, those who grew up in the unflooded area
of the region have the choice between staying in the region (at no cost), emigrating to
another region r′ within the same country (requiring an effort xrr′), or emigrating to an
OECD country (requiring an effort xrF ). Individuals who grew up in the flooded area
have the possibility to relocate in the same region (from the flooded to the unflooded
area). They lose their residential capital and incur a monetary cost that corresponds to
a fraction B of their lifetime income. They can also emigrate to another region or to
another country at the same cost as those who grew up in the unflooded area.
r
Unflooded area Flooded area
xrr′0 xrF xrr′B xrF
Region
Don’t
move Abroad Region
Relocate
locally Abroad
Figure 2.4: Movement decisions
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Individuals raised in unflooded areas
We first focus on individuals who grew up in the unflooded area (d) of their region of
birth. Individual decisions to emigrate result from the comparison of discrete alternatives,
staying in the region of birth, emigrating to the other region, or to a foreign country. To
model these decisions, we use a logarithmic outer utility function with a deterministic
and a random component. The utility of an adult of type s, born in the unflooded area
of region r∗, moving to the unflooded area of region/country r is given by:
Udr∗r,s,t = ln v
d
r,s,t + ln(1− xr∗r,s,t) + ξdr∗r,s,t ∀s, t, r∗, r (2.6)
where vdr,s,t ∈ R is the deterministic level of utility that can be reached in the location r
at period t (governed by the inner utility function described below), xr∗r,s,t ≤ 1 captures
the effort required to migrate from region r∗ to location r (such that xr∗r∗,s,t = 0).
Migration costs are exogenous; they vary across location pairs, across education levels,
and over time. The individual-specific random taste shock for moving from country r∗
to r is denoted by ξdr∗r,s,t ∈ R and follows an iid Type-I Extreme Value distribution with
a common scale parameter µ > 0 (this scale parameter governs the responsiveness of
migration decisions to changes in vdr,s,t and xr∗r,s,t). Although ξ
d
r∗r,s,t is individual-specific,
we omit individual subscripts for notational convenience.
In line with Galor and Weil (2000), Galor (2011), de la Croix and Doepke (2003,
2004), the inner utility ln vdr,s,t is a function of the climate conditions in region r at time t
(Tr,t),
20 consumption (cdr,s,t), fertility (n
d
r,s,t) and the probability that each child becomes
highly skilled (pdr,s,t):
ln vdr,s,t = ln(1− τr,t) + ln cdr,s,t + θ ln
(
ndr,s,tp
d
r,s,t
) ∀s, t, r, (2.7)
where θ ∈ (0, 1) is a preference parameter for the quantity and quality of children, and
τr,t is a possible utility loss directly caused by CLC (see Section 2.4.2).
The probability that a child becomes high-skilled increases with the share of time that
is spent in education (qdr,s,t):
pdr,s,t =
(
pir + q
d
r,s,t
)λ ∀s, t, r, (2.8)
where pir is an exogenous parameter that is region-specific and λ governs the elasticity of
knowledge acquisition to education investment.
A type-s adult in region r receives a wage rate wr,s,t per unit of time worked. Raising
a child requires a time cost φ (thereby reducing the labor market participation rate), and
each unit of time spent by a child in education incurs a cost equal to Er,t. The budget
constraint writes as:
cdr,s,t = wr,s,t(1− φndr,s,t)− ndr,s,tqdr,s,tEr,t. (2.9)
It follows that the labor supply of each type-s adult in region r at time t is given by:
`dr,s,t = 1− φndr,s,t. (2.10)
In the following sub-sections, we solve the optimization problem backward. We first
determine the optimal fertility rate and investment in education in a given location r,
20E.g., the effect of temperature on health, drudgery of work, etc.
66 CHAPTER 2. CLIMATE CHANGE, INEQUALITY, AND MIGRATION
which characterizes the optimal level of utility, vdr,s,t, that can be reached in any location.
We then characterize the choice of the optimal location.
Education and fertility. – Each adult in region r maximizes her utility (2.7) subject to
the constraints (2.8) and (2.9). Solving the system of first-order conditions for an interior
solution gives: {
qdr,s,t =
λφwr,s,t−pirEr,t
(1−λ)Er,t
ndr,s,t =
θ(1−λ)
1+θ
· wr,s,t
φwr,s,t−pirEr,t
∀s, t, r. (2.11)
The cost of education is assumed to be proportional to the wage of high-skilled work-
ers in the region, multiplied by a fixed, region-specific factor ψr,t (capturing education
policy/quality, population density, average distance to schools, etc.):
Er,t = ψr,twr,h,t ∀r, s. (2.12)
The deterministic indirect utility function can be obtained by substituting the first-
order conditions into (2.7). This yields:
ln vdr,h,t = χr,t + ln (wr,h,t)− θλ ln (ψr,t)− θ(1− λ) ln (φ− pirψr,t)
ln vr,l,t = χr,t + ln (wr,l,t)− θλ ln (ψr,t)− θ(1− λ) ln
(
φ− pirψr,tΓwr,t
)
+ ln
(
φ(1+θλ(1−1/Γwr,t))−pirψr,tΓwr,t(1+θ(1−1/Γwr,t))
φ−pirψr,tΓwr,t
) (2.13)
where χr,t = ln(1 − τr,t) + θ ln
(
θ
1+θ
(1− λ)1−λλλ) − ln(1 + θ) include the direct effect of
CLC on utility (τr,t).
Migration. – Given their taste characteristics (captured by ξ), each individual chooses
the location that maximizes her/his utility, defined in Equation (2.6). Under the Type I
Extreme Value distribution with scale µ for ξ, McFadden (1974) shows that the emigration
rate from region r∗ to a particular destination r is governed by a logit expression. The
emigration rate is given by:
Mdr∗r,s,t
Ndr∗,s,t
=
exp
(
ln vdr,s,t+ln(1−xr∗r,s,t)
µ
)
∑
k exp
(
ln vdk,s,t+ln(1−xr∗k,s,t)
µ
) = (vdr,s,t)1/µ(1− xr∗r,s,t)1/µ∑
k(v
d
k,s,t)
1/µ(1− xr∗k,s,t)1/µ .
Skill-specific emigration rates are endogenous and comprised between 0 and 1. In-
dividuals that grew up in region n (respectively a) have the choice between staying in
their region of origin n (respectively a), moving to the other region a (respectively n), or
emigrating to a foreign country F . The emigration rates from r∗ to a particular destina-
tion r depend on the utiliy levels attainable in all regions k of the world. The choice to
emigrate internally or internationally are thus interdependent.
Staying rates (Mdr∗r∗,s,t/N
d
r∗,s,t) are governed by the same logit model. It follows that
the emigrant-to-stayer ratio (mr∗r,s,t) is governed by the following expression:
mdr∗r,s,t ≡
Mdr∗r,s,t
Mdr∗r∗,s,t
=
(
vdr,s,t
vdr∗,s,t
)1/µ
(1− xr∗r,s,t)1/µ. (2.14)
Equation (2.14) is a gravity-like migration equation, which states that the ratio of
emigrants from region r∗ to location r to stayers in region r∗ (i.e., individuals born in r∗
who remain in r∗), is an increasing function of the utility achievable in the destination
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location r and a decreasing function of the utility attainable in r∗. The proportion of
migrants from r∗ to r also decreases with the bilateral migration cost xr∗r,s,t. Labor is
not perfectly mobile across sectors/regions; internal migration costs (xan,s,t and xna,s,t)
capture all private costs that migrants must incur to move between regions. In line with
Young (2013), internal mobility is driven by self-selection (i.e., skill-specific disparities in
utility across regions as well as heterogeneity in individual unobserved characteristics).
Similarly, international migration costs (xaF,s,t and xnF,s,t) capture private costs and the
legal/visa costs imposed by the destination countries. They are also assumed to be
exogenous. Heterogeneity in migration tastes implies that emigrants select all destinations
for which xr∗r,s,t < 1 (if xr∗r,s,t=1, the corridor is empty).
Forcibly displaced people
Individuals raised in the flooded area of region r∗ (denoted by the superscript f) are
forced to move. If they relocate into the unflooded area of their region of birth r∗, they
face a relocation cost equivalent to a fraction B of their lifetime income. Hence, their
budget constraints write as:
cfr∗,s,t = (1−B)wr∗,s,t(1− φnfr∗,s,t)− nfr∗,s,tqfr∗,s,tEr,t.
This relocation cost affects their fertility rate (nfr∗,s,t), investment in education (q
f
r∗,s,t)
and consumption level (cfr∗,s,t). Their labor supply is given by `
f
r,s,t = 1− φnfr,s,t. Hence,
the utility of staying in the region becomes:
ln vfr∗,h,t = χr∗,t + ln (wr∗,h,t) + ln(1−B)− θλ ln (ψr∗,t)− θ(1− λ) ln (φ− pir∗ψr∗,t)
ln vfr∗,l,t = χr∗,t + ln (wr∗,l,t) + ln(1−B)− θλ ln (ψr∗,t)− θ(1− λ) ln
(
φ− pirψr,t Γ
w
r,t
1−B
)
+ ln
(
φ(1+θλ(1−(1−B)/Γwr,t))−pirψr,t(1+θ(1−(1−B)/Γwr,t))Γwr,t/(1−B)
φ−pirψr,tΓwr,t/(1−B)
)
.
It follows that the emigrant-to-stayer ratio (mfr∗r,s,t) for forcibly displaced people is
governed by:
mfr∗r,s,t ≡
M fr∗r,s,t
M fr∗r∗,s,t
=
(
vdr,s,t
vfr∗,s,t
)1/µ
(1− xr∗r,s,t)1/µ
Since vfr∗,s,t < v
d
r∗,s,t, forcibly displaced people tend to migrate more than those who
grew up in unflooded regions.
2.3.3 Dynamics and intertemporal equilibrium
We can characterize the equilibrium structure of the resident population in the unflooded
area of the region ∀s, t, r:21
Ln,s,t =
Ndn,s,t
1+mna,s,t+mnf,s,t
+
Nfn,s,t
1+mfna,s,t+m
f
nf,s,t
+
man,s,tNda,s,t
1+man,s,t+maf,s,t
+
mfan,s,tN
f
a,s,t
1+mfan,s,t+m
f
af,s,t
La,s,t =
Nda,s,t
1+man,s,t+maf,s,t
+
Nfa,s,t
1+mfan,s,t+m
f
af,s,t
+
mna,s,tNdn,s,t
1+mna,s,t+mnf,s,t
+
mfna,s,tN
f
n,s,t
1+mfna,s,t+m
f
nf,s,t
. (2.15)
21In the OECD member states, these variables should be supplemented by the the inflow of immigrants,
Ir,s,t. For simplicity, we assume that the distribution of immigrants by destination is time-invariant,
calibrated on the year 2010. Equation (2.14) also determines the outflow of international migrants by
education level.
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The total labor supply is given by:
`n,s,t =
Ndn,s,t`
d
n,s,t
1+mna,s,t+mnf,s,t
+
Nfn,s,t`
f
n,s,t
1+mfna,s,t+m
f
nf,s,t
+
man,s,tNda,s,t`
d
n,s,t
1+man,s,t+maf,s,t
+
mfan,s,tN
f
a,s,t`
d
n,s,t
1+mfan,s,t+m
f
af,s,t
`a,s,t =
Nda,s,t`
d
a,s,t
1+man,s,t+maf,s,t
+
Nfa,s,t`
f
a,s,t
1+mfan,s,t+m
f
af,s,t
+
mna,s,tNdn,s,t`
d
a,s,t
1+mna,s,t+mnf,s,t
+
mfna,s,tN
f
n,s,t`
d
a,s,t
1+mfna,s,t+m
f
nf,s,t
. (2.16)
Together with the number and structure of the resident population at time t, fertility
and education decisions (nbr,s,t, q
b
r,s,t ∀r, b, s) determine the size and structure of the native
population before migration (Nr,s,t+1 ∀r, s) at time t+ 1. For all t, r, we have:
Nn,h,t+1 =∑
s
[
Ndn,s,tn
d
n,s,tp
d
n,h,t
1+mna,s,t+mnf,s,t
+
Nfn,s,tn
f
n,s,tp
f
n,h,t
1+mfna,s,t+m
f
nf,s,t
+
man,s,tNda,s,tn
d
n,s,tp
d
n,h,t
1+man,s,t+maf,s,t
+
mfan,s,tN
f
a,s,tn
d
n,s,tp
d
n,h,t
1+mfan,s,t+m
f
af,s,t
]
Na,h,t+1 =∑
s
[
Nda,s,tn
d
a,s,tp
d
a,h,t
1+man,s,t+maf,s,t
+
Nfa,s,tn
f
a,s,tp
f
a,h,t
1+mfan,s,t+m
f
af,s,t
+
mna,s,tNdn,s,tn
d
a,s,tp
d
a,h,t
1+mna,s,t+mnf,s,t
+
mfna,s,tN
f
n,s,tn
d
a,s,tp
d
a,h,t
1+mfna,s,t+m
f
nf,s,t
] .(2.17)
Similar expressions characterize the evolution of the low-skilled population, except that
pbr,s,t must be replaced by (1− pbr,s,t) on the numerator of each term.
An intertemporal equilibrium for the world economy can be defined as following:
Definition 2.1 For a set {γ, θ, λ, φ, µ,B} of common parameters, a set {σr, r, κr} of
sector-specific elasticities, a set
{
Ar,t,Γ
η
r,t, xr∗r,s,t, ψr, pir
}
of country- and region-specific
exogenous characteristics, and a set {Nr,s,0} of predetermined variables, an intertemporal
equilibrium is a set {Ar,t, ηr,h,t, wr,s,t, nr,s,t, qr,s,t, vr,s,t, Er,t,mr∗r,s,t, Nr,s,t+1, Lr,s,t, `r,s,t} of
endogenous variables, which simultaneously satisfies technological constraints (2.4), (2.5)
and (2.12), profit maximization conditions (2.2), utility maximization conditions (2.11),
(2.13) and (2.14) in all countries and regions of the world, and such that the equilibrium
structure and dynamics of population satisfy (2.15), (2.16) and (2.17).
The equilibrium level of the other variables described above (in particular, Γ`r,t, Γ
η
r,t,
Γwr,t as well as urbanization rates and international migration outflows and inflows) can
be computed as a by-product of the reduced set of endogenous variables. Note that
equilibrium wage rates are obtained by substituting the labor force variables into the
wage equation (2.2), thereby assuming full employment. By the Walras law, the market
for goods is automatically balanced.
2.3.4 Parameterization
In this section, we describe our parameterization strategy for 145 developing countries
and for the entire set of 34 OECD countries modeled as a single entity.22 We use socio-
demographic and economic data for 1980 and 2010, as well as socio-demographic prospects
for the year 2040. For each country, our baseline trajectory matches the recent trends in
human capital accumulation, income disparities, and population movements (including
internal and international migrations). Table 2.1 summarizes the calibration outcomes.
22With the exceptions of Macao, North-Korea, Somalia and Taiwan, all countries that are not covered
by our sample have less than 100,000 inhabitants.
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Data. – We collect data on the socio-demographic and economic characteristics of
179 countries in the years 1980 and 2010. We use data on national Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) for all countries from the Economic Research Service of the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA).23 Data on the agriculture share in the value added
are taken from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAOSTAT). As for
the structure of the resident labor force by education level and by sector, we use the
estimates described in detail in the previous chapter. Data on wages by education level
are obtained from Biavaschi et al. (2016) for the nonagricultural sector, and from the
Gallup World Polls for the agricultural sector.
We model international migration to OECD countries only. From the Database on
Immigrants in OECD and non-OECD countries (DIOC), we extract the number of emi-
grants by education level to OECD countries for all countries in our sample and for the
year 2010. The DIOC does not identify the region of origin of migrants (urban versus
rural). However, for the majority of countries in our sample, skill- and region-specific
information on the desire to emigrate can be extracted from the Gallup World Polls.
Assuming the structure of migration aspirations is identical to the structure of actual
emigration stocks, we split the number of emigrants to OECD countries by region of
origin and by education level. As for urbanization, net internal migration is then the dif-
ference between the ”before-migration” population (Nr,s,2010) in 2010 and the sum of the
resident population and the international migrants (
∑
r,s(Lr,s,2010 +Mrf,s,2010)) in 2010.
To proxy the average fertility rate (n1980), we divide the total native population of
adults in 2010 (
∑
r,sNr,s,2010) by the resident population of adults in 1980 (
∑
r,s Lr,s,1980).
24
Moreover, our calibration requires data on the skill- and region-specific fertility for each
country. By construction, we have nt ≡
∑
r,s Lr,s,tnr,s,t/
∑
r,s Lr,s,t. We use the Gallup
World Polls and extract the Gallup-based average number of children per household in
urban and rural regions by skill level for 2010. We compute the fertility of the college
educated workers by fitting the sector-specific, low/high-skilled fertility differentials from
the Gallup database. In this way, we obtain the fertility rates for each country for the
year 1980. From 2010 onwards, the number of children is endogenous.
Technological parameters. – Output in each sector depends on the size and skill
structure of employment. To calibrate the set of technological parameters, we proceed in
two steps.
First, we calibrate the parameters affecting the private returns to higher education.
For each sector, we combine our estimates for `r,s,t with cross-country data on the in-
come gap between college graduates and the less educated. We calibrate the elasticity
of substitution between college graduates and less educated workers relying on existing
studies. As for the nonagricultural sector, there is a large number of influential papers
that propose specific estimates for industrialized countries (i.e., countries where the em-
ployment share of agriculture is small). Ottaviano and Peri (2012) suggest setting σn
close to 2.0. As for the agricultural sector, it is usually assumed that the elasticity of
substitution is much larger. For example, Vollrath (2009) or Lucas (2009) assume perfect
substitution between skill groups. In line with the existing literature, we assume σn = 2
and σa = ∞. Once the elasticities are chosen, we use our proxies for Γwr,t and Γηr,t using
(2.3). Regressing the log of Γηr,t on the log of Γ
`
r,t yields an insignificant effect in agri-
23For a few missing observations we impute values by making use of the Maddison database and data
from the World Bank.
24There is no mortality in the model. The average fertility rate at time t, nt, should be seen as a net
population growth rate.
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culture, and a correlation of 0.38 in nonagriculture. We thus rule out the possibility of
skill-biased technical change in agriculture (κa = 0), and assume a linear technology with
a constant Γηa,t = Γ
η
a,t = 1.3 for all countries and all periods. The value of Γ
$
a is given
by the population-weighted average of Γwa , leading to $a = 0.57. In nonagriculture, we
assume that half the correlation is due to the skill-bias externality (i.e., κn = 0.19), and
we calibrate Γ
$
n as a residual from (2.5).
In the second step, we use data on income by sector in the year 2010 and identify the
TFP levels (Ar,t) as a residual from Equation (2.1). There is a clear positive relationship
between TFP and the skill ratio in both sectors. Indeed, regressing the log of Ar,t on the
log of Γ`r,t gives a coefficient of 0.57 in the nonagricultural sector, and 0.66 in agriculture.
We assume that half the correlation between TFP and the share of college-educated
workers is due to the schooling externality (i.e., n = 0.28 and a = 0.33). We calibrate
An as a residual from (2.4).
Preference parameters. – The literature indicates some common values of several
preference parameters. We assign the following values to the parameters that are time-
invariant and equal for all countries: θ = 0.25, λ = 0.5 and φ = 0.14.25 From (2.13) and
(2.14), the scale parameter of the distribution of migration tastes (µ) is the inverse of the
elasticity of bilateral migration to the wage rate. Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga
(2013) find a value between 0.6 and 0.7 for this elasticity. Hence, we use µ = 1.4.
The parameters pir and ψr,t affect the fertility and education decisions. We calibrate
them to match the population dynamics between the years 1980 and 2010, i.e., the tran-
sition from the resident population in 1980 and the native population in 2010. From
Equations (2.11) and (2.12), the fertility rate in the model depends on the product of
pirψr,t. Once fertility rates are matched we are able to identify the product pirψr,t. We then
calibrate pir and ψr,t in order to match the educational structure of the native population
in 2010, imposing the given value to the ratio of probabilities of becoming high-skilled
across regions.
As for internal migration costs, we assume there is only migration from rural to urban
regions (i.e., xan,s,t < 1 and xna,s,t = 1). We obtain internal migration costs for rural-
urban migration from Equation (2.14). In order to determine the international migration
costs (xaf,s,t and xnf,s,t), we begin by retrieving the utilities achievable abroad. We set
these utilities equal to the skill-specific weighted average utilities of the OECD countries.
The weights consist in the respective population sizes of the OECD countries. We then
obtain the international migration costs from Equation (2.14).
To the best of our knowledge, there is no information on the relative income loss expe-
rienced by individuals which are displaced by floods. However, in cases of armed conflicts,
Fiala (2015) finds that displaced households incur a loss of consumption ranging between
28% and 35%. For Columbia, Ibanez and Moya (2006) find that a displacement is as-
sociated with a loss of 50% of income. Kellenberg and Mobarak (2011) characterize the
willingness to pay for investments in disaster prevention to around 24% of income. We
use these studies to proxy the expected income loss due to a climate-driven froced dis-
placement. Given this micro evidence, we pessimistically assume B = 0.5 (i.e., relocating
within the region of birth induces an income loss equal to 50% of the lifetime income).
25Given the expression in (2.9), this assumption reflects setting the bound of the maximal number of
children equal to 7 (i.e., 14 children per couple). See Docquier et al. (2016) for a brief review of studies
using similar parameter values.
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Table 2.1: Common and country-specific parameters
Description Mean s.d. Source/Moment matches
Parameters without country variations
σn Elast. subst. in nonagr. 2.00 - Ottaviano & Peri (2012)
σa Elast. subst. in agr. ∞ - Vollrath (2009) or Lucas (2009)
n Aggregate externality in nonagr. 0.28 - Half correl. betw. lnAn,t & lnΓ
`
n,t
n Aggregate externality in agr. 0.33 - Half correl. betw. lnAa,t & lnΓ
`
a,t
κn Skill-biased externality in nonagr. 0.19 - Half correl. betw. lnΓ
η
n,t & lnΓ
`
n,t
κa Skill-biased externality in agr. 0.00 - Half correl. betw. lnΓ
η
a,t & lnΓ
`
a,t
θ Preference for children 0.25 - Docquier et al. (2016)
λ Elast. training technology 0.50 - Docquier et al. (2016)
φ Time to raise a child 0.14 - Docquier et al. (2016)
µ 1/Elast. mig. to wages 1.40 - Bertoli & Ferna´ndez-Huertas
Moraga (2013)
B Income loss due to forced displ. 0.50 - Fiala (2015) or
Ibanez & Moya (2006)
Parameters with some country variations
An Scale factor in TFP 216,969 267,723 Residual from (2.4)
Aa Scale factor in TFP 89,025 320,698 Residual from (2.4)
Γ
η
n Scale factor in skill bias 1.878 - Residual from (2.3)
Γ
η
a Scale factor in skill bias 1.326 - Residual from (2.3)
pin Scale factor training technology 0.025 0.041 Match fertility/educ. in (2.11)
pia Scale factor training technology 0.043 0.142 Match fertility/educ. in (2.11)
ψn Education cost 13.74 67.27 Match fertility/educ. in (2.11)
ψa Education cost 46.22 148.98 Match fertility/educ. in (2.11)
xan,h Internal mig. cost, high-skilled 0.712 1.989 Match urbanization (WDI)
xan,l Internal mig. cost, low-skilled 0.928 0.163 Match urbanization (WDI)
xnf,h International mig. cost, high-skilled 0.416 4.422 Match migration data (DIOC)
xaf,h International mig. cost, high-skilled 0.829 1.065 Match migration data (DIOC)
xnf,l International mig. cost, low-skilled 0.947 0.281 Match migration data (DIOC)
xaf,l International mig. cost, low-skilled 0.985 0.066 Match migration data (DIOC)
Projections. – The philosophy of our baseline projection exercise is to predict the fu-
ture trends in income, population and human capital if all parameters remain constant,
with the exception of the parameters governing access to education. More precisely,
we constrain our baseline trajectory to be compatible with medium-term official demo-
graphic projections, as reflected by the UN projections of the national adult population
and proportion of college graduates for the year 2040. Hence, we allow for country-specific
proportional adjustments in ψr,t (r = a, n) (i.e., the same relative change in both sectors)
that minimizes the sum of squared differences in population and human capital between
the baseline simulations and the UN projections for the year 2040. Remember ψr,t deter-
mines the cost of education in the region. Comparing the new levels of ψr,2010 with those
obtained in 1980 (i.e., ψr,1980), we identify a conditional convergence process in the access
to education. We see it as a likely consequence of the Millennium Development policy.
We estimate two quadratic, region-specific convergence equations considering the US as
the benchmark frontier: ln (ψr,t+1/ψr,t) = αr + βr ln
(
ψUSAr,t /ψr,t
)
+ γr
(
ln
(
ψUSAr,t /ψr,t
))2
.
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We obtain γa = 0.032, γn = 0.046, βa = −0.195 and βn = −0.223, where all parameters
are highly significant.
For subsequent years, our baseline scenario assumes a continuation of this quadratic
convergence process, in line with the new Sustainable Development Agenda. Under this
assumption, the previous chapter shows that the model simulations fit the official socio-
demographic projections very well. This is a proof of concept that such a stylized model
does a good job in generating realistic projections of population, human capital, and
urbanization.
2.4 Results
In Section 2.4.1, we focuses on the three moderate CLC scenarios and study their eco-
nomic and demographic impacts. Then, Section 2.4.2 discusses the results obtained under
more extreme CLC scenarios. Finally, Section 2.4.3 discusses the role of international mi-
gration policies in limiting the inequality and poverty implications of CLC.
2.4.1 Impact under moderate scenarios
We first consider the three moderate scenarios (Intermediate, Minimalist and Maximalist)
defined in Section 2.2.1, and discuss the worldwide effects of CLC on income per capita,
income inequality, population, human capital, urbanization and international migration.
Then, we highlight the cross-country heterogeneity in the effect of CLC before quantifying
internal and international migration responses.
Aggregate effects on the world economy. – The effects on the world economy are
depicted in Figure 2.5. The worldwide responses are the weighted averages of the positive
and negative effects observed in high-income and developing countries.
We first compare our Intermediate scenario (continuous black curve) to the Minimalist
(dotted black curve) and to the Maximalist (dotted grey curve). CLC slightly increases
the worldwide level of income per worker (Figure 2.5a), but makes the world distribution
of income more unequal (Figure 2.5b). The former result is due to multiple factors. First,
higher temperature levels induce positive changes in TFP at high levels of latitude (where
income per worker is initially higher) and negative changes in TFP close to the equator
(where income per worker initially is lower). Second, in developing countries, CLC reallo-
cates people from lower-productivity rural regions to higher-productivity urban regions,
as illustrated in Figure 2.5e. Third, CLC reallocates people from poorer countries to
richer countries, as illustrated in Figure 2.5f. The effects on the world population size
and on the share of college graduates are small, as illustrated in Figure 2.5c and 2.5d. The
mobility responses to CLC are slightly non linear: the difference between the Maximalist
and Intermediate scenarios slightly exceeds the difference between the Intermediate and
the Minimalist ones. On the contrary, the effects on income per worker and inequality
are almost identical.
Country-specific effects. – The country-specific effects of CLC are depicted in Figure
2.6. For the projected numbers in the year 2100 we report the relative differences between
the Intermediate and the Minimalist scenarios (black bubbles), as well as the relative
differences between the Maximalist and the Intermediate scenarios (grey bubbles). Third-
degree polynomial trends are represented in black and grey, respectively. Bubble sizes are
proportional to the adult population size of each country in 2010. Figure 2.6a shows that
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Figure 2.5: Aggregate effects of CLC on the world economy
Notes: Simulation results based on the moderate CLC scenarios defined in Section 2.2.1.
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CLC decreases income per worker by 15% in countries close to the equator, and increases
it by 10% at high levels of latitude. Hence, the income gap between the richest and
poorest countries increases by 25% in the course of the 21st century. Given the assumed
timing of CLC, unreported results reveal that most of the effect occurs in the first half
of the century. Assuming more gradual CLC, results would be different.
In developing countries, the negative effect on income is resulting from three mecha-
nisms (in line with worldwide aggregate effects). The first one is the fall in TFP in both
sectors, documented in Figure 2.2. The second effect is the rise in urbanization in Figure
2.6c, which attenuates the TFP shocks since the average level of labor productivity is
greater in manufacturing than in agriculture. The third effect is the slight decrease in
human capital illustrated on Figure 2.6b. Although urbanization increases the access to
education in poor countries, rising international emigration (see Figure 2.6d) reduces hu-
man capital accumulation. The reason is that high-skilled people face smaller migration
cost, which implies that migration is skill biased. In poor countries, college graduates
migrate 20 times more than the less educated. CLC reduces the intensity of positive
selection by 10% only, as shown on Figure 2.6f. Hence, the positive effect of CLC on emi-
gration rates tends to reduce the share of college graduates in the origin country. For the
sake of comparability, the effect of CLC on the skill bias in internal migration is similar
to that of long-haul migration, as illustrated in Figure 2.6e. Overall, CLC has a greater
impact on low-skilled mobility than on high-skilled mobility.
Comparing the Maximalist to the Intermediate scenario, and comparing the Inter-
mediate to the Minimalist give very similar results. The negative effect on income is
slightly more pronounced in countries close to the equator when considering the Maxi-
malist scenario. In addition, Figure 2.6c and 2.6d demonstrate that under the Maximalist
scenario, urbanization and emigration responses are slightly greater. The human capital
responses are on average almost identical. Table 2.A1 in Appendix 2.A.1 reports the
effect of CLC on the country-wide level of income per worker for the 20 most adversely
affected countries in the year 2100. Countries close to the equator experience a long-run
decrease in income per worker which varies between 14% and 22% when the temperature
increases by 2◦C. The most affected countries include Sao Tome and Principe, The Gam-
bia, Venezuela, Nepal, Grenada, Nicaragua, Malaysia, the Dominican Republic, Ghana,
the Philippines, and several African countries and Pacific islands.
The income loss is even greater for the poorest workers trapped in the poorest or falling
regions (i.e., rural regions). Extreme poverty is usually measured as the percentage of
population living with less than $1.90 per day in PPP value. Nevertheless, in our secular
context with a constant rate of productivity growth and two skill groups only, we need
to use a relative poverty line. We measure extreme poverty as the world percentage of
adults below a relative poverty line that corresponds to 2% of the worldwide average level
of income per worker.
Comparing the CLC scenarios, Figure 2.7a shows that CLC adversely impacts extreme
poverty. In the Intermediate scenario, poverty headcounts mechanically increase over
time. This is essentially due to the differential in population growth between poor and
rich countries/regions. By the year 2100, we identify 621 million individuals in extreme
poverty in the Intermediate scenario (about 13.2% of the world population). Under the
Minimalist and Maximalist scenarios, the numbers amount to 517 and 835 million (i.e.,
11.0% and 17.9% of the world population), respectively.26 In addition, Figure 2.7b shows
26If the poverty line equals 1% of the worldwide average income level, 202 million workers will live in
extreme poverty in 2100 under the Intermediate scenario (4.2% of the world population). This compares
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Figure 2.6: Country-specific effects by level of latitude
Notes: Simulation results based on the moderate CLC scenarios defined in Section 2.2.1. Latitude
(geographic coordinate) is measured on the X-axis, percentage deviations are measures on the Y-axis,
and bubble sizes are proportional to the population aged 25-64 in the year 2010. A few outliers are not
depicted on Figures 2.6a, 2.6d and 2.6e.
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that the intensity/depth of extreme poverty increases. The ratio of average income of the
extreme poor to the worldwide average income decreases with CLC in all years. Hence,
CLC influences extreme poverty at both extensive and intensive margins.
Figure 2.7c shows the effect of CLC on the relative income of the ten poorest groups
on earth. We rank all classes of worker with respect to the ratio between their income
level and the worldwide average level. The poorest people are low-skilled workers living
in the rural region of the poorest countries. For instance, low-skilled workers in rural
regions of Burundi earned around 0.54% of the global average income in the Intermediate
scenario. This ratio reaches 0.65 in the Minimalist scenario and 0.42 in the Maximalist
one. On average, the index of relative income of the poorest workers is divided by 1.5
when the temperature increases by 2◦C.
Migration responses. – It is frequently claimed that CLC will create the world’s biggest
international refugee crisis of all ages. In line with Figure 2.5f, our results in Table 2.2
suggest that this is unlikely to be the case. We predict that CLC will induce large
displacements of people from vulnerable to more viable areas on Earth. However, most
of them will move within their country. Compared to the Minimalist (no-CLC) scenario,
rising temperature and sea level increases the number of adult movers by 78.4, 24.6 and
16.9 million people in 2040, 2170 and 2100 (i.e., by 2.1%, 0.6% and 0.4% of the world adult
population, respectively). In the course of the 21st century, this amounts to a total of
120 million adults in the Intermediate scenario (we obtain 185 millions in the Maximalist
scenario). Far more people are migrating within their own countries than across borders.
In the Intermediate scenario, 66% of these movements are local displacements within the
region of birth, 15% are movements between regions (from agriculture to nonagriculture),
and only 19% are long-haul international movements from developing to OECD countries.
Hence, CLC increases the number of internal adult migrants by 97 millions (with
81% of internal displacements). In the Maximalist scenario, we obtain 135 millions (with
67% of local displacements). The numbers are very much in line with those reported
in Rigaud et al. (2018), who predict that 65 to 145 million people of all ages could
migrate within their own countries to escape slow-onset impacts of climate change by
the year 2050. Compared to this study, we offer additional insight on the international
migration responses to CLC. We show that CLC increases the number of international
adult migrants by 22.5 millions in the Intermediate scenario and by 51.3 millions in the
Maximalist scenario. Although these numbers are non-negligible, they are small compared
to the global changes in migration stocks.
Table 2.A2 in Appendix 2.A.2 reports emigration and immigration rates by region.
As far as emigration is concerned, we show that CLC multiplies emigration rates by a
factor of 1.05, which is a small fraction (between 1/10 and 1/20) of the total rise in em-
igration rates. Total changes in emigration rates are mostly explained by the changing
educational attainment in the developing world: education makes people more migratory.
As for immigration, the average share of immigrants should be multiplied by a factor of
1.5 in settlement countries (the US, Canada and Australia), and should increase twofold
in Europe over the 21st century. However, the contribution of CLC to increasing immi-
gration is small. CLC explains about 1/20 of the total change in the worldwide share
of immigrants in the population. Total changes are mostly explained by demographic
imbalances between rich and poor countries, and by education trends.
to 181 and 272 million workers (3.9% and 6.0%) under the more optimistic and pessimistic scenarios,
respectively.
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Figure 2.7: Effect of CLC on extreme poverty in 2100
Notes: Simulation results based on the moderate scenarios defined in Section 2.2.1. The reported coun-
tries in Figure 2.7c include Burundi (BDI), Cameroon (CMR), Eritrea (ERI), Guinea (GIN), Mozambique
(MOZ), Nepal (NPL), Tanzania (TZA), Timor-Leste (TLS), Togo (TGO), and Zimbabwe (ZWE).
2.4.2 Robustness to extreme CLC scenarios
It has been argued that we are in uncharted territory when predicting CLC as the effects of
CO2 emissions on temperature and sea level are highly uncertain (Stern, 2003; Schelling,
2007). It is thus important to consider more extreme scenarios. This section defines four
alternative scenarios and analyzes the sensitivity of our results to more extreme changes.
Definition of extreme scenarios. – Uncertainty about SLR is large as climate models
have been unable until recently to replicate the estimated sea level swings reconstructed
from geological data during the Pliocene (about 100,000 years ago) when concentrations
were about the same as now, temperatures were 0-2◦C higher and the sea level was 6-9m
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Table 2.2: Global numbers and shares of movers in 2040, 2070 and 2100
(Numbers in million of people and shares as % of world adult population)
Number (in million) As % world pop.
2040 2070 2100 2040 2070 2100
Intermediate minus Minimalist
Total 78.4 24.6 16.9 2.05 0.57 0.36
Rural-Urban 13.1 4.1 1.1 0.34 0.10 0.02
International 6.4 6.9 9.2 0.17 0.16 0.20
Local 58.8 13.6 6.6 1.54 0.31 0.14
Flooded 69.4 15.5 7.5 1.82 0.36 0.16
Maximalist minus Minimalist
Total 109.7 42.6 33.2 2.58 1.01 0.69
Rural-Urban 26.5 13.5 4.5 0.69 0.32 0.09
International 13.6 16.5 21.2 0.35 0.38 0.46
Local 69.8 12.7 7.5 1.83 0.29 0.16
Flooded 82.5 14.5 8.5 2.16 0.34 0.18
Notes: Simulation results based on the moderate CLC scenarios defined in Section 2.2.1.
higher.27 The World Bank predicts a sea-level rise of 2m for the year 2050. For the
purpose of comparison, we also consider an extreme SLR variant with a 2.7m rise by the
end of the century, and a no-SLR scenario as a point of comparison.
Furthermore, two additional channels of transmission are frequently accounted for in
the literature. Firstly, temperature variations may also cause direct utility effects through
their impact on health or on the drudgery of work. Secondly, CLC can affect economic
performance and migration decisions through conflicts over resources. We model these
two additional channels as following:
• To account for potential direct utility losses (due to the effect of temperature on
health or on the drudgery of work), we follow Dell et al. (2014) who report estimates
that output per worker decreases by 2% per 1◦C increase when temperature exceeds
20◦C. We assume that this effect is due to a decrease in effective labor supply
driven by a greater disutility of labor. In a simple model with quasi-linear utility
function and a constant elasticity of labor supply to the disutility of labor, relative
variations in utility are proportional to relative variations in labor supply. As
shown in Appendix 2.A.3, assuming an elasticity of labor supply to income of 1/3,
the optimal utility level decreases by 8% per 1◦C increase in all regions where
temperature exceeds 20◦C. Although our model disregards the disutility of labor,
we model utility losses similarly and assume τr,t = 0.08(Tr,t − Tr,2010) if Tr,t > 20
and zero otherwise.
• In contexts of high political and social instability, CLC can contribute to the on-
set and propagation of (violent) conflicts driven by the deterioration of governance
capacities and by the increase in inequality among groups (Miguel et al., 2004;
Gleditsch, 2012). The relationship between CLC and conflict has been investi-
gated in a number of studies, which have produced mixed results (Cattaneo et al.,
27De Conto and Pollard (2016) have calibrated the sea level swings of the Pliocene, projecting an
increase in the sea level above 1m in 2100. They estimate that the Antarctica ice sheet cannot be saved
even with extraordinary success at cutting emissions. This would lead to a locking of the sea level rise
of more than 5m.
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2018). Using a hierarchical meta-analysis of 55 studies, Burke et al. (2015) find
that deviations from moderate temperatures and precipitation patterns systemat-
ically increase conflict risk (including interpersonal conflict, such as assault and
murder, and intergroup conflict, including riots and civil war). On average, one
standard-deviation increase in temperature increases interpersonal conflict by 2.4%
and intergroup conflict by 11.3%. In turn, conflicts lead to forced displacements.
Dao et al. (2017) find that severe armed conflicts increase the dyadic stock of
migrants twofold in the long-term.28 In our simulations, we assume that conflicts
decrease net international migration costs in the poorest countries in such a way
that their emigration stocks increase by a factor of 2, as explained in Appendix
2.A.3.
In sum, to investigate the sensitivity of our results to extreme scenarios and additional
channels of transmission, we consider four alternative scenarios:
• Extreme-No SLR. – Assuming constant seal level and a global increase in tempera-
ture of 2.09◦C, this scenario neutralizes forced displacements. It can be considered
as unrealistic and extreme, but we use it as a no-SLR point of reference.
• Extreme-Greater SLR. – While keeping a global increase in temperature of 2.09◦C,
we now assume a sharper sea-level rise over the 21st century. In line with Rigaud et
al. (2018), our Greater SLR variant assumes that the sea level reaches 2m in 2040.
For subsequent periods, we assume the same relative changes as in the Intermediate
scenario; this gives 2.4m in 2070 and 2.7m in 2100. This scenario induces a larger
number of forcibly displaced people.
• Extreme-Utility. – In this scenario, we start from the Maximalist scenario and
supplement it with direct utility losses. As stated above, we assume a direct utility
loss of 8% per 1◦C increase in all regions where temperature exceeds 20◦C.
• Extreme-Conflict. – Here, we start from the Extreme-Utility scenario and assume
that a long-term conflict arises in the ten countries with the highest povery head-
counts (i.e., Burundi, Cameroon, Eritrea, Guinea, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania,
Timor-Leste, Togo, and Zimbabwe).
Results. – Aggregate implications for the world economy are depicted in Figure 2.A2
in Appendix 2.A.4. We focus here on the mobility responses to more extreme scenarios.
Compared to the Intermediate scenario, considering extreme SLR (i.e., no SLR or a
2.7m SLR by the end of the century) has a limited impact on worldwide migration
responses, both at the internal and international level. This means that variations in SLR
mostly induce local displacements. In other words, the variations between the moderate
scenarios reported in Table 2.2 are overwhelmingly explained by the effect of temperature
on productivity. On the contrary, compared to the Maximalist scenario, accounting for
direct utility losses (8% per 1◦C increase above 20◦C) or conflicts over resources (in ten
countries with the greatest poverty headcounts) has a drastic impact on internal and
international migration.
Table 2.3 characterizes the effect of direct utility losses and conflict on mobility pat-
terns. The numbers can easily be compared with those of the Maximalist scenario in
28It increases the dyadic stock of migrants by a factor of 4 in the medium-term.
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Table 2.2. Remember the Maximalist scenario predicts a total number of movers of 185
millions, including 51 million international migrants to the OECD member states. When
adding the direct utility losses, we obtain 305 million movers (i.e., an increment of 120
millions) and 74 million international migrants (i.e., an increment of 23 millions). Ta-
ble 2.A4 in Appendix 2.A.4 shows that, by the year 2100, the proportion of emigrants
increases by 0.9 percentage point in Latin America, and by 0.6 percentage point in sub-
Saharan Africa. As far as OECD destinations are concerned, the proportion of immigrants
increases by 0.9 percentage point in the US and in the European Union.
When adding the conflict effect, we obtain 320 million movers (i.e., a new increment of
15 millions) and 89 million international migrants (i.e., a new increment of 15 millions).
Severe conflicts impact international migration flows. By the year 2100, the proportion of
emigrants increases by additional 0.4 percentage point in sub-Saharan Africa, where most
conflict-affected countries are located. The resulting shares of immigration increase by
0.4 percentage point in the US and in the European Union. These numerical experiments
reveal that conflicts over resources are likely to become a key determinant of climatic
migration pressures, and that direct utility effects of CLC imply rather high uncertainty
about their scale and their type.
Table 2.3: Global numbers and shares of movers under extreme scenarios
(Numbers in million of people and shares as % of world adult population)
Number (in million) As % world pop.
2040 2070 2100 2040 2070 2100
Extreme-Utility minus Minimalist
Total 158.8 87.5 59.0 4.2 2.0 1.3
Rural-Urban 71.0 50.1 20.6 1.9 1.2 0.4
International 18.1 24.7 30.9 0.5 0.6 0.7
Local 69.7 12.7 7.5 1.8 0.3 0.2
Flooded 82.7 14.5 8.5 2.2 0.3 0.2
Extreme-Conflict minus Minimalist
Total 162.1 92.1 65.5 4.2 2.1 1.4
Rural-Urban 72.0 49.8 18.9 1.9 1.2 0.4
International 20.3 29.7 39.1 0.5 0.7 0.8
Local 69.7 12.7 7.5 1.8 0.3 0.2
Flooded 82.7 14.6 8.5 2.2 0.3 0.2
Notes: Simulation results based on the extreme scenarios defined in this section.
2.4.3 Role of migration policies
We now investigate whether a change of immigration policies can help limiting the effect
of CLC on extreme poverty. Starting from the Intermediate scenario, we simulate the
effect of two policy options for two sets of origin countries. The first option consists of
preventing people to emigrate from 2040 onwards (xr∗F,s,t = 1); the second one consists
of reducing international migration cost by 5% (xr∗F,s,t → 0.95 ·xr∗F,s,t). Figure 2.8 shows
the effect of these two policy reforms on the world proportion of people whose income is
smaller than the relative poverty line (i.e., 2% of the world average level of income per
worker). As far as the target group is concerned, Figure 2.8a shows the effect obtained
when the policy affects all workers living in the ten countries with the largest shares of
population in extreme poverty (those reported in Figure 2.7c). Figure 2.8b shows the
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effect obtained when the policy is restricted to low-skilled workers living in the rural
region of the same ten poorest countries. Figure 2.8c shows the effect obtained when
the policy affects all workers living in the twenty most affected countries by CLC (those
listed in Table 2.A1 in Appendix 2.A.2). Figure 2.8d shows the effect obtained when
the policy affects low-skilled workers living in the rural region of the same twenty most
affected countries.
In all cases, reinforcing migration restrictions has little effects on extreme poverty,
which means that the current laws and policies are already highly restrictive. As for
the relaxation of migration restrictions, its effectiveness is highly sensitive to the target
group. When the policy affects the poorest individuals from the poorest countries, it
decreases sensibly the worldwide extreme poverty headcounts. If the policy affects all
workers, the effect is negligible. This is due to skill-selection in international migration
responses. The relaxation policy mostly benefits high-skilled workers in the urban sector.
The resulting ”brain drain” reduces the low-skilled wage rate in this sector, which slows
down urbanization and increases the number of low-skilled workers in the rural sector.
When targeting countries that are strongly impacted by CLC, the effect of relaxing mi-
gration restrictions on extreme poverty is detrimental if affecting all groups of workers,
and very slightly beneficial if affecting low-skilled workers in agriculture.
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Figure 2.8: Poverty effects of relaxing immigration restrictions
Notes: Simulation results based on the Intermediate scenario.
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2.5 Conclusion
In the course of the 21st century, climate change will increase the income gap between
the richest and poorest countries by about 25%. It will also influence extreme poverty
at both extensive and intensive margins, and force millions of adults to flee their flooded
area of residence. These are favorable conditions for increasing the international mobility
of workers. In this chapter, we endogenize the migration responses to climate change at
various spatial scales. Our model relies on consensus micro-foundations, and is calibrated
to match international and urbanization data of the last 30 years. Assuming a moderate
scenario, we predict that climate change will lead to voluntary and forced movements of
about 120 million working-age individuals and their children (i.e., around 200 individu-
als) during the 21st century. Nevertheless, more than 80% of them will move internally
while 19% will opt for long-haul migration to an OECD destination. Under current mi-
gration laws and policies, far more climate migrants will move within their own countries
than across borders. These migrants are mostly originating from countries that have con-
tributed the least to climate change, but experience the most damaging effects. However,
our results also reveal that international migration is a costly adaptation strategy of last
resort. This results hold when considering more extreme temperature and SLR scenarios:
the number of displaced people increases but most of them move locally. Larger amounts
of internal and international migration can be obtained when adding direct utility losses
- which is a difficult mechanism to quantify - or conflicts over resources - which are more
uncertain.
As far as policy implications are concerned, our results illustrate the difficulty to define
a status of climate refugee. In our median scenario, about 85% of forcibly displaced
persons will move internally. In addition, half of non-local movements - and 95% of
international movements - are caused by climate-driven deterioration of economic and
social conditions. Things look clearer when CLC induces conflicts although in practice,
the link between CLC and conflict can be hard to establish. For example, the thesis of
a Syrian ”climate war” has been challenged in the literature (Fro¨hlich, 2016; Selby et
al., 2017). Hence, CLC is an additional factor that calls for better coherence between
migration, development and environmental policies. Given people’s difficulty to emigrate
from the poorest countries, preventive measures are needed to encourage climate change
adaptation, local disaster-risk reduction, sustainable development in general, and urban
sustainable development in particular.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Temperature scenarios
The CCKP projections are organized in 20-year climatological windows for the years
2020-2039, 2040-2059, 2060-2079, and 2080-2099. These projections are obtained from
the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) distribution (Taylor et al.,
2012) which distinguishes between several scenarios for the Representative Concentration
Pathways (RCP) (Moss et al., 2010). The median-emission scenario is called RCP-4.5.
In addition, for each RCP, the CCKP provides data for 16 models obtained from different
research institutes. Figure 2.A1a depicts the evolution of the worldwide mean surface-
temperature predicted by each of the 16 models of the median (RCP-4.5) package. The
dashed black curve describes our baseline scenario. Overall, all models under RCP-4.5
predict an increase in temperature levels.
We proceed to two adjustments before plugging the temperature data into our model:
• Firstly, the climate literature suggests that aggregate (unweighted) country levels
of temperature may not reflect accurately the impact of CLC (Dell et al., 2014).
Particularly in large countries with regions of heterogeneous population densities,
the aggregate measure poorly captures the intensity of the phenomenon. Hence, in
a second step, we weight the monthly future temperature levels by population. To
do this, we extract from the CCKP the monthly mean air temperature levels for
the climatological window for the years 1991-2015. We weight equally the monthly
observations to obtain a yearly temperature level for each country. Furthermore,
Dell et al. (2012) provide a data set with population-weighted data on temperature
levels. We compute the country-specific averages of these temperature levels for the
years between 1995 and 2005. We then construct a scale factor for each country
by dividing these population-weighted temperature levels by the temperature levels
from the CCKP. In order to obtain future population-weighted measures, we mul-
tiply each of the monthly temperature levels for the future 20-year climatological
windows with the country-specific scale factor.
• Secondly, the OLG model described in Section 2.3 must be fed with data in 30-year
intervals (a period that is meant to represent the length of one generation), starting
in 2010. Therefore, our third step consists in allocating the 20-year climatological
windows to fit the temporal structure of the model. We assimilate the 2040-2059
climatological window to the year 2040, the 2060-2079 climatological window to the
year 2070, and the 2080-2099 climatological window to the year 2100, respectively.
In this way we obtain monthly population-weighted levels of temperature for the
179 countries in our data set. When averaged over all countries and months, our
baseline temperature data predicts an increase in global temperature of 2.09◦C by
the end of the 21st century.29
29Under the RCP-4.5 scenario the projected anomalies range from 0.83◦C for the minimalist model of
the 16 models to 3.20◦C for the maximalist model as illustrated on Figure 2.A1a.
84 CHAPTER 2. CLIMATE CHANGE, INEQUALITY, AND MIGRATION
0
1
2
3
Te
m
pe
ra
tu
re
 C
ha
ng
e
2020 2040 2060 2080 2100
Year
(a) Worldwide mean temperature in RCP-4.5
-.5
0
.5
1
1.
5
se
a-
le
ve
l r
is
e
0 1 2 3 4 5
temperature
(b) Variation in temperature and in sea level
Figure 2.A1: CLC scenarios (2010-2100)
Sources: CCPK for Figure 2.A1a, and Vermeer and Rahmstorf (2009) for Figure 2.A1b
2.A.2 Additional results for moderate scenarios
Table 2.A1 gives the effect of CLC on the country-wide level of income per worker for the
20 most adversely affected countries (the ranking is based on the effect in the year 2100).
It documents the relative difference in income per worker between the Intermediate and
the Minimalist scenarios, and between the Maximalist and the Intermediate scenarios.
The table shows that poorer countries close to the equator experience a sustantial decrease
in income per worker in the long-term.
Table 2.A2 reports emigration and immigration rates by region. The top panel shows
that the mean emigration rates from the developing world will increase during the 21st
century. The regional emigration rates will be multiplied by a factor of 1.5 to 2. This
can be explained by the rise in education (highly educated people are more mobile) and
by CLC. To identify the effect of CLC, the last two columns compare the predictions
of the two alternative CLC scenarios in the year 2100. Comparing the Intermediate to
the Minimalist and Maximalist scenarios, CLC affects the emigration rates from Latin
America and, to a lesser extent, from Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. However, on average,
CLC multiplies emigration rates by a factor of 1.05, which is a small fraction of the total
rise in emigration rates.
The bottom panel documents the change in the proportion of immigrants in selected
OECD countries. Remember we assume emigrants to the OECD aggregate entity are
allocated across countries on the basis of the dyadic shares of the year 2010. Over the
21st century and at current migration policies and laws, the average share of immigrants
should be multiplied by a factor of 1.5 in settlement countries (the US, Canada and
Australia), and should increase twofold in Europe. These changes are mostly explained by
demographic imbalances and by the progress in education. Comparing the CLC scenarios
for the year 2100, we show that the contribution of CLC to increasing immigration is
small. CLC explains about 1/20 of the total change in the share of immigrants in the
population. The rise in the sea level induces minor effects on international migration, as
most of the forcibly displaced people will relocate locally.
Table 2.A3 lists the countries with the highest emigration responses to CLC for the
years 2040 and 2100. In 2040, countries that send the greatest numbers of emigrants
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Table 2.A1: Most adversely affected countries in 2040 and 2100 (as % of dev.)
(Ranking based on income per worker in 2100)
Country Interm/Minim Country Maxim/Interm
2040 2100 2040 2100
1 Sao Tome and Principe -17.8 -19.9 Sao Tome and Principe -20.1 -22.5
2 The Gambia -11.7 -18.2 The Gambia -15.1 -21.7
3 Venezuela -13.8 -17.8 Venezuela -16.4 -20.8
4 Nepal -15.9 -17.3 Malaysia -16.8 -19.7
5 Grenada -13.4 -17.1 Dominican Republic -16.0 -19.6
6 Nicaragua -15.3 -16.8 Ghana -18.9 -19.4
7 Malaysia -14.3 -16.7 Philippines -18.1 -19.3
8 Dominican Republic -13.5 -16.6 Nicaragua -17.5 -18.9
9 Ghana -15.9 -16.5 Cuba -15.3 -18.6
10 Philippines -15.3 -16.4 El Salvador -16.1 -18.4
11 El Salvador -13.9 -16.0 Nepal -18.1 -17.9
12 Cuba -12.6 -15.4 Liberia -21.7 -17.6
13 Liberia -18.6 -15.3 Gabon -15.2 -17.5
14 Fiji -11.9 -15.0 Brunei Darussalam -17.0 -17.2
15 Brunei Darussalam -14.4 -14.8 Fiji -14.4 -17.2
16 Gabon -12.5 -14.6 Guinea-Bissau -15.0 -16.7
17 Guyana -14.2 -14.3 Equatorial Guinea -18.6 -16.6
18 Belize -14.2 -14.1 Belize -18.0 -16.2
19 Equatorial Guinea -14.5 -14.0 Panama -15.6 -16.1
20 Barbados -12.5 -13.8 Maldives -15.2 -16.0
Notes: Simulation results based on the moderate CLC scenarios defined in Section 2.2.1.
Table 2.A2: International migration rates under moderate scenarios
(Emig. as % of native pop., Immig. as % of resident pop. 25-64)
Intermediate Minim. Maxim.
2010 2040 2070 2100 2100 2100
Emigration rates
Latin America 3.8 5.3 6.1 6.7 6.3 6.7
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.3 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.0 2.2
MENA 2.8 4.0 4.3 4.6 4.4 4.6
Asia 1.1 1.9 2.5 3.0 2.8 3.0
OECD 4.7 5.6 5.2 4.7 4.8 4.7
Immigration rates
United States 16.0 21.4 23.0 23.1 22.7 23.6
Canada 18.7 26.5 28.5 28.4 28.2 28.6
Australia 24.9 29.4 29.2 28.1 27.8 28.5
European Union 12.1 18.6 21.9 23.6 23.2 24.1
EU15 13.6 20.3 23.3 24.6 24.2 25.1
Germany 15.0 22.5 25.4 26.4 26.1 26.8
France 12.2 18.8 20.5 22.1 21.6 22.6
United Kingdom 14.6 22.2 25.4 26.6 26.3 26.9
Italy 10.9 17.2 20.6 22.5 21.9 23.1
Spain 14.0 20.6 23.3 24.3 23.8 24.8
Notes: Simulation results based on the moderate scenarios defined in Section 2.2.1.
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abroad under the more pessimistic scenarios are usually those with higher fractions of
forcibly displaced workers and/or those located close to the equator. By the end of the
century, these general results do not markedly change. Some of the small Caribbean
islands are among the group of the most adversely affected economies in the year 2100.30
Table 2.A3: Largest changes in the stock of emigrants (as % of dev.)
(Ranking based on 2100)
Country Interm/Minim Country Maxim/Interm
2040 2100 2040 2100
Bot 01 Guyana 17.0 -15.6 Guyana 15.5 -22.3
Bot 02 Suriname 17.3 -13.1 Suriname 12.7 -15.0
Bot 03 Grenada 13.5 -9.5 Samoa 12.3 -11.0
Bot 04 Tonga 7.8 -8.9 Tonga 7.7 -10.3
Bot 05 Russia -10.3 -8.0 Jamaica 11.3 -10.0
Bot 06 Micronesia 23.8 -6.5 Micronesia 17.0 -8.8
Bot 07 Samoa 10.6 -6.5 El Salvador 12.0 -7.3
Bot 08 Jamaica 10.9 -6.3 Russia -8.9 -6.9
Bot 09 Mongolia -9.4 -5.2 Grenada 7.4 -5.8
Bot 10 Lesotho -6.5 -4.3 Mongolia -8.0 -5.0
Bot 11 El Salvador 11.4 -4.2 Fiji 11.8 -3.9
Bot 12 Cape Verde 11.0 -4.2 St Vinc & Gren 8.5 -3.6
Bot 13 Albania 6.1 -3.7 Cape Verde 7.4 -3.4
Bot 14 St Vinc & Gren 10.4 -3.4 Lesotho -4.0 -2.3
Bot 15 Afghanistan -4.3 -3.0 Belarus -4.4 -2.1
Bot 16 Belarus -5.4 -2.4 Afghanistan -2.3 -1.4
Bot 17 Ukraine -2.3 -1.7 Bosnia Herz -3.6 -1.2
Bot 18 Fiji 10.9 -1.6 Ukraine -2.6 -1.1
Bot 19 Bosnia Herz -4.9 -1.4 Albania 1.6 -0.9
Bot 20 Serbia -3.3 -1.1 Serbia -2.1 -0.6
Notes: Simulation results based on the moderate scenarios defined in Section 2.2.1.
2.A.3 Modeling utility losses and conflicts
To account for potential direct utility losses due to the effect of temperature on health or
on the drudgery of work, we follow Dell et al. (2014) who report estimates that output
per worker decreases by 2% per 1◦C increase when temperature exceeds 20◦C. We assume
that this effect is due to a decrease in effective labor supply driven by a greater disutility
of labor.
In a model with a quasi-linear utility function:
U = wl − %l
1+ϑ
1 + ϑ
,
we have:
l =
(
w
%
)1/ϑ
∆U
U
= (1 + ϑ)
∆l
l
.
30Interestingly, Micronesia is among the top positively affected countries in the short-run and the top
negatively affected countries in the long-run.
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Assuming a conservative value of 3 for ϑ (a labor supply elasticity to income of 1/3), we
have ∆U
U
= 4∆l
l
= 8∆T when temperature exceeds 20◦C.
To account for the effect of conflicts over ressources, we follow Dao et al. (2017) who
show that severe armed conflicts increase the emigration stock twofold in the long-term.
In our model, migration decisions from region r∗ are governed by:
Nr∗,s,t = Mr∗r∗,s,t +Mr∗r,s,t +Mr∗f,s,t
= Mr∗r∗,s,t(1 +mr∗r,s,t +mr∗f,s,t),
where mr∗f,s,t = (vf,s,t/vr∗,s,t)
1/µ(1 − xr∗f,s,t)1/µ denotes the migrant-to-stayer ratio, and
Nr∗,s,t is the native (pre-migration) population (given at the beginning of each period).
We can express the emigrant stock as:
Mr∗f,s,t = mr∗f,s,tMr∗r∗,s,t =
mr∗f,s,tNr∗,s,t
1 +mr∗r,s,t +mr∗f,s,t
.
Everything else equal, we constrain Mr∗f,s,t to increase by a factor of 2 after the
conflict (i.e., M r∗f,s,t = 2Mr∗f,s,t). Assuming (i) it affects high- and low-skilled workers
symmetrically, and (ii) it affects all regions symmetrically, the conflict does not impact
the relative attractiveness of rural and urban areas (i.e., mr∗r,s,t is constant). We have to
find the new level of mr∗f,s,t that is compatible with M r∗f,s,t. The solution is:
mr∗f,s,tNr∗,s,t
1 +mr∗r,s,t +mr∗f,s,t
=
2mr∗f,s,tNr∗,s,t
1 +mr∗r,s,t +mr∗f,s,t
=⇒ mr∗f,s,t = 2mr∗f,s,t(1 +mr∗r,s,t)
1 +mr∗r,s,t −mr∗f,s,t = Zr
∗f,s,tmr∗f,s,t
Considering that the effect of the conflict is governed by a change in migration costs
and net amenities (xr∗f,s,t → xr∗f,s,t), this requires:
(1− xr∗f,s,t) = (1− xr∗f,s,t)Zµr∗f,s,t.
2.A.4 Additional results for extreme scenarios
The effects on the world economy are depicted in Figure 2.A2, which reports results from
the Intermediate scenario of Section 2.2.1 and those of the extreme scenarios defined in
Section 2.4.2. The worldwide responses are the weighted averages of the positive and
negative effects observed in high-income and developing countries.
Overall, considering extreme SLR scenarios (i.e., no SLR or a 2.7m SLR) has neg-
ligible impacts on worldwide responses. Changes in SLR slightly influence the share of
international migrants in the year 2040. On the contrary, accounting for direct utility
losses (8% per 1◦C increase above 20◦C) or conflicts over resources (in ten countries
with the greatest CLC-driven changes in poverty headcounts: Burundi, Cameroon, Er-
itrea, Guinea, Mozambique, Nepal, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, and Zimbabwe) has a
drastic impact on urbanization, international migration and income. Greater propensity
to move, internally or internationally, increases the share of people living in cities and
OECD countries. This explains why income per capita increases.
Table 2.A4 reports emigration and immigration rates by region by the year 2100.
The top panel shows that direct utility losses and conflict increase emigration rates by
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0.9 percentage points in Latin America and between 0.6 and 1 percentage point in sub-
Saharan Africa. The effect of SLR is negligible, confirming that forcibly displaced people
migrate internally or locally. The bottom part of the table shows that immigration rates
in OECD countries are very robust to SLR. On the contrary, they increase by 0.5 to 1
percentage point when direct utility losses and conflicts are accounted for.
Table 2.A4: International migration rates under extreme scenarios
(Emig. as % of native pop., Immig. as % of resident pop 25-64)
Interm. No SLR Great SLR Utility Conflict
2100 2100 2100 2100 2100
Emigration rates
Latin America 6.7 6.7 6.7 7.6 7.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.8 3.2
MENA 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.7
Asia 3.0 3.0 3.1 3.6 3.7
OECD 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.5 4.5
Immigration rates
United States 23.1 23.2 23.1 24.0 24.4
Canada 28.4 28.4 28.3 28.8 29.0
Australia 28.1 28.2 28.1 28.8 29.1
European Union 23.6 23.6 23.6 24.5 24.9
EU15 24.6 24.6 24.6 25.4 25.9
Germany 26.4 26.4 26.4 27.0 27.5
France 22.1 22.1 22.0 23.0 23.4
United Kingdom 26.6 26.6 26.5 27.2 27.5
Italy 22.5 22.5 22.4 23.6 24.2
Spain 24.3 24.3 24.2 25.2 25.7
Notes: Simulation results based on the more extreme scenarios defined in Section 2.4.2.
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Figure 2.A2: Aggregate effects of CLC under extreme scenarios
Notes: Simulation results based on the more extreme scenarios defined in Section 2.4.2.
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Chapter 3
Climate change and human capital
in Africa
Abstract1
What is the relationship between climate change and human capital accumulation?
Through which mechanisms do weather changes affect tertiary educational outcomes in
African economies? This chapter investigates the potential link between climate change
and high-skilled human capital formation in Africa. In order to do so, a two-sector, world
economy model that endogenizes education decisions and internal migration decisions is
developed. This stylized model predicts that negative climatic conditions increase the
share of people moving internally from rural to urban areas. This in turn increases the
future share of individuals investing in tertiary education, because the access and returns
to education are higher in urban areas. These theoretical predictions are empirically val-
idated by a panel data analysis at the country level, and a cross-sectional data analysis
at the province level. The panel data set includes 37 African countries and covers the
time period from 1960 to 2010. The cross-sectional data set includes 111 provinces in
17 African economies. A linear regression analysis shows that there is a correlation be-
tween weather changes and educational attainment. A Two-Stage least squares regression
analysis indicates that this effect results from the impact of climatic variation on inter-
nal migration. The research leads to the conclusion that adverse weather changes may
have the unexpected effect of increasing high-skilled educational attainment in African
economies.
Keywords: human capital, migration, climate change
JEL codes: E24, O15, Q54
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3.1 Introduction
The analysis of the consequences of global warming and climate change has gained in-
creasing interest by economists over the past decades. The potentially adverse impact
of climate variables on economic growth and sustainable development has been numer-
ously documented within the economics literature. For instance, beginning from the late
nineties, several studies focused on cross-sectional analyses of the connection between
climate and economic outcomes (Sachs and Warner, 1997; Gallup et al., 1999; Nordhaus,
2006). They have in common that they find a negative relationship between temperature
and economic development. Countries with higher temperatures are characterized by
lower aggregate economic outcomes.
More recently, panel data analyses using weather data for several decades addressed
the shortcoming that a high correlation between temperature and institutional quality
potentially drives the results in the cross sectional analyses (Acemoglu et al., 2002; Sachs,
2003; Rodrik et al., 2004). By identifying changes or shocks in climate variables over
time, these studies find statistically significant impacts of climatic conditions on economic
outcome variables. In terms of economic output, there is evidence of a negative impact
of lower precipitation and temperature increases for a given year on income in poor
countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa (Dell et al., 2012; Hsiang, 2010). In addition,
windstorms have a negative impact on local economic output. Moreover, climate variables
disproportionally affect the output in the agricultural sector (Dell et al., 2014). Most
panel data studies find a negative effect of lower rainfall or higher temperature levels on
agricultural production in developing countries.
At the same time, it is well-established that human capital plays a key role for de-
velopment and long-run growth. In particular, highly educated workers are crucial for
facilitating innovation and technology diffusion when knowledge becomes economically
useful. The literature shows that this was the case during the industrial revolution
(Mokyr, 2005; Scquicciarini and Voigtla¨nder, 2015) and it is still important in the mod-
ern world (Castello´-Climent and Mukhopadhyay, 2013; Jones, 2014; Kerr et al., 2016).
Given that growth and development are affected by both factors, climate variables and
high-skilled educational attainment, the question whether climate variation itself impacts
on educational attainment is apparent.
Indeed several studies explicitly address the connection between weather and educa-
tional variables, demonstrating the relevance of such an analysis. Most of these studies
investigate the matter from a micro-level perspective. For instance, Maccini and Yang
(2009), Marchetta et al. (2017), and Randell and Gray (2016) conclude for Indonesia,
Madagascar, and Ethiopia that positive rainfall shocks increase educational attainment of
female adults, school enrollment, or school completion rates, particularly in the agricul-
tural sector. At the same time, Groppo and Kra¨hnert (2017) show that negative weather
shocks in Mongolia decrease the likelihood of students to complete mandatory schooling
in the future.
While these analyses provide informative results at the micro-level, the long-run con-
clusions at the macro-level remain rather speculative. Little seems to be known about
the adaptation mechanisms of economies to weather changes over time. For the United
States, Burke and Emerick (2016) conclude that farmers have failed to adapt to produc-
tivity losses caused by higher temperatures by adjusting production methods. Similarly,
Fishman (2011) finds that irrigation has a limited impact as an adaptation strategy to
climate variation in the Indian agricultural production sector. In terms of human capital
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investment, there is evidence of an impact of weather shocks on school enrollment via an
effect on wages. Shah and Steinberg (2017) show that positive rainfall shocks in India
increase wages. This in turn leads to less school enrollment and weaker test performances
of students, because the opportunity cost of schooling increases. These findings indicate
that rural households react to negative weather shocks by increasing the investment in
the offspring’s education. Furthermore, Beine and Parsons (2015) investigate whether in-
ternational migration is a channel of medium- or long-run adaptation to adverse weather
changes. In their panel data study they do not find evidence of a direct effect of long-run
climatic factors on international migration rates. However, they show that natural disas-
ters create higher urbanization rates and conclude, in line with numerous other studies
(Piguet et al., 2011; Barrios et al., 2006; Kubik and Maurel, 2016; Dallmann and Mil-
lock, 2013; Henderson et al., 2017), that unfavorable climatic factors may trigger internal
migration movements. This is also in line with one of the main conclusions derived in
the previous chapter, namely that the predominant majority of movements induced by
climate change are at the local scale. Dell et al. (2014) reach a similar conclusion by stat-
ing that emigration from climate-affected areas seems to be a common result of negative
shocks in agricultural production.
Finally, various analyses of the brain drain and brain gain phenomena emphasize
the role of the incentive mechanism of educational attainment. As outlined in detail in
the following chapter, the well-established principal theoretical argument is that higher
returns to education in the destination country increase the individual incentives of po-
tential migrants to invest in education (Mountford, 1997; Stark et al., 1997; Vidal, 1998;
Beine et al., 2001). This argument is confirmed by the empirical evidence in numerous
studies (Chand and Clemens, 2008; Gibson and McKenzie, 2011; Batista et al., 2012;
Shrestha, 2017; Theoharides, 2017). In addition to the studies discussed above, this
indicates that the analysis of the relationships between climatic conditions, adaptation
mechanisms, human mobility, and educational attainment needs to address individual
incentive mechanisms.
The supposition that negative environmental conditions impact on individual move-
ment decisions is further confirmed by the Gallup World Polls. Figure 3.1 reports for 26
African economies the country-specific shares of respondents who anticipate a necessity
to move because of severe environmental problems in the next five years.2 This share
is higher than 0.1 in 19 countries. In addition, Figure 3.1 indicates that this share is
positively correlated with the share of the rural population in 2010.
These findings point to the importance of analyzing the channels through which (par-
ticularly developing) economies adapt to changing climatic conditions. How does climatic
variability affect educational attainment? In particular, do higher temperatures or lower
rainfall have a positive or negative impact on high-skilled education? Do weather changes
result in a medium or long-run substitution away from low-skilled tasks, particularly in the
agricultural sector, to more human capital intensive tasks? Is this process connected with
more internal migration from rural to urban regions? These are the questions addressed
in this chapter. To do so, a simple two-sector partial equilibrium model is developed.
This model incorporates the crucial findings of the literature outlined above. It pro-
vides key predictions that are empirically validated by a panel data and cross-sectional
data analysis focusing on African countries. By using two data sets, it is shown that
adverse weather changes are correlated with higher tertiary educational attainment in
2The question in the Gallup World Polls reads: ”In the next five years, do you think you will need to
move because of severe environmental problems?”
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Figure 3.1: Rural population and expectation to move in Africa
Notes: This figure reports for 26 African countries the share of the rural population in 2010 and the share
of respondents in the Gallup World Polls that expect a necessity to move because of severe environmental
problems in the next five years.
Africa. In addition, a Two-Stage least squares regression analysis indicates that internal
migration seems to be a key mechanism linking climate change and education. Hence,
the empirical validation reveals indirect causality between climate change and education
via the moderating variable of internal migration. The study demonstrates that adverse
weather changes might promote internal migration and in turn high-skilled educational
attainment in Africa.
As opposed to the previous chapter, this chapter focuses exclusively on African coun-
tries. There are mainly four reasons for this: First, the impact of weather variation is
highly region-specific as illustrated in Chapter 2. A climatic anomaly or deviation in
the global and generally humid North has entirely different effects than in hotter regions
closer to the equator.3 Second, this chapter analyzes the impact of climatic variation on
agricultural production. In general, developed countries are characterized by far more
advanced agricultural production technologies than African economies. For instance,
the capacity to construct effective adaptation or protection mechanisms to rainfall de-
viations, such as irrigation systems, might be far more developed in richer countries.
Third, our projections derived and described in Chapter 1 illustrate that future global
socio-demographic variables will be increasingly determined by African countries. For
example, we project that the share of sub-Saharan Africa in the worldwide working-age
population increases from 7.2% in 1980 to 34.0% in 2100 and emphasize that the speed
of urbanization will be faster in Africa than in the rest of the world over the 21st century
3This might also explain the partly conflicting conclusions of the micro-level studies on the climate-
education nexus outlined above.
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(see Appendix 1.A.3 in Chapter 1). Finally, the analysis presented in the previous chapter
finds rather limited effects of climate change on high-skilled human capital accumulation
at the global scale. The country-specific effects depicted in Chapter 2 are characterized
by some degree of variation, particularly for the developing countries. This indicates that
an analysis aiming to understand the mechanisms behind the dynamics of high-skilled
human capital accumulation and climate change might need to specifically focus on a
particular subgroup of countries. For these reasons it appears most reasonable to focus
on less-developed economies in Africa only.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the model.
Section 3.3 contains the empirical validation exercise of key predictions derived from the
theoretical framework. This section describes the data sets and the approach to the
estimation. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Model
The model describes a set of economies with two sectors/regions r = (a, n), denoting
agriculture/rural region (a) and nonagriculture/urban region (n). Goods are produced
in both sectors and are assumed to be perfect substitutes from the point of view of
consumers. The price of goods is normalized to unity. The productivity in the agricultural
sector is a function of climatic conditions. Each economy is populated by individuals
that supply the labor for the production process. An individual λ earns a wage payment
according to the inelastically supplied efficiency units of labor. Individuals have the
option to increase their supply of efficiency units of labor by acquiring education. Hence,
individuals can be attributed to one of two skill groups s = (h, l), with s = h for the
high-skilled individuals and s = l for the low-skilled individuals. Individuals maximize
their well-being by first deciding in which region to live and second whether to invest
in own education. Hence, the dynamic structure of the model is recursive. This section
describes the model assumptions.
3.2.1 Technology
The production sector in each region is characterized by a simple production function.
In the urban sector a single composite good is produced in each time period t according
to a constant returns to scale production function:
Yn,t(Hn,t) = An,tHn,t ∀t, (3.1)
whereAn,t denotes the total factor productivity andHn,t denotes the labor input measured
in efficiency units at time t. The agricultural output is assumed to depend on weather
variables such as temperature or precipitation.4 In the rural sector a single composite
good is produced in each time period t according to a constant returns to scale production
function:
Ya,t(Ha,t) = G(Ct)Aa,tHa,t ∀t, (3.2)
where Aa,t denotes the total factor productivity and Ha,t denotes the labor input mea-
sured in efficiency units at time t. The function G(Ct) ≤ 1 captures the dependence of
agricultural output on climatic conditions Ct at time t, which are determined by rainfall
4Dell et al. (2014) review the studies that stress the impact of the climate on agricultural production.
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or temperature levels. This function is assumed to be decreasing in the severity of the
adverse climatic conditions (i.e., ∂G(Ct)
∂Ct
< 0). This means this function gives a lower value
for more severe adverse climatic conditions.
Labor is the only production factor in this economy.5 High-skilled and low-skilled
labor are assumed to be perfect substitutes. In the urban sector the average and marginal
product of one efficiency unit of labor is given by An,t. In the rural sector the average
and marginal product of one efficiency unit of labor is given by G(Ct)Aa,t. All existing
markets are assumed to be perfectly competitive in this economy. The wage paid per
efficiency unit of labor in each region and period wr,t equals the marginal product of
labor:
wn,t ≡ ∂Yn,t(Hn,t)
∂Hn,t
= An,t ∀t,
wa,t ≡ ∂Ya,t(Ha,t)
∂Ha,t
= G(Ct)Aa,t ∀t.
(3.3)
The total factor productivity levels are assumed to be exogenous in each time period
t. This means they may vary between time periods and will probably increase over time
illustrating technological change. For simplicity, this type of technological change is not
captured explicitly in the model. It is, however, assumed in the following that the total
factor productivity is higher in the urban sector (i.e., An,t > Aa,t). This assumption
reflects real-world productivity and wage differences between both sectors with a higher
productivity in the urban than in the rural sector (Gollin et al., 2014b).
3.2.2 Preferences
Individuals derive utility from the wage payment they obtain for their inelastically sup-
plied units of labor.6 These wage payments are determined by the amount of efficiency
units of labor Es,t that individuals supply on the labor market. In addition, individuals
derive disutility from the effort of moving between regions and the effort of acquiring
education. This is reflected by the individual-specific movement cost xλr∗r,t ∈ [0, 1] and
the individual-specific cost of education eλs,t ∈ [0, 1]. The former parameter captures the
costs of moving from region r∗ to region r, where xλr∗r∗,t = 0. Hence, individuals have
heterogeneous abilities to acquire education and heterogeneous preferences over the re-
gion where they want to live. The utility of an individual with skill-level s born in region
r∗ and moving to region r is denoted by:
Uλr∗r,s,t = ln(wr,tEs,t) + ln(1− xλr∗r,t) + ln(1− eλs,t) ∀r∗, r, s, t. (3.4)
The amount of efficiency units of labor low-skilled individuals supply is normalized to
unity (El,t = 1). As stated above, individuals increase the efficiency units of labor they
can supply by acquiring high-skilled education (Eh,t > 1). Consequently, investments in
education increase the wage payments obtained on the labor market.
However, education investments are not costless. Individual λ incurs a strictly posi-
tive cost of investing in high-skilled education (eλh,t > 0). The cost parameter e
λ
s,t reflects
5A model without physical capital features a globalized economy with a common international interest
rate. This hypothesis is in line with Kennan (2013) or Klein and Ventura (2009) who assume that capital
”chases” labor.
6This formulation implicitly accounts for the consumption of goods by assuming that the earned
wages are exclusively spent on buying consumption goods.
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the innate ability of individuals to acquire education. It is assumed that staying un-
educated is effortless. In this case the cost of acquiring low-skilled education is equal
to zero for all individuals (eλl,t = 0 ∀λ). The individual-specific cost of education for
the high-skilled individuals is distributed on [0, 1] according to the following cumulative
distribution function:
F1(eh,t) = e
z+1
h,t , (3.5)
where the parameter z governs the slope of the density function f1(eh,t) = (1 + z)e
z
h,t.
This function is increasing in eh,t. The fraction of individuals with a high ability to
become high-skilled (i.e., with low high-skilled education cost) is decreasing in the size of
z. The parameter z determines the abundance of highly educated individuals.7
Furthermore, an additional simplifying assumption is made at this stage. College
education is predominantly obtained in urban regions. Hence, it is assumed that indi-
viduals in the rural region do not have the option to invest in high-skilled educational
attainment. This type of education can only be attained in the urban sector.8
As stated above, the wage payments per efficiency unit of labor in each sector is
determined by the marginal product of labor. By assumption, this marginal product
is higher in the nonagricultural sector than in the agricultural sector. With positive
movement costs (i.e., xλr∗r,t ≥ 0 ∀r∗, r, t) there are only one-directional movements of
individuals from the agricultural to the nonagricultural sector. It is simply not beneficial
for individuals to move from the urban to the rural region, since wage payments are
higher at the origin. Therefore, we focus only on the group of individuals born in the
agricultural sector when analyzing the movement decision. For some of these individuals
moving internally may be optimal. This depends on the individual-specific movement
cost parameter xλan,t. This parameter can be broadly interpreted as the effort required to
move between regions. It also captures individual preferences for living in urban or rural
regions and other causes of internal migration (Bryan et al., 2014). In addition, the cost
could also be interpreted as reflecting the ability of individuals to provide funds for the
moving process. Similarly to the education cost, it is assumed that the movement cost
xλan,t is distributed on [0, 1] according to the following cumulative distribution function:
F2(xan,t) = x
v+1
an,t, (3.6)
where v governs the slope of the density function f2(xan,t) = (1 + v)x
v
an,t. This function
is increasing in xan,t. The higher the value of the parameter v, the lower the fraction of
individuals for which moving becomes beneficial.9
3.2.3 Individual decisions
The timing of individual decisions is according to the following pattern: First, individuals
discover their movement cost xλr∗r,t and decide on moving between sectors. At this stage
individuals do not know their education cost eλs,t but know how it is distributed. Hence, it
is assumed that individuals have complete information about wage payments but may not
have complete information about all their individual-specific cost characteristics. This
7Note that for z = 0 the distribution is equal to the uniform distribution.
8In principle, it could also be assumed that education is simply more accessible in urban regions.
In this case high-skilled education would also be available in rural regions. It is key, however, that
education is more accessible in urban regions which is in line with the observation that the educational
infrastructure is usually more developed in urban areas.
9As before, the distribution is equal to the uniform distribution for v = 0.
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assumption can be interpreted as reflecting that individuals have complete information
about markets but may not have detailed knowledge about specific abilities required to
adjust to these markets. After the movement decision is made, those individuals that live
in the urban sector decide in a second step on education. Both decisions follow a discrete
choice in order to maximize the utility function given by Equation (3.4).
To better illustrate the decision structure, Figure 3.2 portrays a timeline of the decision
process in period t. Climatic changes influence the productivity level in the rural sector.
This affects the wage payments. Consequently, climatic changes have the potential to
change individual decisions via the impact on wages. Individual moving decisions are
made in the first stage. In the second stage, individuals decide on acquiring higher
education. In order to determine the optimal individual decisions, the problem is solved
backward in the following.
time
Stage 1
movement
decision
Stage 2
education
decision
climatic conditions individual movement educational attainment
Figure 3.2: Timeline
Education decisions. – After individuals moved and settled in the region where they
prefer to live, the education decision is made. By assumption, individuals living in the
rural sector do not have the option to invest in high-skilled education. However, indi-
viduals in the urban region decide on such an investment. Urban individuals decide on
acquiring education by maximizing Equation (3.4). The individual-specific cost of high-
skilled education eλh,t determines whether an individual acquires high-skilled education.
From transforming Equation (3.4) a threshold level of education cost can be derived:
eˆh,t ≡ Eh,t − 1
Eh,t
∀t. (3.7)
Individuals with a high-skilled education cost parameter lower than eˆh,t invest in educa-
tion, whereas individuals with an education cost higher than eˆh,t do not acquire education.
The threshold education cost is increasing in the efficiency units of labor high-skilled in-
dividuals can supply on the labor market (i.e.,
∂eˆh,t
∂Eh,t
> 0). This means more individuals
invest in high-skilled education if the rise in wage payments generated by higher efficiency
is higher.
Given the distribution specified in Equation (3.5), the share of individuals that live
in the urban region and invest in high-skilled education is described by:
hn,t ≡
(
Eh,t − 1
Eh,t
)z+1
∀t. (3.8)
The share hn,t is increasing in the efficiency units of labor high-skilled individuals can
supply on the labor market (i.e., ∂hn,t
∂Eh,t
> 0) and decreasing in the parameter z (i.e.,
∂hn,t
∂z
< 0).
Movement decisions. – Before individuals decide on acquiring high-skilled education,
individuals in the rural sector decide on moving to the urban sector.10 The decision to
10Note that as emphasized above, the assumption on the wage differential between both sectors impedes
movements from the urban to the rural sector.
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move between both regions depends on the difference in the future generated income in
both sectors and the individual specific movement cost xλr∗r,t. Individuals do not have
information on their exact education cost. However, they anticipate the probability that
their realized individual-specific high-skilled education cost eλh,t is below the threshold
level eˆh,t. This means individuals know they will invest in education with probability pt
if they live in the urban region. Following Equation (3.5), the probability pt is equal to
hn,t and given by Equation (3.8). Individuals born in the rural sector decide on moving
to the urban sector by maximizing their expected utility. From transforming Equation
(3.4) a threshold level of an individual moving cost from a to n can be derived:
xˆan,t ≡ 1− wa,t
wn,t
(Eh,tχt)
−pt ∀t, (3.9)
where χt ≡ eE t[ln(1−eλh,t)] is a term that captures the expected disutility from an invest-
ment in high-skilled education. Since there is no uncertainty about wages, the uncertainty
about future utility arises from the lack of information about the individual-specific ed-
ucation cost. Individuals with a moving cost higher than xˆan,t stay in the rural region,
whereas individuals with a moving cost lower than xˆan,t move to the urban region.
The threshold parameter xˆan,t is inversely proportional to the ratio of wages in both
sectors. If the difference between current wages in both sectors is higher, more individuals
move from rural to urban areas. This difference is higher if either the wage in the urban
sector is higher or the wage in the rural sector is lower (i.e., ∂xˆan,t
∂wn,t
> 0 and ∂xˆan,t
∂wa,t
< 0).11
Finally, the threshold moving cost is increasing in the size of the parameter capturing
education-induced efficiency (i.e., ∂xˆan,t
∂Eh,t
> 0) and decreasing in the size of the expected
disutility (i.e., ∂xˆan,t
∂χt
> 0).12 This means more individuals move internally if the expected
payoff of education investments is higher.
Given the distribution specified in Equation (3.6), the share of individuals that are
born in the rural region and decide to move to the urban region is described by:
man,t ≡
(
1− wa,t
wn,t
(Eh,tχt)
−pt
)v+1
∀t. (3.10)
The share man,t is decreasing in the parameter v (i.e.,
∂man,t
∂v
< 0).
3.2.4 Educational attainment
The individual decisions determine the size of the group of individuals that acquire high-
skilled education. The share of individuals born in the rural sector in period t is denoted
by rt. Consequently, the share of individuals born in the urban sector is given by 1− rt.
The share of individuals that decide to acquire high-skilled education Ht is given by:
Ht = [(1− rt) + rtman,t]hn,t ∀t. (3.11)
Combining Equations (3.3), (3.8), (3.10) and (3.11) leads to the following term:
Ht =
[
(1− rt) + rt
(
1− G(Ct)Aa,t
An,t
(Eh,tχt)
−pt
)v+1](
Eh,t − 1
Eh,t
)z+1
∀t. (3.12)
11Note that if the movement cost is interpreted as reflecting individual abilities to secure funds for the
moving process, climatic changes affect the moving decisions of those individuals that are in the middle
of this distribution. This is in line with the conclusion of Kubik and Maurel (2016) that individuals in
the middle of the wealth distributions react to weather shocks by moving internally.
12The disutility is higher for smaller χt.
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This expression explicitly links the climatic conditions in period t to the share of indi-
viduals that invest in high-skilled education. It simply states that the share of individuals
moving from the rural region is higher, the more severe the adverse climatic condition.
The share of individuals living in the urban region is higher if the share of individuals
moving from the rural region is higher. The future share of tertiary educated individuals
is higher if the share of individuals living in the urban region is higher.13
Formally this can be concluded by analyzing the signs of the partial derivatives of
Equation (3.12). The threshold level xˆan,t, that determines the share of individuals mi-
grating internally, is decreasing in the function G(Ct) which captures the climatic con-
ditions Ct (i.e.,
∂xˆan,t
∂G(Ct)
< 0). Therefore, the share of individuals investing in high-skilled
education in t is decreasing in the function that reflects the size of adverse climatic condi-
tions in period t (i.e., ∂Ht
∂G(Ct)
< 0). Since G(Ct) is decreasing in Ct, the share of individuals
investing in high-skilled education is increasing in the size of adverse climatic conditions
(i.e., ∂Ht
∂Ct
> 0).
Proposition 3.1 For given values of rt, Ar,t, Eh,t, χt, for exogenous parameters z,
v, and for a negative impact of adverse climatic conditions on agricultural productiv-
ity
(
∂G(Ct)
∂Ct
< 0
)
, adverse climatic conditions (Ct) increase the share of highly educated
individuals (Ht).
3.3 Empirical validation
The theoretical framework provides key predictions. This section aims at validating these
predictions by means of an empirical investigation drawing on two data sets. The first
sub-section describes the data sources and the construction of some additional variables.
The following sub-sections outline different estimation approaches to validate the key
theoretical predictions of the model.
3.3.1 Data
The first data set used for the empirical validation is an unbalanced panel data set for
37 African countries. The variables in this data set are provided at the country level
in intervals of five years (i.e., the difference between period t and t + 1 amounts to five
years). The second data set provides data at the province level for 111 provinces in 17
African countries. Collecting data at the province level for African economies is more
difficult than obtaining data at the country level. Data for provinces are accessible only
for recent years. Therefore, the second data set has a cross-sectional character.
Panel data
The crucial dependent variable in Equation (3.12) is the share of individuals investing in
high-skilled education within an economy.14 Data on the shares of people with completed
tertiary education are provided by Barro and Lee (2013). These data are available for
13Higher returns to education in the destination region (the urban sector) promote individual educa-
tional attainment. Hence, the theoretical prediction of the model is akin to the central argument of the
brain gain literature that is described above.
14In this section and the following sections we focus on the percentage shares for expositional conve-
nience.
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38 African countries in five-year intervals from 1950 until 2010. Note that this variable
captures the stocks of highly educated individuals. Since there is a time gap between the
decision to invest in education and the completion of education, the share of individuals
investing in tertiary education in period t is proxied by the stock of college educated
individuals in period t+ 1.15
Moreover, Equation (3.12) builds on the share of individuals born in the rural region.
The World Bank database on the World Development Indicators 2017 contains yearly
data on the share of the rural population for 52 African economies from 1960 to 2015.
The shares of the population in the urban sector are simply obtained as the reciprocal
shares. To be in line with the variable reflecting high-skilled educational attainment,
the quinquennial averages of the urban and rural shares are obtained by computing the
average of the yearly values five years around the year of interest.16
Following the approach of Beine and Parsons (2015), the impact of long-run environ-
mental factors is analyzed. In other words, the following analysis focuses on slow-onset
variables as opposed to addressing the impact of fast-onset shocks.17 Rainfall and tem-
perature data are obtained from the TS4.0 data set which is provided by the Climatic
Research Unit of the University of East Anglia. This data set contains monthly weather
observations on high-resolution 0.5◦ x 0.5◦ grids. The country level annual observations
are the averages of the area weighted monthly observations. Quinquennial values are ob-
tained by computing the mean of the five annual observations before the year of interest.
The approach differs from the approach taken above, because it is assumed that individ-
uals adapt their decisions to climatic conditions they observed in the recent past. The
effect of the absolute levels of rainfall or temperature might simply reflect the educational
attainment for wetter or warmer countries.18 Hence, the way in which adverse weather
impacts are measured is very important. As in Beine and Parsons (2015) or Dallmann
and Millock (2013), several different measures of the weather conditions are computed.
First, deviations are characterized by the difference between the country level quin-
quennial mean and the long-run mean given by:
Devi,t(Clim) = µ
5
i,t(Clim)− µLRi (Clim), (3.13)
where the index i denotes the country, µ5i,t(Clim) denotes the quinquennial means of the
climate variable (Clim ∈ {Pre, Tem}), that can be precipitation (Pre) or temperature
(Tem), five years before time t and µLRi (Clim) denotes the long-run mean of the climate
variable for the 20th century. Hence, the long-run refers in this context to the period
1901 until 2000.
Second, anomalies are obtained by normalizing the deviations by dividing through
15In general, there is no specific restriction or prediction on the time it takes for internal migration to
have an impact on stocks of tertiary educated individuals. Given that most college degrees take around
three years to complete, it is reasonable to assume a time gap of five years for the analysis.
16Note that the model relies on the stock of individuals in urban areas in order to capture inter-
nal migration movements. Different fertilities between sectors are not accounted for in the theoretical
framework. The literature has shown that for the period between 1960 and 1990 around half of African
urbanization can be explained by internal migration movements (Zachariah and Conde, 1981; Kelley,
1991; Barrios et al., 2006). If this share is constant, fertility differentials should have no qualitative
impact on the results of the empirical analysis.
17As argued in the previous chapter, the slow-onset indicators and the frequency of fast-onset shocks
are positively correlated.
18Note that there is arguably a high correlation between temperature and institutional quality (Ace-
moglu et al., 2002; Sachs, 2003; Rodrik et al., 2004).
102 CHAPTER 3. CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN AFRICA
the long-run standard deviations:
Anoi,t(Clim) =
µ5i,t(Clim)− µLRi (Clim)
σLRi (Clim)
, (3.14)
where σLRi (Clim) denotes the long-run standard deviation of temperature or rainfall for
the the 20th century. As argued by Marchiori et al. (2012), this measure corrects for
scale effects.
Third, similarly to Iyer and Topalova (2014), a non-linear measure of the climatic
conditions is constructed. For this measure positive and negative climatic conditions
are simply counted. A positive rainfall (respectively temperature) shock is defined as
a yearly rainfall (respectively temperature) level that is one standard deviation above
(respectively below) the long-run mean for the 20th century. Equivalently, a negative
rainfall (respectively temperature) shock is characterized as a yearly rainfall (respectively
temperature) level that is one standard deviation below (respectively above) the long-run
mean. For each year a variable is constructed which takes the value of one if a positive
and minus one if a negative rainfall or temperature shock occurred:19
Dumi,t′(Pre) =

1 Prei,t′ > µ
LR
i (Pre) + σ
LR
i (Pre)
−1 Prei,t′ < µLRi (Pre)− σLRi (Pre)
0 otherwise
(3.15)
Dumi,t′(Tem) =

1 Temi,t′ < µ
LR
i (Tem)− σLRi (Tem)
−1 Temi,t′ > µLRi (Tem) + σLRi (Tem)
0 otherwise
(3.16)
These variables are then summed for the five years before time period t in order to obtain
the non-linear measure:
Nlini,t(Clim) =
t∑
t′=t−5
Dumi,t′(Clim). (3.17)
The non-linear variable capturing the climatic conditions can take a value between minus
five and five. The higher the value of this variable, the more positive are the climatic
conditions five years before time period t.
Finally, some control variables are used in the empirical investigation. Data on the
gross domestic product per capita are taken from the World Bank database on the World
Development Indicators 2017. The yearly data are given in constant 2010 US Dollars for
the period between 1960 and 2016. Moreover, as in Castello´-Climent and Mukhopadhyay
(2013), the adult population is defined as the sum of individuals that are older than
15 years. Yearly population data by age group are provided by the United Nations
Population Division for the period between 1950 and 2015. From these data, the share of
population that is older than 15 years is computed. To be in line with the other variables
of the data set, quinquennial averages of both variables are computed as the average of
the yearly values five years around the year of interest.
19Unreported results show that using dummy variables for positive and negative weather shocks sepa-
rately in the regression analysis leads to similar results. For this reason, the analysis focuses on a variable
that jointly captures positive and negative weather events.
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Table 3.1 reports some descriptive statistics for the variables of the data set. The
merged data set is unbalanced and provides information for 37 economies in Africa from
1960 to 2010.20
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics - panel data
count mean s.d. min max
Tertiary completed 370 1.63 1.94 0.0 11.7
Urban population 370 29.49 17.00 2.1 83.4
Pre. Deviation 370 -0.99 6.93 -40.5 21.8
Tem. Deviation 370 0.15 0.39 -0.7 1.5
Pre. Anomaly 370 -0.09 0.59 -1.7 1.5
Tem. Anomaly 370 0.37 1.02 -1.5 6.1
Non-linear Pre. 370 -0.20 1.49 -4.0 3.0
Non-linear Tem. 370 -0.78 2.23 -5.0 4.0
ln(GDP per capita) 335 6.89 0.93 4.9 9.6
Adult population 370 56.16 4.19 50.0 75.4
Notes: This table reports some descriptive statistics for the share of individuals with completed tertiary
education (tertiary completed), the share of people living in urban regions (urban population), the
logarithm of the GDP per capita (ln(GDP per capita)), the share of people that are older than 15 years
(adult population), as well as the temperature and precipitation deviation (Devi,t(Clim)), anomaly
(Anoi,t(Clim)), and non-linear measures (Nlini,t(Clim)). Depicted shares are percentage shares.
Cross-sectional data
The Gallup World Polls provide data on individual educational attainment. For each
of 111 African provinces the provincial share of high-skilled individuals is computed as
the weighted sum of tertiary educated individuals divided by the weighted sum of all
individuals living in the respective province. As stated above, the individual decision
to invest in high-skilled education is not immediately reflected in the stocks of tertiary
educated individuals. The share of individuals investing in tertiary education in a certain
period is proxied by the provincial stock of college educated individuals between two and
nine years later.21
Henderson et al. (2017) use weather variables at the province level for their analysis
of the connection between climate change and urbanization in African provinces. Their
data is used to analyze the impact of climatic conditions at the province level. Following
the approach of Henderson et al. (2017), the change in climatic conditions is defined as:
Changej(Clim) =
ln(Climj,t)− ln(Climj,t−4)
4
, (3.18)
where the index j denotes the province, Climj,t is the climate variable at time t, that can
be precipitation (Pre) or temperature (Tem). The change in rainfall or temperature is
measured in a four-year interval. This comes closest to the approach applied for the panel
data analysis which consists of computing the differences over five years. The variable
20Table 3.A1 in Appendix 3.A.1 lists the countries of the panel data set. Figure 3.A1 in Appendix
3.A.1 provides a map of Africa which illustrates the countries for which panel data is used in the linear
regression.
21Restrictions in the availability of data only allow to match the provincial data on the basis of this
wide time frame.
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Changej(Clim) reflects the assumption that the change in the climatic conditions in the
recent past impacts on individual decisions.
Finally, three control variables are used in the empirical analysis. Two of these vari-
ables are only available at the country level. As before, the country-specific share of the
population that is older than 15 years is computed from data provided by the United Na-
tions Population Division. For this control variable the averages of the yearly values five
years around the year 2005 are computed. In addition, similarly to Castello´-Climent and
Mukhopadhyay (2013) a country-specific control variable on the government expenditures
is used in the cross-sectional regression analysis. The UNESCO Institute for Statistics
provides data on the government expenditures on education as a share of total govern-
ment expenditures. These shares for the year 2005 are included in the cross-sectional
specification as an additional control variable.22 The control variable on the economic
capacity can be computed at the province level. The Gallup World Polls provide data on
household income. Similarly to the approach for the province-specific high-skilled shares
described above, the average of the household income levels are computed for each of the
111 provinces. The logarithmic values of these province-specific income levels are used
as a proxy for the GDP per capita in each province.23
Table 3.2 reports some descriptive statistics for the variables in the cross-sectional
data set. Data are available for one time period per country only. The time periods
match years between 2000 and 2009.24
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics - cross-sectional data
count mean s.d. min max
Tertiary completed 111 1.81 2.14 0.1 10.7
Pre. Change 111 0.0017 0.0111 -0.0368 0.0420
Tem. Change 111 0.0012 0.0019 -0.0062 0.0074
ln(income) 111 6.42 0.57 5.0 7.7
Adult population 111 55.86 3.48 50.8 64.9
Expenditures 111 19.26 6.27 7.7 32.4
Notes: This table reports some descriptive statistics for the share of individuals with completed ter-
tiary education (tertiary completed), the change in precipitation and temperature at province level
(Changej(Clim)), the logarithm of the household income levels (ln(income)) at province level, the share
of people that are older than 15 years at the country level (adult population), and the government ex-
penditures on education as a share of total government expenditures. Depicted shares are percentage
shares.
22Due to data limitations, information on the government expenditures on education of the year 2006
is used for Niger.
23For Zimbabwe no province-specific income levels could be computed from the Gallup World Polls.
Therefore, the GDP per capita from the World Development Indicators 2017 is taken as a proxy for the
income levels in the provinces of Zimbabwe.
24Table 3.A2 in Appendix 3.A.1 lists the countries and provinces of the cross-sectional data set. Figure
3.A2 in Appendix 3.A.1 provides a map of Africa which illustrates the provinces for which the cross-
sectional data set is used in the linear regression. The cross-sectional data set is corrected in some ways.
First, data for Kenya are available at a more detailed scale, so that data on several administrative regions
are merged at the province level. Second, for other countries of the data set some provinces are merged.
Third, data on educational attainment appear unreasonably high in very few cases, so that provinces
with a share of high-skilled individuals above 0.11 are dropped from the data set. This leads to the
exclusion of three observations.
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3.3.2 Linear regression - reduced form
In a first step, this sub-section investigates whether there is a correlation between edu-
cational attainment and adverse climatic changes in Africa.25 The approach consists of
estimating the reduced form of the model in order to analyze whether climatic conditions
and human capital accumulation are related. Equation (3.12) illustrates the dependence
of the share of high-skilled individuals on the climatic conditions. The main prediction of
the model is that the share of tertiary educated workers is higher if the adverse weather
impact is more severe.26 The data sets allow to estimate a linear dependence of this form.
Panel data
The regression analysis for the panel data set focuses on two estimable equations. The
first part of this sub-section analyzes the simplest specification to assess the potential cor-
relation between climate change and high-skilled educational attainment. The following
equation is estimated:
Hi,t = β
l.p.A
0 + β
l.p.A
1 Ci,t + β
l.p.A
2 ln(y
c
i,t) + β
l.p.A
3 pop
a
i,t + ki + 
l.p.A
i,t , (3.19)
where the index i denotes the country, Hi,t is the share of individuals with completed
tertiary education (at time t + 1), Ci,t is a measure for the climate variable at time t,
ln(yci,t) is the logarithm of the GDP per capita at time t, pop
a
i,t is the share of individuals
older than 15 years at time t, ki is a country fixed effect, and 
l.p.A
i,t is the error term.
Similarly to Castello´-Climent and Mukhopadhyay (2013), the linear regression analysis
controls for the GDP per capita and the size of the adult population. Both measures
are expected to impact on the share of individuals obtaining high-skilled education.27
Furthermore, country fixed effects capture the role of idiosyncrasies at the country level.
Finally, one could also think of adding time fixed effects to the specification. However, the
empirical analysis focuses on one continent. Overall, the weather conditions analyzed here
(rainfall and temperature) could potentially be correlated across regions. For instance,
exceptionally hot or cold years might affect a whole continent in a similar manner. If this
is the case, time fixed effects would absorb some of the variation in the weather conditions.
For this reason, the analysis refrains from including time fixed in the specification.
Table 3.3 gives the results of the estimation. Columns (1), (3), and (5) contain the
results for the estimations in which the rainfall data is used. Columns (1) and (3) show
that there is a negative correlation between precipitation deviations as well as anomalies
and the share of tertiary educated individuals five years later. Column (5) indicates that
a higher number of positive rainfall shocks occurring in the recent past is correlated with
a lower future share of college educated workers.
25For additional illustration, Appendix 3.A.2 provides graphs which depict the correlation between the
climate variables contained in the data sets and the variables capturing future educational attainment.
Note that the slopes of the curves illustrating the linear fit have the expected signs.
26Remember that the partial derivative of Equation (3.12) with respect to the measure of the adverse
weather impact is positive (i.e., ∂Ht∂Ct > 0).
27The use of additional control variables may further increase the precision of the empirical analysis.
For instance, Castello´-Climent and Mukhopadhyay (2013) use total or development expenditures as
additional control variables. However, including such measures comes at the severe cost of drastically
decreasing the number of observations for the panel data analysis. Data on government expenditures are
only available for 91 observations of the data set used in this section. In the cross-sectional analysis a
control variable on government expenditures can be included.
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Table 3.3: Linear fixed effects regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Tertiary completed (5 years later)
Pre. Deviation -0.0564***
(0.0160)
Tem. Deviation 1.805***
(0.225)
Pre. Anomaly -0.843***
(0.127)
Tem. Anomaly 0.592***
(0.101)
Non-linear Pre. -0.336***
(0.0582)
Non-linear Tem. -0.288***
(0.0386)
ln(GDP per capita) 0.904** 0.906** 0.944** 1.047*** 0.945** 1.002***
(0.388) (0.375) (0.388) (0.387) (0.382) (0.376)
Adult population 0.221*** 0.116** 0.217*** 0.142** 0.219*** 0.138**
(0.058) (0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057)
Constant -9.025** -3.406 -9.675** -6.190 -9.603** -5.733
(4.413) (4.306) (4.283) (4.368) (4.398) (4.387)
Observations 335 335 335 335 335 335
Number of countries 37 37 37 37 37 37
R-squared 0.646 0.681 0.660 0.670 0.661 0.675
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table reports the coefficients for the linear fixed effects regression. The independent variables
include the deviation in precipitation and temperature (Devi,t(Pre) and Devi,t(Tem)), the precipitation
and temperature anomalies (Anoi,t(Pre) and Anoi,t(Tem)), and the non-linear measure of precipitation
and temperature (Nlini,t(Pre) and Nlini,t(Tem)). The control variables include the logarithm of the
GDP per capita (ln(GDP per capita)) and the share of the population older than 15 years (adult popu-
lation). Country fixed effects are not depicted. The dependent variable is the share of individuals with
completed tertiary education five years after period t. Shares are measured in percentage.
Columns (2), (4), and (6) depict the results for the estimations using the temperature
data. The results indicate that temperature deviations or anomalies occurring in Africa
are positively correlated with the share of individuals investing in high-skilled education.
Column (6) shows that higher numbers of positive temperature shocks are negatively
correlated with the shares of tertiary educated individuals five years later.
Furthermore, a second specification for the reduced form estimation of the model is
analyzed. Many of the macroeconometric analyses addressing high-skilled educational
attainment propose a dynamic specification of human capital accumulation. Commonly
a β-convergence specification is estimated.28 The second part of this sub-section follows
28For instance, Beine et al. (2008) use a β-convergence equation for their analysis of the brain drain
phenomenon. In addition, the following proposed specification is fully in line with the specification
applied in Chapter 4.
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this approach and focuses on the following estimable equation:
ln
(
Hi,t
Hi,t−1
)
= βl.p.B0 +β
l.p.B
1 Ci,t +β
l.p.B
2 ln (Hi,t−1) +β
l.p.B
3 ln(y
c
i,t) +β
l.p.B
4 pop
a
i,t + ki + 
l.p.B
i,t ,
(3.20)
where the index i denotes the country, Hi,t is the share of individuals with completed
tertiary education (at time t+1), Hi,t−1 is the share of individuals with completed tertiary
education (at time t), Ci,t is a measure for the climate variable at time t, ln(y
c
i,t) is the
logarithm of the GDP per capita at time t, popai,t is the share of individuals older than 15
years at time t, ki is a country fixed effect, and 
l.p.B
i,t is the error term. This specification
focuses on the change in the shares of high-skilled individuals. It departs from equation
(3.12) which is derived in the theoretical section and links climatic conditions to the
share of individuals living in urban areas and the share of individuals investing in tertiary
education.29
Table 3.4 provides the results of the estimation with the dynamic specification. In
line with the literature (see Beine et al., 2008), there is a statistically significant negative
effect of the share of tertiary educated individuals in the previous period. This indicates
a catching-up process in terms of human capital.
Equivalently to Table 3.3, columns (1), (3), and (5) of Table 3.4 give the results for the
estimations in which the rainfall data is used while columns (2), (4), and (6) depict the
results for the estimations using the temperature data. Columns (1) and (3) show that
there is a negative correlation between precipitation deviations as well as anomalies and
the change in human capital. For the other climate variables no statistically significant
effect can be recorded. Nevertheless, the signs of the coefficients are in line with the
previous results depicted in Table 3.3. This further indicates that unfavorable climatic
conditions are positively correlated with a change in human capital accumulation.
Cross-sectional data
Similarly to the analysis at the country level, the correlation between climatic conditions
and educational attainment can be investigated at the province level. The regression
analysis for the cross-sectional data set focuses on the following estimable equation:
Hj = β
l.c
0 + β
l.c
1 Cj + β
l.c
2 ln(y
c
j) + β
l.c
3 pop
a
i + β
l.c
4 expi + 
l.c
j , (3.21)
where the index i denotes the country, the index j denotes the province, Hj is the share
of individuals with tertiary education, Cj is a measure for the climate variable, ln(y
c
j) is
the logarithm of the income levels, popai is the share of individuals older than 15 years,
expi is the share of educational government expenditures, and 
l.c
j is the error term.
Table 3.5 shows the results for the linear estimation of the reduced form of the model
at the province level. Column (1) contains the result for the estimation in which the
change in rainfall is used as a proxy of the climatic conditions. The result points to a
negative correlation between precipitation and the share of tertiary educated individuals
29Many studies addressing internal migration analyze a similar change in the shares of individuals
living in urban areas in different time periods. For instance, Henderson et al. (2017) focus on the
annualized growth of the urban population share. In general, the current analysis could follow a similar
strategy by including a specification with the change in the shares of individuals living in urban areas.
However, a specification focusing on the change in the urban population shares departs further from the
main theoretical prediction derived from the model. Therefore, it is not included in the current analysis.
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Table 3.4: Linear fixed effects regression - dynamic specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Change in tertiary completed (in 5 years)
Pre. Deviation -0.0157*
(0.00823)
Tem. Deviation 0.177
(0.170)
Pre. Anomaly -0.180**
(0.0883)
Tem. Anomaly 0.0455
(0.0555)
Non-linear Pre. -0.0579
(0.0356)
Non-linear Tem. -0.0228
(0.0271)
ln(tertiary completed) -0.206*** -0.209** -0.220*** -0.197** -0.210*** -0.198**
(0.0663) (0.0915) (0.0725) (0.0878) (0.0752) (0.0884)
ln(GDP per capita) 0.105 0.121 0.128 0.125 0.123 0.124
(0.0915) (0.106) (0.0951) (0.115) (0.0971) (0.111)
Adult population -0.0019 -0.0141* -0.0025 -0.0100 -0.0029 -0.0106
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Constant 0.255 0.805 0.00239 0.511 0.111 0.550
(1.149) (0.977) (1.199) (1.099) (1.232) (1.076)
Observations 331 331 331 331 331 331
Number of countries 37 37 37 37 37 37
R-squared 0.220 0.183 0.215 0.177 0.200 0.178
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table reports the coefficients for the linear fixed effects regression in the dynamic specification.
The independent variables include the deviation in precipitation and temperature (Devi,t(Pre) and
Devi,t(Tem)), the precipitation and temperature anomalies (Anoi,t(Pre) and Anoi,t(Tem)), and the
non-linear measure of precipitation and temperature (Nlini,t(Pre) and Nlini,t(Tem)). The control
variables include the logarithm of the share of individuals with completed tertiary education in period
t (ln(tertiary completed)), the logarithm of the GDP per capita (ln(GDP per capita)), and the share
of the population older than 15 years (adult population). Country fixed effects are not depicted. The
dependent variable is the logarithm of the share of individuals with completed tertiary education five
years after period t divided by the share of individuals with completed tertiary education in period t.
Shares are measured in percentage.
several years later. However, the coefficient is not precisely estimable. Column (2) illus-
trates the result for the estimation in which the temperature change is used. It indicates
that an increase in temperature levels occurring in the recent past is correlated with a
higher future share of college educated workers. The depicted coefficient is statistically
significant at the ten percent level. These results are in line with the results of the linear
country fixed effects regression analysis for the panel data set. The coefficients have the
expected signs but are only significant when the temperature data is used.
Overall, the results of the linear regression analysis might only reflect correlations
between different variables. They are results of a reduced form estimation. However, these
results align with the model prediction on the sign of the partial derivative of Equation
(3.12) with respect to the climatic variation. In this light, the linear regression analysis
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Table 3.5: Linear regression - province data
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Tertiary completed (2-9 years later)
Pre. Change -25.06
(23.36)
Tem. Change 219.2*
(121.1)
ln(income) 1.455*** 1.443***
(0.423) (0.387)
Adult population -0.0104 0.0676
(0.0625) (0.0686)
Expenditures -0.0495 -0.0822
(0.0458) (0.0496)
Constant -5.958** -9.909***
(2.497) (3.301)
Number of provinces 111 111
Number of countries 17 17
R-squared 0.120 0.128
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table reports the coefficients for the linear regression for the cross-sectional province data.
The independent varibale include the change in precipitation (Changej(Pre)) and the change in tem-
perature (Changej(Tem)) between period t and four years before period t. These variables are region-
specific. The control variables include the province-specific logarithm of the household income levels
(ln(income)), the country-specific share of the population older than 15 years (adult population), and
the country-specific government expenditures on education as a share of total government expenditures.
The dependent variable is the region-specific share of individuals with tertiary education between two
and nine years after period t. Shares are measured in percentage.
can be understood as a first step in empirically validating the theoretical predictions of
the model. In the next sub-section another approach is taken to reinforce the results.
3.3.3 Two-Stage least squares regression - structural form
The main claim of the theoretical model is that climatic changes impact on tertiary
educational attainment via their effect on internal migration. A Two-Stage least squares
regression analysis based on the panel data set allows to isolate and test this effect.
This aims at estimating the structural form of the model and is considered as the main
empirical validation of the predictions derived from the theoretical framework.
Column (1) of Table 3.6 shows that there is a significant positive effect of the share of
people living in urban areas on the share of individuals with completed tertiary education
five years later. In an analogous manner to columns (1) to (6) of Table 3.3, this column
provides the coefficients of a country fixed effects estimation with the usual control vari-
ables. Column (2) provides the results for the estimation using the dynamic specification.
The coefficient of interest is not statistically significant but has the expected sign.
A Two-Stage least squares country fixed effects regression analysis is conducted to
investigate whether the correlation between higher shares of the urban population and
future tertiary educational attainment may result from the impact of weather changes.
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Table 3.6: Correlation between urban population and tertiary educational attainment
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Tertiary completed Change in tertiary completed
(5 years later) (in 5 years)
Urban population 0.119*** 0.0137
(0.0107) (0.00908)
ln(GDP per capita) -0.0640 0.0486
(0.232) (0.0731)
Adult population 0.194*** -0.0052
(0.0411) (0.0081)
ln(tertiary completed) -0.275**
(0.119)
Constant -7.459* 0.0813
(4.173) (1.295)
Observations 335 331
Number of Countries 37 37
R-squared 0.791 0.201
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table reports the coefficients for the linear fixed effects regression with the simple and
the dynamic specification. The control variables include the logarithm of the share of individuals with
completed tertiary education in period t (ln(tertiary completed)), the logarithm of the GDP per capita
(ln(GDP per capita)), and the share of the population older than 15 years (adult population). Country
fixed effects are not depicted. The dependent variable is the share of individuals with completed tertiary
education five years after period t (column (1)) and the logarithm of the share of individuals with
completed tertiary education five years after period t divided by the share of individuals with completed
tertiary education in period t (column (2)). Shares are measured in percentage.
The regression analysis is based on the following two stages. First stage:
ui,t = α
2SLS
0 + α
2SLS
1 C
p
i,t + α
2SLS
1 C
t
i,t + ki + v
2SLS
i,t , (3.22)
where ui,t is the share of the urban population at time t in country i, C
p
i,t is the variable
capturing rainfall variation at time t in country i, Cti,t is the variable capturing temper-
ature variation at time t in country i, ki is a country fixed effect, and v
2SLS
i,t is the error
term.30 In line with the linear regression analysis, two variations of the estimation of the
second stage are analyzed. The second stage for the simplest version is given by:
Hi,t = β
2SLS.A
0 + β
2SLS.A
1 uˆi,t + β
2SLS.A
2 ln(y
c
i,t) + β
2SLS.A
3 pop
a
i,t + ki + e
2SLS.A
i,t , (3.23)
where Hi,t is the share of highly educated individuals (i.e., the stocks of individuals with
completed tertiary education five years after time t) in country i, ln(yci,t) is the logarithm
of the GDP per capita at time t, popai,t is the share of individuals older than 15 years at
time t, ki is a country fixed effect, and e
2SLS.A
i,t is the error term.
30Two instrumental variables are used jointly in the first stage regression to test the validity of the
instrumental variables used in the Two-Stage least squares regression analysis. This differs slightly from
the expression of the theoretical model. Using only one of the instruments at a time gives very similar
and significant results as shown by unreported results.
3.3. EMPIRICAL VALIDATION 111
In addition, a dynamic specification of the second stage is analyzed. This is given by:
ln
(
Hi,t
Hi,t−1
)
= β2SLS.B0 + β
2SLS.B
1 uˆi,t + β
2SLS.B
2 ln (Hi,t−1) (3.24)
+ β2SLS.B3 ln(y
c
i,t) + β
2SLS.B
4 pop
a
i,t + ki + e
2SLS.B
i,t , (3.25)
where Hi,t is the share of individuals with completed tertiary education five years after
time t in country i, Hi,t−1 is the share of individuals with completed tertiary education
at time t in country i, ln(yci,t) is the logarithm of the GDP per capita at time t, pop
a
i,t
is the share of individuals older than 15 years at time t, ki is a country fixed effect, and
e2SLS.Bi,t is the error term.
Table 3.7 depicts the coefficients for the first stage of the Two-Stage least squares
country fixed effects estimation. Negative rainfall and positive temperature deviations
have a positive effect on urbanization rates as depicted in column (1). Similarly, column
(2) shows that negative rainfall and positive temperature anomalies have a positive effect
on urbanization rates. Finally, column (3) indicates that a higher number of years with
positive rainfall and temperature shocks is associated with a lower urbanization rate.
This means the coefficients have the expected signs. All results are significant at the one
percent level.
Table 3.7: 2SLS fixed effects regression - first stage
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Urban population
Pre. Deviation -0.320***
(0.0659)
Tem. Deviation 12.98***
(1.184)
Pre. Anomaly -4.486***
(0.801)
Tem. Anomaly 4.112***
(0.470)
Non-linear Pre. -1.868***
(0.312)
Non-linear Tem. -1.922***
(0.213)
Constant 27.24*** 27.61*** 27.61***
(0.455) (0.462) (0.457)
Observations 335 335 335
Number of Countries 37 37 37
R-squared 0.384 0.349 0.359
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table reports the results for the first stage of the Two-Stage least squares country
fixed effects estimation. The independent variables include the deviation in precipitation and tem-
perature (Devi,t(Pre) and Devi,t(Tem)), the precipitation and temperature anomalies (Anoi,t(Pre)
and Anoi,t(Tem)), and the non-linear measure of precipitation and temperature (Nlini,t(Pre) and
Nlini,t(Tem)). Country fixed effects are not depicted. The dependent variable is the share of indi-
viduals living in urban areas in period t. Shares are measured in percentage.
Table 3.8 depicts the results for the second stage regression. The left panel of the
table reports the result for the simple specification, while the right panel provides the
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results for the dynamic specification. Column (1) and (4) depict the results if rainfall
and temperature deviations are used in the first stage. Column (2) and (5) show the
equivalent results for rainfall and temperature anomalies. Finally, column (3) and (6)
depict the results if the non-linear measures of rainfall and temperature are used in
the first stage. The coefficients have the expected signs and are significant at the one
percent level. Furthermore, the reported F statistics are high and above ten in all cases.
This indicates that the instrumental variables are not weak. Moreover, for the simple
specification the instrumental variables seem not to be orthogonal to the error term in the
second stage. The reported Sargan p-values are high, so that the null hypothesis that the
instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage cannot
be rejected at the one percent level. This indicates statistical validity of the instrumental
variables when the specification most closely related to the theoretical model is considered.
For the dynamic specification the Sargan p-values are lower and only close to 0.2 when
the non-linear measures of precipitation and temperature are included in the first stage
regression.
Table 3.8: 2SLS fixed effects regression - second stage
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Tertiary completed Change in tertiary completed
(5 years later) (in 5 years)
(Dev) (Ano) (Nlin) (Dev) (Ano) (Nlin)
Urban population 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.122*** 0.0482*** 0.0511*** 0.0444***
(0.0123) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0140) (0.0170) (0.0154)
ln(GDP per capita) -0.0433 -0.0519 -0.0898 -0.0905 -0.102 -0.0752
(0.243) (0.245) (0.244) (0.103) (0.111) (0.105)
Adult population 0.1948*** 0.1947*** 0.1940*** -0.0067 -0.0068 -0.0065
(0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0253) (0.0100) (0.0101) (0.0098)
ln(tertiary completed) -0.539*** -0.562*** -0.510***
(0.111) (0.134) (0.121)
Observations 335 335 335 331 331 331
R-squared 0.552 0.552 0.552 -0.050 -0.086 -0.008
Number of Countries 37 37 37 37 37 37
Craig-Donald Wald
F statistic 94.26 86.7 88.35 17.68 11.91 13.66
Sargan p-value 0.935 0.52 0.849 0.04 0.046 0.185
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table reports the results for the second stage of the Two-Stage least squares country fixed
effects estimation. The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the share of individuals with completed
tertiary education five years after period t. The dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is the logarithm of
the share of individuals with completed tertiary education five years after period t divided by the share
of individuals with completed tertiary education in period t. Temperature and precipitation deviations
(Dev), anomalies (Ano), and non-linear measures of temperature and rainfall (Nlin) are used as variables
in the first stage. The control variables include the logarithm of the GDP per capita (ln(GDP per capita)),
the share of the population older than 15 years (adult population), and the logarithm of the share of
individuals with completed tertiary education in period t (ln(tertiary completed)). Country fixed effects
are not depicted. Shares are measured in percentage.
In addition to the results of the linear estimation, the results obtained by estimating
the structural form of the model confirm the predictions of the theoretical framework.
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These results show that climatic variations affect the level of internal migration, as mea-
sured by the share of people living in urban areas. Increased urbanization in turn impacts
on the proportion of highly educated workers within each country.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter investigates the link between tertiary educational attainment and variation
of climate variables in Africa. Recent analyses of this connection do not provide long-run
conclusions at the macro-level. Numerous contributions to the literature find that adverse
weather changes have a negative impact on production, particularly in the agricultural
sector. Moreover, several studies show that the agricultural sector seems to be unable
to adjust to these changes which potentially induces more people to leave rural areas.
This chapter incorporates these findings in a theoretical model. This model predicts that
unfavorable weather changes in the past generate higher shares of individuals moving
from rural to urban regions. This will increase the future share of individuals investing in
high-skilled education, because the access and returns to education are higher in urban
regions. In this light, the model addresses the capacities of economies to adapt to weather
changes via increasing their share of highly educated workers.
The empirical section of the chapter validates the key predictions of the model. By
drawing on a panel data set for 37 African countries and a cross-sectional data set for
111 African provinces, the empirical analysis confirms that there is a positive correlation
between adverse weather changes and future shares of tertiary educated individuals. In
addition, a Two-Stage least squares regression analysis indicates that the correlation be-
tween urbanization and future tertiary educational attainment results from the impact
of rainfall or temperature changes. The conclusion that climate change might have ben-
eficial effects on high-skilled human capital accumulation may be somewhat unexpected.
Nevertheless, this shows that climate change potentially affects economies through mul-
tiple and complex channels and that the overall effects of weather changes are not always
purely one-directional. These findings further underline the importance of policies tar-
geting education quality and sustainable urban development as advocated by the findings
of the previous chapters. If there are indeed some beneficial effects of weather changes
on human capital accumulation, it is vital to harness these potentially beneficial effects
by ensuring that effective policy environments exist.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 African countries and provinces
Table 3.A1: African countries in the panel data set
Algeria (DZA), Benin (BEN), Botswana (BWA), Burundi (BDI), Cameroon (CMR), Central African
Republic (CAF), Congo (COG), Cote d’Ivoire (CIV), Democratic Republic of the Congo (COD), Egypt
(EGY), Gabon (GAB), The Gambia (GMB), Ghana (GHA), Kenya (KEN), Lesotho (LSO), Liberia
(LBR), Libya (LBY), Malawi (MWI), Mali (MLI), Mauritania (MRT), Mauritius (MUS), Morocco
(MAR), Mozambique (MOZ), Namibia (NAM), Niger (NER), Rwanda (RWA), Senegal (SEN), Sierra
Leone (SLE), South Africa (ZAF), Sudan (SDN), Swaziland (SWZ), Tanzania (TZA), Togo (TGO),
Tunisia (TUN), Uganda (UGA), Zambia (ZMB), Zimbabwe (ZWE)
Table 3.A2: African countries and provinces in the cross-sectional data set
Benin (BEN): Atacora and Donga, Mono and Couffo, Borgou and Alibori, Zou and Collins, Atlantique
and Littoral, Oueme and Plateau
Botswana (BWA): North-East, Kgatleng, South-East, Ghanzi, Ngamiland-old, Central, Kweneng
Burkina Faso (BFA): Nord, Centre Nord, Centre Sud, Centre Est, Centre, Sud-Ouest, Hauts Bassins
Cameroon (CMR): Nord-Ouest, Est, Ouest, Centre Sud, Nord and Adamoua and Extreme Nord,
Sud-Ouest, Littoral
Central African Republic (CAF): Ouaka, Basse-Kotto, Ombella-M’Poko and Bangui
Chad (TCD): Tandjile, Lac, Mayo-Kebbi, West Logone (Occidental), East Logone (Oriental), Kanem
and Bahr el Gazal, Guera, Chari-Baguirmi and N’Djamena and Hadjer Lamis
Ghana (GHA): Eastern, Ashanti, Northern, Volta, Brong Ahafo, Greater Accra, Western
Kenya (KEN): Eastern, North Eastern, Rift Valley, Central, Nyanza, Nairobi, Western, Coast
Lesotho (LSO): Maseru, Quthing, Mohale’s Hoek, Leribe, Mafeteng, Berea
Mali (MLI): Koulikoro, Segou, Kayes, Bamako, Gao and Kidal, Sikasso
Mozambique (MOZ): Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Province of Maputo, Sofala
Niger (NER): Agadez, Zinder, Diffa, Niamey/Tillaberi, Maradi
Senegal (SEN): Fleuve/Saint-Louis and Matam, Sine-Saloum (Fatick and Kaolack and Kaffrine),
Cap-Vert/Dakar, Thies, Louga, Casamance (Kolda and Ziguinchor and Sedhiou), Senegal Orien-
tal/Tambacounda and Kedougou, Diourbel
Sierra Leone (SLE): Western, Northern, Southern, Eastern
Tanzania (TZA): Mbeya, Mwanza, Mara, Tabora, Kigoma, Morogoro, Kagera, Dar es Salaam, Iringa,
Kilimanjaro, Shinyanga, Ruvuma
Zambia (ZMB): Western, Central and Lusaka, Southern, Eastern, Copperbelt, Northern, North-
Western
Zimbabwe (ZWE): Mashonaland East, Mashonaland West, Mashonaland Central, Matabeleland
South, Matabeleland North, Midlands
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Figure 3.A1: Share of college educated individuals in 2010 in African countries
Notes: This figure reports the percentage share of college educated individuals for the year 2010 in
African countries in the panel data set. Countries are grouped into five bins, each bin representing a
quintile of the distribution of tertiary educated individuals.
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Figure 3.A2: Share of college educated individuals in African provinces
Notes: This figure reports the percentage share of college educated individuals for the provinces in Africa
in the cross-sectional data set. Provinces are grouped into five bins, each bin representing a quintile of
the distribution of tertiary educated individuals.
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3.A.2 Correlation between climate variables and human capital
accumulation
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(e) Non-linear Precipitation
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(f) Non-linear Temperature
Figure 3.A3: Pooled panel data
Notes: This figure reports the correlation between the country-specific precipitation and temperature
variables and the country-specific percentage shares of individuals with completed tertiary education five
years later. Observations are pooled.
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Figure 3.A4: Cross-sectional data
Notes: This figure reports the correlation between the province-specific precipitation and temperature
changes and the province-specific percentage shares of individuals with completed tertiary education
several years later.
.
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Chapter 4
Migration and human capital
inequality: a dyadic approach
Abstract1
This chapter revisits the implications of (selective) international migration for upper-tail
human capital accumulation and inequality. After reviewing and updating the existing
literature, we propose a new approach that establishes the micro-foundations of the re-
lationship between higher education and migration decisions in a dyadic context. We
parameterize our model for 174 countries and for the year 2010. Contrary to the stan-
dard approach, this allows us to investigate the country-specific effects of international
migration on higher education decisions, on human capital accumulation, and on the
effectiveness of public education policies. Human capital responses to skilled emigration
vary with the characteristics of origin and destination countries, as well as with low-skilled
emigration prospects/rates. On average, the net effect on human capital accumulation is
small in low-income and middle-income countries. There are a few exceptions to this rule.
As opposed to earlier findings, we show that a net brain gain emerges in some small, poor
countries, while a net brain loss is observed in countries where emigrants are negatively
selected. We also demonstrate that international migration hardly affects the effective-
ness of public education policies in developing countries. Overall, our results suggest that
international migration has a limited impact on the world distribution of human capital.
The responses are even smaller when general equilibrium effects are accounted for.
Keywords: upper-tail human capital, migration, selection, brain drain/gain, education
policy, human capital inequality
JEL codes: E24, J24, O15
4.1 Introduction
Human capital is usually perceived as a proximate cause of development (Glaeser et al.,
2004; Acemoglu et al., 2014; Jones, 2014). Although there are different ways to measure
it (literacy rates, mean years of schooling, or population shares by educational attain-
1This chapter is coauthored with Fre´de´ric Docquier. We thank the UNESCO for its financial support
(contract no. 4500345673) as well as Fabio Mariani and Jose´ Tavares for their helpful and accurate
comments.
120 CHAPTER 4. MIGRATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL INEQUALITY
ment), recent contributions in the growth literature show, in line with the findings of the
previous chapters, that the role of workers with completed tertiary/college education is
key for development. These highly educated workers exhibit the greatest levels of produc-
tivity, generate positive labor market complementarities with the less educated, and are
instrumental to facilitating innovation and technology diffusion when knowledge becomes
economically useful. This was the case during the Industrial Revolution (Mokyr, 2005;
Squicciarini and Voigtla¨nder, 2015) and it is still relevant in the modern world (Castello´-
Climent and Mukhopadhyay, 2013; Jones, 2014; Kerr et al., 2016). The size of the
college-educated labor force is endogenous as higher education investments are costly, re-
turns to schooling are endogenous, and college-educated workers are highly mobile across
nations. Over the last 25 years, education policies have led to an absolute convergence
in the share of college graduates between countries. However, cross-country disparities
remain significant and it is imperative to understand the factors that affect upper-tail
human capital accumulation, in particular in the context of developing countries. This
chapter focuses on the role of (skill-biased) international migration flows to OECD coun-
tries and contributes to the growing literature on skilled emigration and human capital
formation.
We provide an update of the macroeconometric findings on skilled emigration and
human capital formation, and a generalization of the theoretical framework that relates
human capital disparities to higher education and migration decisions. In particular, we
propose a new dyadic approach that establishes the micro-foundations of these relation-
ships. Compared to the existing literature, this is the substantial novelty of this chapter.
The standard macroeconometric approach of Beine et al. (2008, 2010) relies on a simple
human capital accumulation technology that endogenizes the share of college-educated
natives at time t + 1 (Hi,t+1) as a function of its lags (Hi,t), of the lagged high-skilled
emigration rate (mi,h,t), and of a set of additional control variables (Ai,t). The empirical
specification boils down to a Cobb-Douglas training technology, Hi,t+1 = Ai,tH
φ
i,tm
α
i,h,t,
which suffers from three main limitations. It is incompatible with a closed economy
context; it disregards the role played by low-skilled emigration; and it assumes that the
elasticity of education to emigration prospects (α) is common to all countries. The latter
is independent of the size of emigration and of the characteristics of the origin and desti-
nation countries. On the contrary, our dyadic framework is compatible with all levels of
openness (including the total absence of openness) and fully accounts for the characteris-
tics of each origin country and of all its potential destinations. The dyadic model can be
parameterized to match 2010 migration and education data for 174 countries, as well as
the average education responses identified in the standard macroeconometric literature.
This new model enables to produce migration backcasts by education level, to identify
the country-specific effects of international migration on higher education decisions and
on human capital accumulation, and to gain an understanding of the factors governing
the effectiveness of education policies.
Our quantitative analysis reveals that high-skilled emigration rates to OECD coun-
tries decreased between 1990 and 2010, a phenomenon that is due to the progress in
education and to human capital convergence across countries. Indeed, in line with Doc-
quier et al. (2007), we find that changes in education among natives generate a less than
proportional change in the education level of emigrants. Using new data for 2010, we
follow the standard macroeconometric literature and confirm the existence of a positive
and significant relationship between skilled emigration prospects and higher education
decisions. However, compared to existing studies (which use data for 1990 and 2000
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only), the elasticity is sensitive to the choice of human capital indicators. When the effect
is significant, the updated short-run elasticity is greater, while the long-run elasticity is
slightly smaller. The standard model predicts that low levels of high-skilled emigration
generate large education (or brain gain) responses, that high levels of emigration generate
large human capital losses, and that the maximal brain gain response is obtained when
the skilled emigration rate is around 14%.
We then use our dyadic approach to refine and generalize these results. After showing
that our dyadic model replicates the historical migration trends of the last 20 years well,
we use it to predict country-specific responses to skilled emigration. In the vast majority
of cases (90% of the sample), we find that emigration prospects stimulate the expected
returns to schooling and natives’ investments in higher education. Then, we identify
the net effect of emigration on human capital accumulation. A net brain gain emerges
in 90 countries, while a brain loss emerges in the remaining 84 countries. Contrary to
the standard approach, we find that the net effect need not be positive at low levels
of emigration, and need not be negative at high levels of emigration. The size of the
net effect varies with the characteristics of origin and destination countries, as well as
with low-skilled emigration prospects/rates. On average, the net effect is small in low-
income and middle-income countries. There are a few exceptions to this rule. Contrary
to the standard approach, a net brain gain emerges in some small, poor countries, while
a net brain loss is observed in countries where emigrants are negatively selected. We
also demonstrate that international migration has little effect on the effectiveness of
public education policies. Larger effects are obtained for the richest countries; selective
emigration reduces their stock of human capital and the effectiveness of education policies.
Nonetheless, our results suggest that international migration to OECD countries has a
limited impact on the world distribution of human capital.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 summarizes the existing
empirical cross-country literature and the standard approach, and updates the findings of
the literature. Section 4.3 establishes the micro-foundations of the relationship between
education decisions and international migration in a dyadic context. This section presents
the predictions of the dyadic model and discusses its policy implications. Finally, Section
4.4 concludes.
4.2 Standard macroeconometric approach: literature
and updates
Existing studies suggest that the effect of international migration on human capital dis-
parities is ambiguous. On the one hand, two salient features of international labor mo-
bility are that well-educated people exhibit a much greater propensity to emigrate than
the less educated, and tend to agglomerate in countries/regions with high rewards to
skill (Grogger and Hanson, 2011; Belot and Hatton, 2012; Docquier and Rapoport, 2012;
Kerr et al., 2016). Positive selection is due to migrants’ self-selection (high-skilled people
are more responsive to economic opportunities and political conditions abroad, have more
transferable skills and a greater ability to gather information, or finance emigration costs,
etc.), and to the skill-selective immigration policies implemented in the major destination
countries (Docquier et al., 2009). Some of the early contributions to this literature em-
phasize the worldwide inegalitarian effects induced by positive selection (e.g., Bhagwati
and Hamada, 1974; Miyagiwa, 1991; Haque and Kim, 1995; Wong and Yip, 1999).
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On the other hand, skill-biased emigration prospects impact on the expected return
to investments in human capital. Starting with Mountford (1997), Stark et al. (1997),
Vidal (1998), and Beine et al. (2001), the link between skill-biased emigration rates
and pre-migration human capital formation has been theoretically investigated in a two-
country setting with a (poor) origin country and a (rich) destination country. Emigration
prospects are shown to raise the expected return to human capital, thus leading more
people to invest (or people to invest more) in education at home before deciding whether
to emigrate or not.
A growing strand of literature shows empirically that incentives for human capital
accumulation in developing countries are based to a significant extent on migration op-
portunities. Micro-level evidence of a positive impact of emigration on the net stock of
human capital in the source country has been provided in many studies. They include
Chand and Clemens (2008) on Fiji, Gibson and McKenzie (2011) on Tonga and Papua
New Guinea, Batista et al. (2012) on Cape Verde, Shrestha (2017) on Nepal, and Theo-
harides (2017) on the Philippines. To identify causation, these studies exploit survey data
on education choices and migration intentions, micro data on education and exposition
to migration by region, or quasi-natural experimental methods.
Macro-level evidence of the same relationship can be found in the literature. Using
1990 emigration data for 127 developing countries, Beine et al. (2008) estimate that
a doubling of a country’s emigration rate of highly-skilled workers is associated with a
20% increase in the long-run stock of human capital possessed by its nationals (including
emigrants), and with a 5% increase in the short run (in the 1990-2000 decade). Their
findings suggest that under certain conditions the stimulus to skill formation may be
strong enough to bring the economy’s stock of human capital to a higher level in the
post-migration equilibrium. Beine et al. (2010) find that the brain gain mechanism holds
when using alternative brain drain measures controlling for whether migrants acquired
their skills in the home or host country, or when using alternative specifications and/or
indicators of human capital formation. Beine et al. (2011) confirm these effects in a panel
setting covering 147 origin countries and 6 destinations during the period 1975-2000.
In this section, we use new and updated databases described in detail in Appendix
4.A.1 to examine empirically whether the conclusions of Beine et al. (2008) also apply
to the period 2000-2010.2 We follow the β-convergence empirical specification of Beine
et al. (2008). The regression model is written:
ln
(
Hi,t+1
Hi,t
)
= α0 + α1 ln (Hi,t) + α2 ln (mi,h,t) + βXi,t + i,t, (4.1)
where ln (Hi,t+1/Hi,t) is the log change in the proportion of college graduates in the native
labor force of country i between t and t+1, ln (Hi,t) is the log of the initial level, ln (mi,h,t)
is the log of the skilled emigration rate at the beginning of period t, Xi,t is a vector of
additional control variables used in Beine et al. (2008) - this includes population density
(DENSi,t), a dummy for sub-Saharan African countries (SSADi) and for Latin American
countries (LATDi) - and i,t is the error term.
As stated in the introduction, this β-convergence specification boils down to a Cobb-
Douglas relationship between human capital and emigration: Hi,t+1 = Ai,tH
1+α1
i,t m
α2
i,h,t
where Ai,t = exp (α0 + βXi,t). The short-run elasticity of human capital to emigration
2Appendix 4.A.1 discusses migration trends by education level. Comprehensive tables are provided
in Appendix 4.A.3.
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equals α2. If −1 < α1 < 0, the model is stable, and the human capital stock converges to-
wards Hi = A
−1/α1
i m
−α2/α1
i,h , so that the long-run elasticity of human capital to emigration
equals −α2/α1.
This β-convergence specification suffers from three main limitations. Firstly, it is
incompatible with a closed economy context (Hi,t+1 = 0 if mi,h,t = 0). Secondly, it
disregards the role played by low-skilled emigration.3 Thirdly, it assumes a constant
elasticity of education to emigration prospects (α2). The latter is independent of the size of
emigration and of the characteristics of the origin and destination countries. Nevertheless,
this specification has been used to empirically explore the link between skilled emigration
prospects and higher education decisions.
Our empirical results are provided in Table 4.1. The results reported in column (1)
are based on the same data set, the same specification and the same sample as in Beine et
al. (2010). For the sake of comparability with other regressions, we exclude remittances
from the set of control variables.4 Nevertheless, the results obtained in column (1) are
very similar to those described in Beine et al. (2010). There are two main parameters
of interest. Firstly, we are interested in the short-run impact of emigration prospects on
human capital formation. This is captured by the coefficient on the log of the high-skilled
emigration rate (α2). This coefficient is given in the first row of the table. Secondly, we
are also interested in the long-run effect of skilled emigration, which can be obtained by
dividing the short-run coefficient (α2) by the convergence coefficient (−α1). The latter
captures the inertia in human capital responses to emigration. The long-run effect is
reported in the bottom of the table (Long Run). Column (1) gives a short-run elasticity
of 0.045 and a long-run elasticity of 0.209. This evidences a positive association between
the high-skilled emigration rate in 1990 and the change in human capital between 1990
and 2000. Since Beine et al. (2010) find rather robust results (by age of entry and across
specifications), we consider these results as our reference levels, and compare them with
those obtained when conducting the regression for different data sources and periods.
Column (2) presents the results of the regression for the same period as in column (1),
but uses the revised version of the migration database described in ADOP. The effect of
emigration remains significant albeit smaller in size. With respect to our first parameter
of interest, the coefficient on the share of high-skilled migrants is significant at the 5%
level. The short-run elasticity amounts to 0.024, while the long-run elasticity is similar to
that of column (1) (we obtain a value of 0.173 as compared to 0.209 in column (1)). The
human capital data used in columns (1) and (2) combine census data available in ADOP,
data from Barro and Lee’s database (Barro and Lee, 2013), and data from Cohen and
Soto (2007). When restricting the sample to countries available in Barro and Lee (2013),
we lose about 25 observations. Conducting the regression on 96 countries changes the
significance of coefficients, as shown in column (3). The short-run and long-run effects
have the same magnitude as in column (1) but become insignificant. In addition, we can
also use human capital proxies from the more recent database of the Wittgenstein Centre.
Column (4) presents the results for the analysis using this data set for the years 1990
to 2000. The short-run elasticity becomes negative and insignificant. This demonstrates
that the education response to emigration prospects is sensitive to the choice of the
database used to proxy the proportion of college graduates in the resident population.
3Beine et al. (2010) consider a specification with the ratio of emigration rates (mi,h,t/mi,l,t) but find
less significant results. They also consider a specification with 1 + mi,h,t, which is compatible with a
no-migration situation.
4This increases the number of countries included in the sample from 103 to 123.
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In column (5) and (6), we turn our attention to the period 2000-2010. Column (5)
uses the 96 countries available in the data set of Barro and Lee (2013), while column
(6) uses the data set of the Wittgenstein Centre. In line with previous results, the effect
obtained in column (5) is insignificant.5 On the contrary, a positive and significant effect
is found in column (6). Compared to the previous period, the short-run elasticity is
greater (0.099) but the long-run effect does not change (0.173).
Finally, columns (7) and (8) provide the results obtained when pooling both decades,
and when using human capital proxies from Barro and Lee (2013) or from the Wittgen-
stein Centre, respectively. Column (7) shows that the coefficient for the short-run impact
is not significant, albeit positive when using Barro and Lee (2013). The short-run elastic-
ity is positive (0.0977) and highly significant when using the Wittgenstein Centre data.
The corresponding long-run effect amounts to 0.165, which is very similar to the values
obtained in columns (2) and (6).
Overall, our estimates suggest that the long-run elasticity of ex-ante human capital
to high-skilled emigration is around 0.165 (and the short-run elasticity is around 0.098).
Figure 4.1 illustrates the effect of skilled emigration on the share of college graduates in
the resident labor force. We denote this share by h. Our numerical example assumes an
economy where the low-skilled emigration rate is nil, and where H ' h = 0.05 if the high-
skilled emigration rate is close to zero. In the absence of low-skilled migration, we have
h = (1−mh)H
1−mhH . Figure 4.1 reports the predicted relative deviation from the closed economy,
∆h/h, when the high-skilled emigration rate (mh) varies between 0 and 1. Figure 4.1a
shows the effect obtained using the estimates from Beine et al. (2008). In the short-run,
high-skilled emigration increases human capital if the brain drain is below 14%; the cost
of the brain drain is exponential for larger emigration rates. In the long-run, the brain
drain is beneficial if the high-skilled emigration rate is below 62%. Figure 4.1b is based
on the pooled 1990-2010 estimates. The short-run effect is more beneficial (a brain gain
emerges when emigration rates are below 33%), but the long-run effect is smaller (a brain
gain emerges when emigration rates are below 54%). The maximal brain gain response
is obtained when the brain drain equals 14%. High-skilled emigration leads to a share of
college graduates of 7.4% (i.e., +2.4 percentage points compared to the closed economy).
We show below that our dyadic approach allows refining and generalizing these results.
4.3 New dyadic approach
In this section, we establish the micro-foundation for the link between emigration rates
and human capital formation in a multi-destination or dyadic framework. We begin by
outlining the theoretical model in Section 4.3.1. Once calibrated, the dyadic model can
be used to quantify the effect of immigration and education policies on human capital
formation and global inequality, and to backcast the skill structure of international mi-
gration. We produce three sets of results in a partial equilibrium context with exogenous
wages. Firstly, in Section 4.3.2, we assess the predictive power of the model by comparing
emigration backcasts and data by education level for the years 1990 and 2000. Then, in
Section 4.3.3, we calibrate the training technology of the dyadic model and quantify the
country-specific effects of migration on human capital accumulation. Section 4.3.4 inves-
tigates the effect of migration prospects and realizations on the effectiveness of education
5In Barro and Lee (2013), the growth rate in human capital between 1990-2000 is uncorrelated to
that observed between 2000 and 2010.
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Table 4.1: Standard approach - updated estimation results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1990-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000 1990-2000 2000-2010 2000-2010 1990-2010 1990-2010
ln
(
mi,h,t
)
0.0454** 0.0244** 0.0400 -0.0141 -0.00438 0.0993*** 0.0181 0.0977***
(0.0221) (0.0109) (0.0513) (0.0453) (0.0317) (0.0347) (0.0307) (0.0321)
ln (Hi,t) -0.217*** -0.141*** -0.188*** -0.169** -0.0929** -0.573*** -0.157*** -0.591***
(0.0349) (0.0250) (0.0504) (0.0745) (0.0425) (0.0583) (0.0326) (0.0454)
SSADi -0.336*** -0.182*** -0.168* -0.164 -0.0786 -0.816*** -0.142* -0.747***
(0.0930) (0.0521) (0.0986) (0.148) (0.107) (0.136) (0.0730) (0.117)
LATDi -0.0628 0.00727 -0.0786 -0.179 -0.139* -0.0295 -0.104* -0.0109
(0.0549) (0.0386) (0.0836) (0.124) (0.0810) (0.102) (0.0605) (0.0984)
DENSi,t -0.000154 2.92e-05 -0.000636 -0.000102 -3.43e-05 -5.22e-05 -0.000317* -0.000227
(0.0001) (8.7e-05) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Constant -0.0332 -0.00635 -0.196 0.380 -0.119 -1.058*** -0.204 -0.833***
(0.0901) (0.0855) (0.241) (0.278) (0.130) (0.159) (0.126) (0.170)
Long Run 0.209 0.173 ins. ins. ins. 0.173 ins. 0.165
Obs. 123 120 96 120 96 120 192 240
R-sq. 0.380 0.306 0.231 0.111 0.128 0.566 0.179 0.458
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: This table reports updated estimation results for the standard macroeconometric approach. The
independent variables include the logarithm of the skilled emigration rate at the beginning of period
t (ln (mi,h,t)) and the logarithm of the initial proportion of college graduates in the native labor force
(ln (Hi,t)). The control variables include the population density (DENSi,t), a dummy for sub-Saharan
African countries (SSADi) and for Latin American countries (LATDi). The dependent variable is the
logarithm change in the proportion of college graduates in the native labor force between period t and
t+ 1 (ln (Hi,t+1/Hi,t)).
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Figure 4.1: Effect of brain drain on human capital
(Relative deviation from the closed economy = (h− hNM)/hNM )
Notes: This numerical example assumes an economy where H ' h = 0.05 if mh→ 0, and where the
low-skilled emigration rate is nil.
policies. Finally, we illustrate the implications of a general equilibrium extension with
endogenous wages in Section 4.3.5.
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4.3.1 Theory
We depict a world-economy model with J countries. We consider an origin country i
with a working-age native population denoted by Ni. We divide the population into two
skill groups s = (h, l), with s = h for college graduates and s = l for the less educated,
and we denote by Ni,s the endogenous size of the type-s native population. Hence, the
fraction of college graduates in the native population is written:
Hi ≡ Ni,h
Ni,l +Ni,h
. (4.2)
Individuals have the choice between staying in their home country or emigrating to a
foreign country j ∈ J . We denote by Nij,s the number of type-s individuals deciding to
move from i to j. Hence, the skill-specific emigration rate is given by:
mi,s ≡
∑
j 6=iNij,s
Ni,s
. (4.3)
Our multi-country model jointly endogenizes Hi and mi,s, and extracts some static
comparative properties. To do so, we model migration and education choices as outcomes
of a random utility model (RUM). The RUM is becoming the consensus tool to model
dyadic migration decisions. The standard RUM assumes that the utility of a type-s
individual λ born in country i and moving to a destination country j is made of a
deterministic component that accounts for the average income at destination (wj,s ∈ <+)
and the average level of moving costs (cij,s < 1), and of a random component (ε
λ
ij,s ∈ <)
that captures heterogeneity between individuals (i.e., heterogeneity in preferences, in
the ability to assimilate, in moving costs, etc.). To model interdependencies between
migration and education decisions, we extend the standard RUM and introduce a second
source of heterogeneity in the cost of college education, eλh ∈ [0, 1], in line with Delogu et
al. (2018). There is no such cost if the individual chooses not to invest in human capital
(eλl = 0).
We also allow the individual-specific effort to acquire education to decrease with the
(exogenous) provision of public education and to vary with other country characteristics
(reflected in the scale variable Gi). Highlighting the complementarity between public
education and individual efforts to accumulate human capital is particularly relevant
when considering the problem of investment in education in poor developing countries,
where credit markets for the purpose of funding private education are underdeveloped,
as noted by the World Bank (2000). Higher education systems are heavily dominated by
public universities with the costs falling predominantly to the state.
Hence, working-age individuals have heterogeneous abilities to acquire higher educa-
tion, and heterogeneous preferences concerning destination countries. The utility function
of an individual choosing the education type s and moving from i to j has a logarithmic
form and is written:
Uλij,s = ln (wj,s) + ln (1− cij,s) + ln
(
1− e
λ
s
Gi
)
+ ελij,s. (4.4)
As is standard in the migration literature, we assume that the random component
of utility ελij,s follows a Type I Extreme Value distribution, also known as the double-
exponential cumulative distribution function:
ελij,s  F1 (ε) = exp
[
− exp
(
− ε
µ
− γ
)]
∀i, j, s, t, (4.5)
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where µ > 0 is a common scale parameter governing the responsiveness of migration
decisions to income disparities, and γ ≈ 0.577 is Euler’s constant.
As far as the higher education cost is concerned, no effort is required if the individual
does not acquire higher education (as stated above, eλl = 0). On the contrary, investing in
higher education requires a positive level of effort (eλh ≥ 0). We assume eλh is distributed
on [0, 1] according to the following cumulative distribution function:
F2(eh) = e
z+1
h , (4.6)
where z ∈ <+ is a parameter governing the slope of the density function, f2(eh) = (1 +
z)ezh, which is increasing in eh. The greater z, the smaller the fraction of individuals with
a high ability to educate (i.e., with a low education cost). In other words, z determines
the scarcity of talent. The scale factor (1 + z) in f2(eh) ensures that
∫
f2 (e
z
h) = 1.
6
The timing of the decisions is the following. First, each individual discovers her
education type (eλh). She does not know her migration type (ε
λ
ij,s) but she knows its
distribution. Given her expectations about wj,s and cij,s, she decides whether to acquire
higher education or not. Second, she discovers her migration type (ελij,s) and decides
whether to emigrate or to stay in her home country.
Higher education decisions. – In the first stage, individuals acquire higher education
if the expected utility gain from being college educated exceeds the effort cost. Under
the Type I Extreme Value distribution for ελij,s, de Palma and Kilani (2007) derive the
expression for the ex-ante expected utility. Using their theorem, the expected utility of
choosing type s is given by:
E (Ui,s,t) = E [ln (wj,s) + ln (1− cij,s)] + ln
(
1− e
λ
s
Gi
)
= ln
I∑
j=1
e[ln(wj,s)+ln(1−cij,s)]/µ + ln
(
1− e
λ
s
Gi
)
= ln
I∑
j=1
(wj,s)
1/µ (1− cij,s)1/µ + ln
(
1− e
λ
s
Gi
)
. (4.7)
Investing in college education is optimal if E (Ui,h) > E (Ui,l). This condition is writ-
ten: (
1− e
λ
s
Gi
) I∑
j=1
(wj,h)
1/µ (1− cij,h)1/µ ≥
I∑
j=1
(wj,l)
1/µ (1− cij,l)1/µ. (4.8)
A variable that plays a key role in this condition is the expected return to higher
education investment, which is defined as:
Λi ≡
∑I
j=1 (wj,h)
1/µ (1− cij,h)1/µ∑I
j=1 (wj,l)
1/µ (1− cij,l)1/µ
≡ (wi,h)
1/µ + (Wi,h)
1/µ
(wi,l)1/µ + (Wi,l)1/µ
. (4.9)
where (Wi,s)
1/µ ≡∑j 6=i(wj,s)1/µ(1−cij,s)1/µ ∀s is the expected-income component related
to emigration prospects. The expected return to higher education investments is fully
6If z = 0, there is a uniform distribution. When z > 0, the density is strictly increasing in z: there
are more individuals facing large education costs than individuals facing low education costs.
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determined by the local wage ratio (ΛNMi = (wi,h/wi,l)
1/µ) in a no-migration (or closed)
economy. The influence of emigration prospects is large if the levels of Wi,s/wi,s are
large. This is the case if foreign wages are large and migration costs are low. In an open
economy (i.e., when Wi,s > 0), the expected return to higher education investment is
clearly affected by emigration prospects.
From (4.8) and (4.9), investing in college education is optimal when:
eλh ≤ Gi,t
[
Λi − 1
Λi
]
≡ χi, (4.10)
where χi is the (endogenous) critical level of ability below which investing in higher
education is optimal. As in the two-country setting of Djajic´ et al. (2017), this critical
level increases with the provision of public education (Gi) and with the expected college
premium, which accounts here for the wage structure in all potential destination countries.
The fraction of natives deciding to invest in higher education is given by F2(χi,t),
which can be expressed as:
Hi = G
1+z
i
[
Λi − 1
Λi
]1+z
, (4.11)
where wi,s and Gi are the components of the expected utility affected by the home country
characteristics (i.e., domestic wages and education policy), and Wi,s is the component
driven by emigration prospects. Again, this is the case if the origin country is poor relative
to other countries and if emigration costs are small. In a closed economy framework
(cij,s = 1 ∀s, j 6= i), the critical level of effort below which college education is beneficial
is determined locally; it increases with Gi and with the local skill premium (wi,h/wi,l).
Proposition 4.1 For a given education policy (Gi,t), emigration prospects stimulate in-
centives to acquire higher education if the expected education premium abroad is greater
than in the country of origin
Wi,h
Wi,l
>
wi,h
wi,l
.
The condition
Wi,h
Wi,l
>
wi,h
wi,l
is equivalent to Λi > Λ
NM
i .
Emigration decisions. – In the second stage, education has been determined and
individuals choose to emigrate to a country j if ln (wj,s) + ln (1− cij,s) + ελij,s exceeds the
level attainable in any other location. Following McFadden (1974), under the Type I
Extreme Value distribution, the probability that a type-s individual born in country i
moves to country j is given by a multinomial logit expression:
N sij
N si
=
e[ln(wj,s)+ln(1−cij,s)]/µ∑J
k=1 e
[ln(wk,s)+ln(1−cik,s)]/µ
=
(wj,s)
1/µ(1− cij,s)1/µ∑J
k=1(wk,s)
1/µ(1− cik,s)1/µ
. (4.12)
Skill-specific emigration rates are endogenous and comprised between 0 and 1. The multi-
nomial logit expression also implies that the emigration rate from i to j depends on the
characteristics of all potential destinations k (i.e., a crisis in Greece affects the emigration
rate from Romania to Germany). However, the staying rates (N sij/N
s
i ) are governed by
the same multinomial logit expression. The emigrant-to-stayer ratio in Equation (4.13)
and the aggregation constraint in Equation (4.14) fully characterize the equilibrium dis-
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tribution of the population:
nij,s ≡ Nij,s
Nii,s
=
e[lnwj,s+ln(1−cij,s)]/µ
e[lnwi,s]/µ
=
(
wj,s
wi,s
)1/µ
(1− cij,s)1/µ, ∀j 6= i, (4.13)
Ni,s =
J∑
j=1
Nij,s =
(
1 +
∑
j 6=i
nij,s
)
Nii,s. (4.14)
From Equation (4.13), it comes out that 1/µ can now be interpreted as the elasticity
of migration to wage disparities. The ratio of emigrants to stayers only depends on the
characteristics of the destination and origin countries: it increases with the income gap
between the two countries, and it decreases with dyadic migration costs. Heterogeneity
in migration tastes implies that emigrants select all destinations for which cij,s < 1. If
cij,s = 1, the corridor is empty. All corridors such that cij,s, cji,s < 1 exhibit bidirectional
migration flows.7
Brain gain in a dyadic context. – The aggregate emigration rate (mi,s) and the ratio
of emigration rates (ρi) from country i (an index of skill selection) are jointly determined
and are given by the following expressions:
mi,s ≡
∑
j 6=iNij,s
Ni,s
=
(Wi,s)
1/µ
(wi,s)1/µ + (Wi,s)1/µ
, (4.15)
ρi ≡ mi,h
mi,l
=
(Wi,h)
1/µ
(Wi,l)1/µ
[
(wi,h)
1/µ + (Wi,h)
1/µ
(wi,l)1/µ + (Wi,l)1/µ
]−1
. (4.16)
The ratio of emigration rates increases with Wi,h and decreases with Wi,l. From (4.11)
and (4.16), we have sgn
(
∂Hi
∂Wi,s
)
= sgn
(
∂ρi
∂Wi,s
)
and sgn
(
∂Hi
∂wi,s
)
6= sgn
(
∂ρi
∂wi,s
)
:
Proposition 4.2 Emigration-driven expected utility shocks (∆Wi,s) induce a positive
correlation between human capital formation (Hi) and the ratio of emigration rates (ρi).
Local expected utility shocks (∆wi,s) induce a negative correlation between Hi and ρi.
In particular, shocks increasing the expected utility of college graduates abroad (e.g.,
greater skill selection in the major destination countries) have a positive effect on human
capital formation (Hi) and on the positive selection of emigrants (as reflected by the
ratio of emigration rates ρi). Shocks increasing the expected utility of the less educated
abroad have a negative effect on both variables. This establishes the micro-foundation
for the link between emigration rates and pre-migration human capital formation in a
multi-destination framework.
4.3.2 Predictive power
We parameterize the dyadic model of Section 4.3.1 for 174 countries and for the year 2010.
Equation (4.13) and (4.14) show that dyadic migration stocks depend on wage disparities
between countries (wj,s/wi,s), on migration costs (cij,s), and on the size and structure of
7Note that the previous chapters intensively discussed the important implications of internal migra-
tion. In this chapter, we do not explicitly address internal migration. However, the dyadic approach
allows accounting for country-specific characteristics (i.e., international migration net costs) that implic-
itly account for internal migration opportunities. This is shown in Appendix 4.A.4.
130 CHAPTER 4. MIGRATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL INEQUALITY
the native population (Ni,s). To calibrate skill-specific wages, we use data on the size
and structure of the labor force from the Wittgenstein Centre (Li,s), and data on the
wage ratio between college graduates and less educated workers (WRi ≡ wi,h/wi,l) from
Hendricks (2004). GDP per capita in PPP values is taken from the Maddison project
described in Bolt and Zanden (2014). The data are available for 143 out of the 174
countries in our larger sample. We obtain the GDP in PPP by simply multiplying the
GDP per capita by the population size given by the Wittgenstein Centre. For missing
observations, we use rescaled GDP data from the World Development Indicators (WDI)
provided by the World Bank.8 Assuming total labor income (Wi) equals 2/3 of the GDP,
we have Wi = Li,hwi,h + Li,lwi,l = wi,l(Li,hWRi + Li,l). In line with Dao et al. (2017),
we identify wi,l from this equation and use wi,h = wi,lWRi for the high-skilled wage.
Finally, to calibrate migration costs (cij,s), we use the DIOC data on dyadic migration
stocks and assume an elasticity of bilateral migration to the wage ratio, 1/µ, equal to 0.7
(in line with Bertoli and Ferna´ndez-Huertas Moraga, 2013). Dyadic migration costs are
calibrated as a residual from Equation (4.13).
To gauge the ability of our micro-founded model to replicate past emigration rates,
we parameterize the model of Section 4.3.1 and use it to backcast the size and structure
of emigration stocks in the years 1990 and 2000. For these two years, wage and labor
force proxies by education level are obtained from Dao et al. (2017), who follow the
same calibration as ours for all years prior to 2010. Plugging them into Equation (4.13)
and (4.14), we predict the allocation of the native labor force, compute emigration rates
by education level, and compare the backcasts with the data. Figure 4.2 presents the
correlation between the observed and simulated stocks of emigrants for 2000 and 1990.
The 45◦ line is added to better visualize the prediction errors.
Figure 4.2a and 4.2b show that the square of the correlation between actual and
predicted stocks equals 0.907 for college graduates and 0.905 for the less educated in
the year 2000. For the year 1990, Figure 4.2c and 4.2d show that these correlations are
equal to 0.766 for college graduates and to 0.803 for the less educated. The correlation
unsurprisingly decreases with the distance from the year 2010. This is because our model
identifies neither past variations in migration policies (e.g., the Schengen agreement in
the European Union, changes in the H1B visa policy in the US, etc.), nor past changes in
net amenities and non-pecuniary push/pull factors (e.g., conflicts, political unrest, etc.)
between 1990 and 2010. Nevertheless, the correlations are large, a proof of concept that
our model does a good job at explaining migration patterns.
4.3.3 Emigration and human capital
Furthermore, we now use the dyadic model to assess the educational response to inter-
national migration prospects/rates. The empirical analysis of Section 4.2 captures the
average education response to emigration prospects in a large set of developing countries.
It might be the case that the mean response hides large differences across countries. Once
properly calibrated, our dyadic model of Section 4.3.1 enables to account for country-
specific characteristics and to predict specific responses. To do so, we now parameterize
the human capital technology of the dyadic model to assess the country-specific effects of
8The data is rescaled in a way that matches the GDP in the United States. For this, the GDP obtained
from the Maddison project is divided by the GDP obtained from the WDI for the United States. The
GDP from the WDI is then multiplied by this quotient for the missing observations in order to retrieve
comparable GDP measures.
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emigration shocks. We use the dyadic migration costs, the wage rates calibrated in Sec-
tion 4.3.2, and the share of college graduates among natives in the year 2010, Hi. When
wage and migration cost proxies are available, Equation (4.11) shows that the ex-ante
proportion of college graduates depends on two unknown parameters, z and Gi.
We calibrate these two parameters iteratively. We arbitrarily allocate alternative
values (e.g., 0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, ... ,) to z and, for each z, we calibrate the scale variable
Gi to the level that perfectly matches Hi as a residual of Equation (4.11). Let us denote
by Gi(z) the scale factor that corresponds to the arbitrary level of z. We then simulate
several skilled migration shocks (i.e., changes in mi,h) and identify the education responses
(i.e., the change in Hi). These shocks consist in reducing the high-skilled migration cost
by one, five, and ten percentage points. For each of these shocks and for each pair of z
and Gi(z), we compute the human capital responses as the log variations in the share of
college graduates, ∆ lnHi. We then regress ∆ lnHi on the corresponding log changes in
the high-skilled emigration rate, ∆ lnmi,h, using the same sample of countries as in the
standard macroeconometric literature (see Section 4.2). Finally, we choose a value for the
parameter z for which the simulated elasticity of education to emigration is the closest
to the average of the empirical estimates of the long-run elasticity reported in Table 4.1
(i.e., 0.18). As shown on Figure 4.3a, we find that z∗ = 0.7 is the most relevant value,
whatever the size of the migration shock.
Having calibrated the value of z allows us to quantify the education response to
emigration and selection. Figure 4.3 illustrates the effect of shocks in migration costs on
higher education investment for constant wages (i.e., in partial equilibrium). Figure 4.3b
compares the open economy expected return to higher education investment (Λi) with
the no-migration (closed) economy level (ΛNMi ). We identify 16 countries (9.2% of the
sample) where international migration reduces Λi. These are countries where low-skilled
emigration rates are large and/or for which the main destinations are less developed than
the origin.9 In these countries, emigration prospects reduce the optimal investment of
the natives (Hi); these countries are below the 45
◦ line on Figure 4.3c. For example,
the share of college graduates among natives decreases from 12.1% to 11.9% in Turkey
or from 14.0% to 13.2% in Mexico. In the other 158 countries, emigration prospects
increase Λi and Hi. On average, the Λi and Hi increase by a factor of 1.17 and 1.16,
respectively. The greatest effects on Λi are observed in small and poor countries. The
open economy level of Λi is twice as large as the closed economy level in 9 countries (The
Gambia, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Mauritius, Saint-Vincent and Grenadines,
Sao Tome and Principe, and Trinidad and Tobago). In these countries (above the 45◦
line on Figure 4.3b and 4.3c), emigration prospects increase the optimal investment of
the natives. For example, the share of college graduates among natives increases from
3.5% to 5.3% in Haiti or from 12.0% to 18.6% in Jamaica. Finally, Figure 4.3d compares
the observed share of college graduates in the resident population (hi on the vertical axis)
with the no-migration (closed) economy level (hNMi on the horizontal axis). Out of our
174 countries, 84 countries experience a decrease in human capital (48.3% of the sample),
while the remaining 90 countries experience a net brain gain.
Contrary to the long-run and short-run predictions of the standard model, the net
effect of emigration on human capital accumulation need not be positive at low levels
9They include Albania (-2.1%), Bolivia (-1.7%), Bulgaria (-1.7%), Canada (-1.0%), Croatia (-0.6%),
Dominican Republic (-0.4%), Ecuador (-1%), El Salvador (-6.2%), Finland (-2.3%), Kazakhstan (-3.8%),
Lithuania (-4.9%), Mexico (-5.6%), Portugal (-2.4%), Serbia (-1.0%), Macedonia (-8.7%), and Turkey
(-1.1%).
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Figure 4.2: Actual (X-axis) and predicted (Y-axis) migrant stocks by dyad in 1990 and
2000 (in logs)
of emigration, and need not be strongly negative at high levels of emigration. For a
given emigration rate, the net effect varies across countries, due to the dyadic hetero-
geneity across destination characteristics and to the level of the low-skilled emigration
rate. Figure 4.4 shows the effect of international migration on human capital. On Figure
4.4a and 4.4b, the change in human capital, in relative terms or in absolute terms (i.e.,
∆hi/hi or ∆hi = hi − hNMi ), is plotted against the migration rate differential between
high- and low-skilled natives (mi,h − mi,l). On average and despite the fact that our
model matches the long-run average elasticity of education to skilled emigration, the net
effect is smaller than under the standard approach (with the exception of a few small
countries). Overall, the coefficient of variation in the share of college graduates equals
0.763 in the current open economy context and 0.758 in the hypothetical closed economy
context. This strongly suggests that international migration has limited effects on the
world distribution of human capital.
On Figure 4.4c, we rank countries by increasing order of their observed level of h (i.e.,
the X-axis is ordinal), and we compare the observed level of h (thin grey curve) with three
counterfactuals: no high-skilled emigration in dots (mi,h = 0), no low-skilled migration in
dashed (mi,l = 0), and no migration in bold black (mi,s = 0 ∀s). The effect of migration
is usually negative but negligible in the bottom 33% of the sample (i.e., in the poorest
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Figure 4.3: Country-specific responses to migration
countries with less than 10% of college graduates), and there are small effects in the next
33%. The effect is larger in the top 33%: stopping skilled migration is usually good for
human capital accumulation, while stopping low-skilled migration is bad. Overall, the
net effect is ambiguous but generally positive in these richer countries. There are a few
exceptions to the rule. Contrary to the standard approach, a net brain gain emerges in
about 20 small, poor countries where both emigration rates are large. In addition, a net
brain loss is observed in 5 to 10 countries where emigrants are negatively selected (i.e.,
mi,l > mi,h).
4.3.4 Emigration and education policy
In this section we investigate whether international migration affects the effectiveness of
public education policies of the origin country. We calibrated z∗ and Gi(z∗) so as to match
the long-run elasticity of human capital to high-skilled migration and the observed share
of college graduates in the native population of 2010. The mean and standard errors
of Gi equal 0.747 and 0.819, respectively. Regressing Gi (in logs) on the level of public
expenditures as a percentage of GDP gives a significant and positive coefficient equal
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Figure 4.4: Global implications of international migration
(Relative and absolute deviations from the closed economy)
Notes: In Figure 4.4c countries are ranked on the horizontal axis by increasing order of observed h. The
observed level is depicted in grey, ms = 0 in bold black, ml = 0 in dashed, and mh = 0 in dots.
to 0.094.10 Hence, increasing the ratio of public education expenditures to GDP by 1
percentage point leads to ∆Gi/Gi = exp(0.094) − 1 ' 0.10. In partial equilibrium, Λi
is constant. From Equation (4.11), it implies that ∆Hi/Hi = (1 + z)∆Gi/Gi ' 0.17.
In addition, mi,s are also constant for all s in the partial equilibrium framework. This
10Note that the log of Gi is also positively correlated with the income per capita (in logs) and with
the urbanization rate (Gi is a good proxy for the access to education).
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implies that ∆Hi/Hi ' ∆hi/hi.11
Hence, a one-percentage-point increase in public education expenditures generates a
variation in the domestic share of college graduates that is almost proportional to the
initial share, ∆hi ' 0.17hi, which is itself an ambiguous function of international migra-
tion rates, mi,h and mi,l. In countries where international migration reduces (respectively
increases) domestic human capital (hi), migration also reduces (respectively increases)
the effectiveness of public education policies. In other words, the effect of migration on
the effectiveness of public education policies moves in the same direction as the effect of
migration on human capital accumulation. Djajic´ et al. (2017) find a similar result in a
two-country setting. Again, our dyadic model generalizes previous findings. In addition,
given Figure 4.3d and 4.4a, we show that international migration has little effect on hi in
the bottom 2/3 of the sample, and a small positive effect in high-income countries. We
conclude that international migration has very little effect on the effectiveness of pub-
lic education policies in developing countries. On the contrary, it slightly increases the
effectiveness of public education policies in the majority of high-income countries.
4.3.5 General equilibrium extension
In the dyadic model of Section 4.3.1, the condition under which migration to a destination
country j is profitable for type-s workers born in country i depends on wage disparities.
Through the production technology, the latter are affected by the allocation of labor
which depends itself on the size and structure of migration flows. The combination
of endogenous migration decisions and equilibrium wages jointly determines the world
distribution of income and the allocation of the world population. The resident labor
force in country i is given by:
Li,s =
∑
j
Nji,s. (4.17)
Assume output in country i, Yi, is a multiplicative function of total factor productivity
(TFP), Ai, and total quantity of labor in efficiency units, Li,T .
12 In the recent labor
market, immigration and growth literatures, labor in efficiency units is usually modeled
as a CES function of the number of college-educated and less educated workers employed.
We have:
Yi = AiLi,T = Ai
[
θi,hL
σ−1
σ
i,h + θi,lL
σ−1
σ
i,l
] σ
σ−1
, (4.18)
where θi,s is the country and time-specific value share parameter for workers of type s
(such that θi,h + θi,l = 1), and σ is the common elasticity of substitution between the two
groups of workers.
Firms maximize profits and the labor market is competitive. The equilibrium wage
rate for type-s workers in country j is equal to the marginal productivity of labor:
wi,s = θi,sAi
(
Li,T
Li,s
)1/σ
. (4.19)
Hence, the wage ratio between college graduates and less educated workers is given by:
wi,h
wi,l
=
θi,h
θi,l
(
Li,h
Li,l
)−1/σ
. (4.20)
11The effect is slightly greater in countries with large emigration rates. We have ∆hi/hi ∈ [0.18, 0.20]
in countries such as Belize, Fiji, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Mauritius, Suriname, etc..
12Such a model without physical capital features a globalized economy with a common international
interest rate.
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As long as this ratio is greater than one, a rise in human capital increases the average
productivity of workers. Furthermore, greater contributions of human capital to produc-
tivity can be obtained by assuming technological externalities. In particular, as discussed
in the previous chapters, skill-biased technical changes affect the relative productivity of
high-skilled workers (see Acemoglu, 2002; Restuccia and Vandenbroucke, 2013). For ex-
ample, Autor et al. (2003) show that computerization is associated with a declining
relative industry demand for routine manual and cognitive tasks, and increased relative
demand for non-routine cognitive tasks. The observed relative demand shift favors college
versus non-college labor. We write:
θi,h
θi,l
= Φi
(
Li,h
Li,l
)κ
, (4.21)
where Φi is the exogenous country-specific component of the skill bias in productivity in
country i, and κ is the elasticity of the skill bias to the skill ratio. Plugging (4.21) into
(4.20), the elasticity of the college premium to the skill ratio (Li,h/Li,l) is now equal to
κ− 1/σ.
In the general equilibrium setting, the world economy equilibrium is characterized by:
Definition 4.1 For a set {µ, σ, κ, z} of common parameters, a set {Φi, Gi}∀i of country-
specific parameters, a set {cij,s}∀i,j,s of dyadic migration costs, and for given distribution
of the native population {Ni,s}∀i,s, a competitive equilibrium is an allocation of labor
{Nij,s}∀i,j,s and a vector of wages {wj,s}∀j,s satisfying (i) the utility maximization condi-
tion, Equation (4.13), (ii) the profit maximization condition, Equation (4.19), (iii) the
skill-biased technological constraint, Equation (4.21), and (iv) the aggregation constraints,
Equations (4.14) and (4.17).
It is thus interesting to check whether the partial equilibrium results discussed in the
previous sections resist a general equilibrium analysis. We parameterize the technology
for 174 countries and for the year 2010. We use the wage and labor force data of the year
2010. Assuming σ = 2 (in line with Ottaviano and Peri, 2012) and using Equation (4.20),
we first calibrate the technological skill bias, θi,h,2010/θi,l,2010, to perfectly match the skill
premium data. Note that the cross-country elasticity of
θi,h,2010
θi,l,2010
to the skill ratio is equal
to 0.214 (our proxy for κ), suggesting the existence of directed technical changes. Then,
using Equation (4.18), we calibrate Ai,2010 to perfectly match the aggregate GDP data.
Finally, we use Equation (4.19) to predict the wages.
Figure 4.5 shows the effect of international migration on upper-tail human capital
accumulation in a general equilibrium context with endogenous wages. Compared to the
partial equilibrium results of Figure 4.4, the effects are much smaller. On Figure 4.5c, we
rank countries by increasing order of their observed level of h (i.e., the X-axis is ordinal),
and we compare the observed level of h (thin grey curve) with three counterfactuals: no
high-skilled emigration in dots (mi,h = 0), no low-skilled migration in dashed (mi,l = 0)
and no migration in bold black (mi,s = 0 ∀s). When low-skilled emigration is prohibited,
the proportion of college graduates (hi) decreases in most countries. This effect is attenu-
ated by an increase in Λi: without emigration prospects for the low-skilled, the expected
return to higher education investment increases. This mitigation effect is small because
migration costs are large. In the general equilibrium setting, the decrease in hi leads to
a rise in the domestic skill premium, which leads to a larger increase in Λi. This in turn
triggers investments in high-skilled human capital. The opposite effects are found when
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high-skilled emigration is prohibited. Repatriating college-educated migrants increases
hi mechanically. This effect is attenuated by a moderate decrease in Λi due to lower em-
igration prospects for the highly skilled. In the general equilibrium setting, the rise in hi
leads to a decrease in the domestic skill premium, which leads to a larger decrease in Λi.
This confirms that international migration has a limited impact on the world distribution
of human capital.
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Figure 4.5: Global implications of international migration - general equilibrium effects
(Relative and absolute deviations from the closed economy)
Notes: In Figure 4.5c countries are ranked on the horizontal axis by increasing order of observed h. The
observed level is depicted in grey, ms = 0 in bold black, ml = 0 in dashed, and mh = 0 in dots.
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4.4 Conclusion
International migrants are positively selected in terms of skills and education, and the
movement of highly educated workers from developing to advanced countries has been
the subject of extensive research over the last four decades. This brain drain has long
been viewed as detrimental to the growth potential of the home country and to the wel-
fare of those left behind. It is usually expected to be even more harmful for the least
developed countries where positive selection is greatest. This view has been challenged
by the recent literature, which demonstrates that limited high-skilled emigration can be
beneficial for growth and development. In relative terms, the standard macroeconometric
approach suggests that large brain gain effects can be obtained at low levels of emigra-
tion, and large costs are observed at high levels of emigration. While these findings are
globally confirmed when pooling old and recent data on skill-specific emigration rates, we
argue here that the standard approach fails to capture the cross-country heterogeneity in
migration opportunities and development differentials.
We propose a new dyadic approach that fully accounts for the characteristics of each
origin country and of all its potential destinations. Our structural model jointly endoge-
nizes higher education decisions, as well as the skill and dyadic structures of emigration.
Parameterized on the year 2010, our model predicts the migration data of the previous
decades well, a proof of concept that it does a good job at explaining migration pat-
terns. Our analysis reveals that the effect of international migration on upper-tail human
capital accumulation is much smaller than the effect predicted by standard macroecono-
metric models. On average, the net effect on human capital accumulation is very small
in low-income and middle-income countries. Despite positive selection, we argue that
international migration has a limited impact on the world distribution of human capital.
The effects are even smaller in a general equilibrium framework with endogenous wages.
In addition, the exodus of high-skilled workers is usually seen as a factor reducing the
effectiveness of education policies and the optimal provision of public education. Given
that the cost of education and training represents a disproportionate financial burden for
poor economies, a number of studies argue that high-skilled migration reduces the net
benefits from public investments in education (see Justman and Thisse, 1997; Stark and
Wang, 2002; Docquier et al., 2008). On the contrary, our quantitative analysis shows that
international migration has little effect on the effectiveness of public education policies in
developing countries. Significant negative effects are found in some high-income countries
only. This implies that international migration is unlikely to jeopardize the achievement
of education-related development goals, and should not be cited as an argument to curb
efforts for improving the quantity and quality of education.
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4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Migration trends by education level
Although many aspects of migration have been analyzed by demographers, economists,
sociologists, and other social scientists, data constraints have long obstructed some im-
portant research avenues. Fortunately, several databases have been recently constructed
to document dyadic migration stocks and their skill structure.13 They all rely on census
and administrative data which are usually available in ten-year intervals. Expanding on
Docquier et al. (2009), Artuc¸ et al. (2015) provide comprehensive matrices of dyadic
migration stocks for the years 1990 and 2000 (referred to as the ADOP database). The
DIOC database of the OECD (Database on Immigrants in OECD Countries) is described
in Arslan et al. (2014) and provides data for the 2000 and 2010 census rounds. Finally,
the IAB database (Bru¨cker et al., 2013) provide data in five-year intervals from 1980 to
2010 but for a restricted set of 20 OECD destination countries only. The authors have to
deal with inevitable gaps in the data. This is particularly the case in the IAB database
where many interpolations and/or imputations were used when census data were missing
or were not sufficiently detailed. This is also the case in the ADOP database for some
non-OECD destinations.
We combine the ADOP and DIOC databases to characterize the evolution of emi-
gration rates between 1990 and 2010. We focus on emigration to 34 OECD countries,
which is the best documented, growing component of international migration; migration
to non-OECD countries is ignored. We restrict our sample to emigrants aged 25 and
over, who emigrated to one of the OECD member states. Data on emigration for the
year 1990 are taken from the ADOP database. For the years 2000 and 2010, we extract
data on dyadic migration numbers from DIOC. In order to obtain the emigration rates,
we have to proxy the size of the native populations. For this purpose, we combine data
on the population aged 25 years and above, with data on the share of college-educated
individuals from different data sources.14 For 174 origin countries, the skill-specific emi-
gration rates (mi,s) are proxied as the ratio of emigrants to OECD destination countries
(Mi,s) to the sum of the emigrant and resident populations (Li,s). We write:
mi,s =
Mi,s
Mi,s + Li,s
.
Figure 4.A1 illustrates the evolution of emigration rates by education level and by
period. Figure 4.A1a and 4.A1b describe the evolution observed over 20 years. On
average, skilled emigration rates decreased by 23%, while low-skilled emigration rates
increased by 17%. These trends must be related to the worldwide evolution of human
capital. A strong regularity in migration data is that the proportion of the educated
among emigrants increases with the general level of education of the native population.
The most educated migrants originate from countries with the highest level of human
capital. However, an increase in human capital generates a less than proportional increase
13O¨zden et al. (2011) provide dyadic data from 1960 to 2000 in ten-year intervals for the whole
population of migrants (including children), but with no disaggregation between age and skill groups.
They can be supplemented by the matrices of the United Nations Population Division for the years 2010
and 2015.
14For the years 1990 and 2000, we use population data by education level from Docquier et al. (2009).
For the year 2010, we use a combination of data from Docquier et al. (2009) and the Wittgenstein
database.
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in the education level of emigrants (Docquier et al., 2007). As illustrated in Appendix
4.A.2 (see Figure 4.A2), human capital indicators evidence a general increase in virtually
all countries, and an absolute convergence process (the human capital growth rate is
greater in initially poor countries). This translates into a less than proportional increase
in the stock of college-educated emigrants, and a more than proportional increase in the
stock of low-skilled emigrants. Disentangling the 20-year change by decade, Figure 4.A1c
and 4.A1e show that half of the change in skilled emigration rates occurred between 1990
and 2000, and the other half occurred between 2000 and 2010. As far as low-skilled
emigration rates are concerned, most of the changes occurred between 1990 and 2000, as
illustrated on Figure 4.A1d and 4.A1f.
Table 4.A1 provides emigration stocks and skill-specific rates for the years 1990, 2000,
2010 by income group, by country size, and by region. It shows that high-skilled emi-
gration rates strongly decrease with economic development and population size. On the
contrary, low-skilled emigration rates increase with economic development. Regions with
the greatest skilled emigration rates include small, poor countries (e.g., Caribbean and
Pacific islands). Overall, skilled emigration rates decreased between 1990 and 2010 in
all groups. Exceptions are Eastern Europe, Eastern Asia, and South-Central Asia. The
worldwide average emigration rate has been quite stable for the last 20 years, which is
due to the increasing demographic share of low-income countries (the group exhibiting
the greatest emigration rates). On the contrary, low-skilled emigration rates increased in
virtually all groups.
Table 4.A2 shows the evolution of migration stocks and rates in the countries most
and least affected by emigration. Countries with less than one million inhabitants are
excluded from the list of 174 countries. The first part of Table 4.A2 lists the ten countries
with the greatest stocks of college-educated emigrants in 1990, 2000, and 2010. The top
countries include rich countries with highly educated populations (the UK, Germany,
Canada, etc.) and large developing countries such as the Philippines, India, or China.
The second part of the table displays the ten countries with the greatest rates of college-
educated emigrants in 1990, 2000, and 2010. In line with Table 4.A1, small, poor countries
exhibit large emigration rates. The brain drain reaches more than 60% of the population
in countries such as Jamaica, Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, or Mauritius. Finally, the third
part gives the high-skilled emigration rates for the ten countries with the lowest rates in
1990, 2000, and 2010. This set includes rich countries from the Persian Gulf, as well
as ex-Soviet block countries sending their emigrants to Russia (a non-OECD destination
country).
4.A.2 Human capital and migration
Figure 4.A2 describes the evolution of human capital (proxied by the share of college-
educated adults) between 1990 and 2010, and the relationship between the change in
human capital and the changes in emigration rates. Figure 4.A2a and 4.A2b show that
the shares of college graduates in the resident and native populations increased by a factor
of 1.5 between 1990 (on the X-axis) and 2010 (on the Y-axis). Figure 4.A2c and 4.A2d
compare the 1990-2010 average annual growth rates in the share of college graduates (on
the X-axis) with the initial (1990) shares in logs (on the Y-axis). This β-convergence
analysis evidences an absolute convergence in residents’ and natives’ human capital. In
both cases, the annual speed of convergence is around 1.1%. Finally, Figure 4.A2e and
4.A2f show the relationship between the growth rate of the share of college graduates
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Figure 4.A1: Emigration rates to OECD destination countries
(Data by education level and for the years 1990, 2000 and 2010)
Notes: Figure 4.A1 focuses on emigration to OECD destination countries only. Bubble sizes are propor-
tional to the stock of emigrants.
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Table 4.A1: Emigration stocks and rates to OECD destination countries
(Data by group of countries, by education level and for the years 1990, 2000 and 2010)
Total stock Rate low-skilled Rate high-skilled
(in thousand) (as %) (as %)
Year 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010
World 40,717 58,585 81,449 1.3 1.5 1.7 5.2 4.7 5.1
By income group
High-income 19,570 22,369 26,286 2.7 3.0 3.0 3.9 3.3 3.7
Upper-middle 11,708 20,238 30,229 0.9 1.3 1.6 6.4 5.5 5.1
Lower-middle 8,791 14,739 22,679 0.9 1.1 1.3 8.5 8.4 8.1
Low-income 649 1,240 2,255 0.5 0.8 1.1 16.4 16.2 18.0
By country size
High-pop. 25,603 37,997 52,565 0.9 1.1 1.2 4.0 3.8 4.2
Upper-middle 6,919 9,714 14,204 2.9 3.6 4.3 10.2 8.8 9.4
Lower-middle 6,683 8,880 12,064 4.7 5.5 6.2 12.1 10.5 10.4
Low-pop. 1,511 1,994 2,617 8.0 9.3 9.9 28.2 24.5 22.1
By region
Africa
Northern 2,016 3,274 4,687 3.1 3.6 4.0 10.8 10.7 9.2
Sub-Saharan 1,375 2,414 4,250 0.5 0.7 0.9 14.1 13.0 11.9
Americas
Caribbean 1,951 3,055 3,926 9.3 13.2 13.8 43.6 34.6 32.7
Central 3,484 8,166 12,221 6.8 12.2 13.8 13.6 9.4 10.2
South 1,628 3,100 5,214 0.8 1.4 1.9 4.8 4.0 4.5
USA & CAN 1,428 1,660 1,905 0.6 0.9 0.7 1.0 0.8 0.9
Asia
Eastern 1,288 2,248 3,399 0.1 0.1 0.2 2.0 2.4 2.3
South-Cent. 1,726 3,302 6,353 0.2 0.3 0.4 3.2 4.4 5.2
South-East 2,583 4,207 5,979 0.8 1.1 1.2 10.8 7.4 6.2
Middle East 2,760 3,840 5,230 2.6 2.8 2.7 10.4 7.4 6.4
Europe
Eastern 6,644 8,558 12,488 4.3 5.4 7.4 9.5 9.5 11.6
Western 13,304 13,972 14,742 4.5 4.4 4.1 8.4 7.4 7.1
Oceania
Australia & NZ 397 565 753 2.6 3.4 3.4 4.3 4.3 5.2
Pacific islands 133 223 303 4.1 5.5 5.6 47.2 39.7 27.5
Notes: Table 4.A1 focuses on emigration to OECD destination countries only. For income groups and
regions, we follow the World Bank classification. For country size, we distinguish between countries with
a population above 25 million (High-pop.), between 10 and 25 million (Upper-middle), between 2.5 and
10 million (Lower-middle), and below 2.5 million (Low-pop.).
(on the X-axis) and the growth rate of emigration rates (on the Y-axis). High-skilled
emigration rates decrease with human capital, while low-skilled emigration rates increase
with h.
4.A.3 Emigration data and backcasts by country
Table 4.A3 reports the emigration rates by education and by country for the years 1990,
2000 and 2010 for the partial equilibrium. We supplement these observations with back-
casts from the dyadic model for the years 1970 and 1980. To do so, we use proxies for
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Figure 4.A2: Human capital and emigration between 1990 and 2010
Notes: Bubble sizes are proportional to the stock of emigrants.
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Table 4.A2: Most and least affected countries in 1990, 2000 and 2010
Highest stocks of college-educated migrants
1990 2000 2010
UK 1,149,411 UK 1,299,901 India 2,087,376
Germany 807,612 India 933,289 Philippines 1,494,127
Philippines 635,129 Philippines 859,974 UK 1,450,392
India 447,409 Germany 823,956 China 1,361,434
Canada 401,812 China 777,671 Germany 1,169,076
Mexico 366,838 Poland 451,781 Poland 941,028
China 359,692 Mexico 433,892 Mexico 825,502
Poland 334,190 Canada 403,201 Ukraine 642,428
Italy 321,953 USA 395,759 France 551,245
USA 316,353 Italy 360,108 USA 548,750
Highest emigration rates for college graduates (as %)
1990 2000 2010
Jamaica 85.5 Jamaica 81.0 Trin & Tob 68.8
Trin & Tob 80.0 Trin & Tob 75.2 Jamaica 65.7
Haiti 76.6 Haiti 74.1 Mauritius 61.8
The Gambia 76.2 Mozambique 64.3 Haiti 61.7
Mozambique 71.4 The Gambia 60.3 The Gambia 53.7
Mauritius 66.9 Mauritius 53.5 Liberia 44.7
Lebanon 53.2 Guinea-Bissau 44.6 Mozambique 41.2
Guinea-Bissau 50.7 Sierra Leone 43.1 Guinea-Bissau 33.0
Liberia 47.2 Ghana 37.4 Sierra Leone 32.6
Kenya 46.6 Lebanon 35.3 Somalia 32.0
Lowest emigration rates for college graduates (as %)
1990 2000 2010
Oman 0.3 USA 0.4 USA 0.5
USA 0.5 Oman 0.5 Turkmenistan 0.7
UAE 0.6 Turkmenistan 0.7 Tajikistan 0.8
Tajikistan 0.9 UAE 0.7 Japan 1.1
Uzbekistan 0.9 Saudi Arabia 0.9 Indonesia 1.1
Saudi Arabia 0.9 Japan 1.2 Oman 1.2
Turkmenistan 1.0 Tajikistan 1.2 Thailand 1.4
Kyrgyzstan 1.0 Thailand 1.7 Saudi Arabia 1.4
Azerbaijan 1.2 Brazil 1.8 Kyrgyzstan 1.6
Kazakhstan 1.2 Indonesia 2.0 UAE 1.6
Notes: Table 4.A2 focuses on emigration to OECD destination countries only. It excludes countries with
a population below one million.
skill-specific wages and native labor force data from Dao et al. (2017), and simulate the
equilibrium allocation of the world labor force using Equations (4.13) and (4.14).
Table 4.A4 illustrates the country-specific effects of international migration on human
capital in partial and general equilibrium. This table reports the proportions of college
graduates in the native labor force and the resident population, as well as the proportions
of college graduates under a no migration scenario for the year 2010.
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Table 4.A3: Emig. rate by skill group and by country, 1970-2010 (1/4)
Low-skilled emig. rates High-skilled emig. rates
Iso Backcasts Observations Backcasts Observations
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
AFG 0.014 0.017 0.006 0.010 0.020 0.094 0.122 0.128 0.111 0.153
ALB 0.240 0.272 0.163 0.189 0.285 0.252 0.281 0.153 0.184 0.269
DZA 0.038 0.036 0.054 0.062 0.061 0.068 0.070 0.090 0.169 0.129
AGO 0.015 0.028 0.026 0.030 0.025 0.089 0.169 0.169 0.154 0.149
ARG 0.013 0.015 0.006 0.013 0.017 0.037 0.040 0.034 0.030 0.045
ARM 0.038 0.044 0.009 0.028 0.044 0.106 0.119 0.096 0.113 0.112
AUS 0.013 0.014 0.011 0.015 0.013 0.032 0.033 0.021 0.027 0.032
AUT 0.050 0.046 0.055 0.048 0.043 0.098 0.085 0.169 0.124 0.083
AZE 0.008 0.009 0.005 0.006 0.010 0.029 0.034 0.012 0.029 0.035
BHS 0.030 0.061 0.075 0.097 0.087 0.116 0.214 0.364 0.288 0.270
BHR 0.005 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.028 0.036 0.042 0.050 0.044
BGD 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.023 0.029 0.036 0.038 0.039
BRB 0.180 0.225 0.247 0.245 0.251 0.399 0.501 0.685 0.576 0.511
BLR 0.034 0.038 0.014 0.022 0.035 0.065 0.078 0.046 0.049 0.070
BEL 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.038 0.038 0.055 0.051 0.052 0.050 0.052
BLZ 0.155 0.161 0.238 0.248 0.203 0.349 0.371 0.530 0.485 0.454
BEN 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.109 0.119 0.084 0.109 0.124
BTN 0.012 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.040 0.058 0.004 0.006 0.067
BOL 0.031 0.034 0.008 0.016 0.047 0.023 0.024 0.068 0.043 0.031
BIH 0.202 0.194 0.122 0.153 0.201 0.224 0.214 0.235 0.213 0.218
BWA 0.015 0.008 0.001 0.002 0.008 0.140 0.074 0.040 0.047 0.092
BRA 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.017 0.015 0.013 0.018 0.022
BRN 0.003 0.007 0.016 0.020 0.020 0.012 0.028 0.221 0.130 0.087
BGR 0.087 0.088 0.061 0.076 0.092 0.075 0.074 0.068 0.066 0.076
BFA 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.032 0.040 0.020 0.030 0.043
MMR 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.024 0.024 0.043 0.032 0.021
BDI 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.042 0.041 0.114 0.087 0.083
KHM 0.045 0.043 0.030 0.034 0.030 0.213 0.219 0.225 0.164 0.183
CMR 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.100 0.113 0.213 0.179 0.170
CAN 0.047 0.045 0.042 0.052 0.047 0.036 0.035 0.049 0.036 0.037
CPV 0.426 0.386 0.243 0.308 0.331 0.723 0.697 0.821 0.750 0.650
CAF 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.084 0.113 0.049 0.108 0.181
TCD 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.057 0.109 0.207 0.144 0.100
CHL 0.016 0.019 0.012 0.016 0.018 0.033 0.038 0.069 0.043 0.036
CHN 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.057 0.057 0.030 0.038 0.031
COL 0.019 0.020 0.013 0.022 0.030 0.032 0.036 0.106 0.075 0.053
COM 0.036 0.052 0.020 0.048 0.086 0.107 0.145 0.151 0.262 0.268
COD 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.049 0.071 0.215 0.204 0.145
COG 0.019 0.018 0.009 0.029 0.029 0.073 0.081 0.160 0.160 0.131
CRI 0.022 0.022 0.017 0.028 0.027 0.033 0.034 0.083 0.046 0.042
CIV 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.012 0.039 0.043 0.050 0.067 0.105
HRV 0.123 0.113 0.116 0.125 0.141 0.125 0.112 0.188 0.159 0.136
CUB 0.082 0.078 0.079 0.093 0.103 0.196 0.200 0.311 0.210 0.257
CYP 0.157 0.144 0.196 0.171 0.137 0.218 0.211 0.274 0.268 0.218
CZE 0.027 0.027 0.016 0.019 0.029 0.069 0.067 0.105 0.060 0.073
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Table 4.A3: Emig. rate by skill group and by country, 1970-2010 (cont’d 2/4)
Low-skilled emig. rates High-skilled emig. rates
Iso Backcasts Observations Backcasts Observations
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
DNK 0.026 0.027 0.036 0.028 0.027 0.067 0.069 0.074 0.061 0.069
DJI 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.065 0.090 0.091 0.086 0.132
DOM 0.150 0.134 0.067 0.137 0.143 0.139 0.126 0.245 0.183 0.140
ECU 0.054 0.052 0.035 0.068 0.091 0.045 0.044 0.074 0.064 0.081
EGY 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.034 0.030 0.062 0.045 0.035
SLV 0.203 0.216 0.118 0.201 0.279 0.151 0.165 0.323 0.168 0.231
GNQ 0.136 0.127 0.028 0.044 0.040 0.547 0.522 0.127 0.274 0.236
ERI 0.022 0.024 0.009 0.026 0.027 0.226 0.241 0.298 0.286 0.271
EST 0.056 0.061 0.028 0.026 0.055 0.071 0.079 0.068 0.057 0.068
ETH 0.005 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.041 0.054 0.091 0.070 0.089
FJI 0.105 0.097 0.093 0.165 0.191 0.317 0.290 0.653 0.604 0.512
FIN 0.070 0.069 0.074 0.064 0.066 0.042 0.043 0.073 0.059 0.045
FRA 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.019 0.018 0.044 0.046 0.026 0.038 0.052
GAB 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.008 0.013 0.120 0.136 0.092 0.215 0.229
GMB 0.039 0.037 0.016 0.025 0.052 0.442 0.415 0.762 0.603 0.537
GEO 0.023 0.029 0.008 0.029 0.045 0.037 0.046 0.020 0.060 0.067
DEU 0.040 0.038 0.033 0.039 0.040 0.061 0.056 0.062 0.051 0.059
GHA 0.010 0.014 0.010 0.012 0.016 0.224 0.265 0.369 0.374 0.277
GRC 0.077 0.070 0.091 0.076 0.066 0.069 0.063 0.154 0.074 0.067
GRD 0.404 0.410 0.358 0.494 0.407 0.690 0.708 0.840 0.802 0.710
GTM 0.087 0.080 0.042 0.082 0.102 0.096 0.089 0.195 0.138 0.118
GIN 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.059 0.070 0.037 0.061 0.080
GNB 0.023 0.030 0.038 0.043 0.044 0.166 0.247 0.507 0.446 0.330
GUY 0.264 0.271 0.307 0.363 0.407 0.661 0.669 0.909 0.836 0.782
HTI 0.051 0.044 0.053 0.095 0.097 0.374 0.333 0.766 0.741 0.617
HND 0.081 0.076 0.031 0.077 0.111 0.132 0.127 0.224 0.147 0.190
HUN 0.034 0.034 0.032 0.033 0.036 0.106 0.106 0.157 0.137 0.115
ISL 0.055 0.051 0.062 0.063 0.069 0.131 0.122 0.264 0.180 0.166
IND 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.053 0.059 0.028 0.039 0.046
IDN 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.011 0.010 0.056 0.020 0.011
IRN 0.006 0.007 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.045 0.059 0.251 0.133 0.091
IRQ 0.007 0.005 0.023 0.027 0.030 0.022 0.017 0.095 0.107 0.100
IRL 0.243 0.227 0.257 0.200 0.182 0.252 0.236 0.361 0.271 0.205
ISR 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.029 0.029 0.068 0.063 0.086 0.064 0.068
ITA 0.040 0.037 0.058 0.047 0.039 0.067 0.062 0.116 0.089 0.068
JAM 0.165 0.212 0.223 0.289 0.305 0.456 0.539 0.855 0.810 0.657
JPN 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.010 0.010 0.013 0.012 0.011
JOR 0.018 0.013 0.022 0.019 0.019 0.040 0.030 0.090 0.056 0.050
KAZ 0.070 0.082 0.005 0.040 0.092 0.041 0.049 0.012 0.049 0.056
KEN 0.005 0.005 0.011 0.010 0.008 0.127 0.132 0.466 0.352 0.223
KWT 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.008 0.012 0.024 0.051 0.062 0.064 0.077
KGZ 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.021 0.016
LAO 0.084 0.081 0.069 0.092 0.077 0.293 0.277 0.302 0.265 0.258
LVA 0.041 0.046 0.017 0.022 0.049 0.090 0.101 0.068 0.070 0.102
LBN 0.064 0.066 0.106 0.111 0.103 0.148 0.162 0.532 0.353 0.268
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Table 4.A3: Emig. rate by skill group and by country, 1970-2010 (cont’d 3/4)
Low-skilled emig. rates High-skilled emig. rates
Iso Backcasts Observations Backcasts Observations
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
LSO 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.047 0.042 0.082 0.055 0.045
LBR 0.012 0.015 0.007 0.019 0.026 0.286 0.354 0.472 0.339 0.447
LBY 0.005 0.007 0.022 0.028 0.023 0.009 0.014 0.061 0.062 0.069
LTU 0.077 0.088 0.070 0.077 0.105 0.039 0.047 0.094 0.076 0.060
LUX 0.079 0.095 0.081 0.076 0.068 0.108 0.124 0.091 0.073 0.089
MKD 0.141 0.130 0.123 0.163 0.187 0.080 0.075 0.075 0.066 0.109
MDG 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.008 0.009 0.089 0.110 0.068 0.134 0.160
MWI 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.170 0.167 0.133 0.189 0.210
MYS 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.060 0.054 0.263 0.099 0.060
MDV 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.021 0.020 0.013 0.017 0.024
MLI 0.016 0.015 0.008 0.010 0.013 0.229 0.220 0.104 0.192 0.192
MLT 0.236 0.204 0.272 0.239 0.209 0.311 0.279 0.688 0.534 0.306
MRT 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.011 0.014 0.038 0.049 0.053 0.112 0.068
MUS 0.129 0.126 0.076 0.082 0.095 0.699 0.694 0.669 0.535 0.618
MEX 0.102 0.092 0.072 0.129 0.143 0.054 0.052 0.109 0.077 0.089
FSM 0.173 0.145 0.153 0.180 0.267 0.203 0.156 0.360 0.378 0.327
MDA 0.029 0.036 0.009 0.014 0.069 0.081 0.098 0.021 0.076 0.172
MNG 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.042 0.039 0.095 0.071 0.061
MAR 0.081 0.080 0.079 0.089 0.106 0.159 0.174 0.256 0.246 0.248
MOZ 0.005 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.318 0.448 0.714 0.643 0.412
NAM 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.006 0.038 0.043 0.030 0.045 0.068
NPL 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.014 0.016 0.062 0.034 0.020
NLD 0.038 0.041 0.040 0.038 0.040 0.068 0.072 0.116 0.086 0.070
NZL 0.108 0.113 0.086 0.111 0.127 0.141 0.147 0.169 0.140 0.157
NIC 0.029 0.038 0.051 0.080 0.075 0.077 0.107 0.278 0.250 0.205
NER 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.029 0.045 0.082 0.082 0.081
NGA 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.036 0.038 0.078 0.095 0.062
NOR 0.032 0.027 0.036 0.026 0.025 0.053 0.045 0.080 0.060 0.043
OMN 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.007 0.009 0.003 0.005 0.012
PAK 0.008 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.124 0.120 0.077 0.111 0.125
PAN 0.036 0.035 0.037 0.047 0.051 0.077 0.077 0.240 0.162 0.116
PNG 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.058 0.047 0.204 0.125 0.082
PRY 0.015 0.014 0.004 0.017 0.023 0.033 0.028 0.039 0.052 0.045
PER 0.029 0.032 0.011 0.028 0.044 0.035 0.038 0.060 0.043 0.052
PHL 0.026 0.025 0.019 0.033 0.037 0.078 0.077 0.126 0.108 0.114
POL 0.079 0.081 0.038 0.061 0.080 0.161 0.162 0.154 0.142 0.164
PRT 0.164 0.148 0.142 0.143 0.149 0.133 0.120 0.159 0.105 0.128
QAT 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.009 0.016 0.026 0.022
ROU 0.091 0.089 0.026 0.051 0.114 0.186 0.177 0.108 0.167 0.207
RWA 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.209 0.211 0.167 0.295 0.280
LCA 0.172 0.179 0.148 0.183 0.219 0.386 0.410 0.630 0.572 0.471
VCT 0.236 0.270 0.214 0.308 0.324 0.588 0.635 0.809 0.775 0.682
WSM 0.302 0.284 0.362 0.407 0.420 0.374 0.361 0.625 0.522 0.503
STP 0.098 0.099 0.125 0.151 0.163 0.445 0.479 0.503 0.460 0.611
SAU 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.014
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Table 4.A3: Emig. rate by skill group and by country, 1970-2010 (cont’d 4/4)
Low-skilled emig. rates High-skilled emig. rates
Iso Backcasts Observations Backcasts Observations
1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
SEN 0.024 0.030 0.019 0.026 0.035 0.196 0.233 0.141 0.238 0.252
SRB 0.043 0.039 0.068 0.068 0.070 0.040 0.036 0.111 0.076 0.061
SLE 0.008 0.009 0.004 0.011 0.016 0.179 0.204 0.439 0.431 0.326
SGP 0.021 0.018 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.050 0.046 0.253 0.129 0.055
SVK 0.088 0.089 0.095 0.092 0.087 0.166 0.166 0.125 0.153 0.158
SVN 0.043 0.038 0.038 0.040 0.041 0.050 0.041 0.086 0.061 0.044
SLB 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.029 0.021 0.210 0.171 0.054
SOM 0.027 0.032 0.011 0.025 0.048 0.183 0.229 0.215 0.225 0.320
ZAF 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.060 0.061 0.120 0.079 0.085
ESP 0.021 0.019 0.030 0.022 0.016 0.037 0.032 0.035 0.035 0.032
LKA 0.027 0.028 0.010 0.016 0.025 0.166 0.153 0.270 0.209 0.208
SDN 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.004 0.034 0.041 0.076 0.060 0.051
SUR 0.236 0.240 0.441 0.422 0.369 0.439 0.441 0.692 0.635 0.587
SWZ 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.031 0.038 0.037 0.043 0.058
SWE 0.020 0.022 0.017 0.018 0.021 0.041 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.042
CHE 0.045 0.052 0.044 0.060 0.057 0.092 0.099 0.071 0.101 0.106
SYR 0.012 0.009 0.016 0.014 0.013 0.038 0.029 0.077 0.050 0.044
TJK 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.012 0.008
TZA 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.078 0.089 0.108 0.103 0.122
THA 0.009 0.008 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.015 0.014 0.024 0.017 0.014
TGO 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.010 0.043 0.054 0.136 0.140 0.111
TON 0.331 0.317 0.292 0.364 0.455 0.428 0.427 0.809 0.727 0.582
TTO 0.174 0.161 0.160 0.194 0.188 0.680 0.660 0.800 0.752 0.688
TUN 0.068 0.061 0.063 0.077 0.069 0.099 0.105 0.311 0.203 0.140
TUR 0.054 0.055 0.052 0.053 0.057 0.041 0.043 0.085 0.045 0.047
TKM 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.010 0.007 0.007
UGA 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.125 0.181 0.428 0.330 0.170
UKR 0.017 0.020 0.023 0.026 0.029 0.052 0.061 0.033 0.059 0.086
ARE 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.016
GBR 0.055 0.056 0.050 0.054 0.053 0.126 0.128 0.178 0.153 0.121
USA 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.005
URY 0.051 0.052 0.018 0.029 0.056 0.118 0.117 0.079 0.080 0.117
UZB 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.025 0.026 0.009 0.024 0.032
VUT 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.011 0.014 0.060 0.059 0.130 0.101 0.101
VEN 0.007 0.009 0.004 0.011 0.015 0.024 0.033 0.035 0.038 0.052
VNM 0.032 0.035 0.013 0.027 0.025 0.162 0.183 0.238 0.188 0.140
YEM 0.007 0.005 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.028 0.020 0.278 0.110 0.039
ZMB 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.068 0.090 0.197 0.178 0.128
ZWE 0.006 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.015 0.111 0.114 0.076 0.115 0.244
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Table 4.A4: Effect of intl. migration on human capital in 2010 (1/4)
Iso Observations No mig. (par. eq.) No mig. (gen. eq.)
Λ H h Λ H = h Λ H = h
AFG 3.4 0.046 0.040 3.0 0.041 2.9 0.041
ALB 2.2 0.128 0.130 2.2 0.132 2.2 0.131
DZA 2.7 0.115 0.107 2.5 0.106 2.6 0.107
AGO 3.1 0.053 0.047 2.7 0.047 2.7 0.047
ARG 1.8 0.218 0.213 1.8 0.205 1.8 0.209
ARM 2.4 0.251 0.237 2.2 0.228 2.2 0.231
AUS 1.2 0.354 0.361 1.2 0.300 1.2 0.350
AUT 1.3 0.218 0.201 1.2 0.158 1.2 0.191
AZE 2.3 0.195 0.191 2.3 0.189 2.3 0.189
BHS 2.6 0.184 0.153 2.1 0.139 2.2 0.144
BHR 2.1 0.179 0.174 2.1 0.169 2.1 0.171
BGD 2.9 0.064 0.062 2.8 0.062 2.8 0.062
BRB 3.2 0.217 0.153 2.1 0.137 2.2 0.143
BLR 1.6 0.242 0.235 1.6 0.217 1.6 0.227
BEL 1.2 0.349 0.337 1.2 0.312 1.2 0.332
BLZ 3.4 0.159 0.115 2.3 0.111 2.4 0.112
BEN 3.3 0.026 0.023 2.9 0.024 2.9 0.023
BTN 3.1 0.055 0.052 2.9 0.052 2.9 0.052
BOL 1.6 0.175 0.178 1.6 0.184 1.6 0.180
BIH 2.3 0.133 0.130 2.3 0.129 2.3 0.129
BWA 3.3 0.055 0.050 3.0 0.051 3.0 0.051
BRA 3.6 0.106 0.105 3.5 0.105 3.5 0.105
BRN 2.0 0.154 0.145 1.9 0.135 1.9 0.139
BGR 1.3 0.223 0.226 1.3 0.249 1.3 0.232
BFA 3.1 0.021 0.020 3.0 0.020 3.0 0.020
MMR 3.0 0.068 0.067 2.9 0.067 2.9 0.067
BDI 3.2 0.039 0.036 2.9 0.036 2.9 0.036
KHM 3.4 0.039 0.033 2.9 0.034 2.8 0.034
CMR 3.6 0.046 0.039 3.0 0.040 3.0 0.040
CAN 1.2 0.574 0.568 1.2 0.639 1.2 0.571
CPV 4.9 0.047 0.025 2.6 0.030 2.5 0.028
CAF 3.6 0.018 0.015 2.9 0.016 2.9 0.015
TCD 2.3 0.010 0.009 2.0 0.009 2.1 0.009
CHL 2.0 0.177 0.177 2.0 0.171 2.0 0.174
CHN 1.4 0.051 0.049 1.3 0.044 1.4 0.047
COL 3.0 0.163 0.160 2.9 0.160 2.9 0.160
COM 3.7 0.053 0.043 3.0 0.045 2.9 0.044
COD 3.5 0.027 0.023 3.0 0.024 3.0 0.024
COG 3.3 0.063 0.057 3.0 0.058 3.0 0.058
CRI 2.0 0.209 0.206 2.0 0.203 2.0 0.205
CIV 3.3 0.050 0.045 3.0 0.046 3.0 0.046
HRV 2.2 0.159 0.160 2.2 0.160 2.2 0.160
CUB 2.6 0.146 0.124 2.2 0.115 2.2 0.119
CYP 1.9 0.260 0.242 1.7 0.213 1.8 0.227
CZE 1.1 0.154 0.150 1.1 0.075 1.1 0.137
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Table 4.A4: Effect of intl. migration on human capital in 2010 (cont’d 2/4)
Iso Observations No mig. (par. eq.) No mig. (gen. eq.)
Λ H h Λ H = h Λ H = h
DNK 1.4 0.252 0.249 1.3 0.202 1.3 0.234
DJI 3.0 0.056 0.049 2.6 0.049 2.6 0.049
DOM 1.7 0.193 0.194 1.7 0.195 1.7 0.194
ECU 1.9 0.198 0.200 1.9 0.202 1.9 0.201
EGY 2.3 0.153 0.149 2.2 0.146 2.2 0.147
SLV 2.1 0.133 0.140 2.2 0.146 2.2 0.144
GNQ 3.1 0.062 0.050 2.5 0.050 2.5 0.050
ERI 3.9 0.033 0.025 2.9 0.027 2.9 0.027
EST 1.5 0.320 0.323 1.5 0.306 1.5 0.317
ETH 3.3 0.027 0.025 3.0 0.026 3.0 0.026
FJI 4.1 0.182 0.118 2.5 0.121 2.5 0.120
FIN 1.5 0.387 0.387 1.6 0.416 1.5 0.397
FRA 1.4 0.236 0.230 1.4 0.201 1.4 0.220
GAB 2.9 0.053 0.042 2.3 0.040 2.3 0.041
GMB 5.9 0.030 0.015 2.9 0.020 2.7 0.019
GEO 1.8 0.276 0.271 1.8 0.262 1.8 0.266
DEU 1.2 0.304 0.287 1.2 0.256 1.2 0.281
GHA 3.3 0.038 0.028 2.4 0.029 2.4 0.028
GRC 1.3 0.206 0.204 1.3 0.205 1.3 0.204
GRD 4.8 0.202 0.110 2.3 0.117 2.3 0.115
GTM 3.4 0.068 0.067 3.3 0.067 3.3 0.067
GIN 3.2 0.037 0.034 3.0 0.035 3.0 0.035
GNB 4.3 0.023 0.016 3.0 0.018 2.9 0.018
GUY 7.5 0.206 0.087 2.7 0.122 2.5 0.111
HTI 7.0 0.053 0.023 3.0 0.035 2.7 0.031
HND 3.9 0.081 0.075 3.6 0.077 3.5 0.076
HUN 1.5 0.158 0.152 1.3 0.110 1.4 0.136
ISL 1.9 0.295 0.275 1.7 0.235 1.8 0.255
IND 2.8 0.073 0.070 2.7 0.070 2.7 0.070
IDN 2.7 0.095 0.094 2.7 0.094 2.7 0.094
IRN 2.7 0.114 0.106 2.5 0.105 2.5 0.105
IRQ 2.5 0.128 0.120 2.4 0.117 2.4 0.118
IRL 1.6 0.339 0.347 1.5 0.310 1.6 0.333
ISR 1.3 0.335 0.353 1.3 0.268 1.3 0.329
ITA 1.4 0.123 0.121 1.4 0.109 1.4 0.116
JAM 5.5 0.186 0.102 2.7 0.120 2.6 0.115
JPN 1.4 0.309 0.308 1.4 0.299 1.4 0.305
JOR 2.0 0.272 0.266 2.0 0.258 2.0 0.261
KAZ 1.8 0.242 0.249 1.9 0.261 1.9 0.256
KEN 3.8 0.035 0.028 3.0 0.030 2.9 0.029
KWT 2.0 0.194 0.184 1.8 0.171 1.9 0.177
KGZ 1.9 0.193 0.191 1.9 0.188 1.9 0.190
LAO 3.5 0.070 0.057 2.8 0.059 2.8 0.058
LVA 1.7 0.312 0.288 1.6 0.268 1.6 0.280
LBN 2.7 0.194 0.165 2.2 0.153 2.3 0.157
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Table 4.A4: Effect of intl. migration on human capital in 2010 (cont’d 3/4)
Iso Observations No mig. (par. eq.) No mig. (gen. eq.)
Λ H h Λ H = h Λ H = h
LSO 3.1 0.032 0.031 3.0 0.031 3.0 0.031
LBR 5.2 0.035 0.020 2.9 0.025 2.8 0.023
LBY 2.3 0.137 0.132 2.2 0.128 2.2 0.130
LTU 1.7 0.333 0.344 1.8 0.372 1.8 0.357
LUX 1.2 0.306 0.308 1.2 0.258 1.2 0.297
MKD 1.8 0.140 0.151 2.0 0.167 1.9 0.160
MDG 3.5 0.029 0.025 3.0 0.026 3.0 0.026
MWI 3.8 0.010 0.008 3.0 0.008 3.0 0.008
MYS 2.6 0.175 0.168 2.4 0.165 2.5 0.166
MDV 2.2 0.092 0.090 2.2 0.089 2.2 0.089
MLI 3.6 0.012 0.010 3.0 0.011 2.9 0.010
MLT 2.4 0.165 0.148 2.1 0.137 2.1 0.141
MRT 3.1 0.051 0.049 2.9 0.049 2.9 0.049
MUS 5.6 0.078 0.034 2.4 0.043 2.2 0.040
MEX 2.7 0.132 0.140 2.9 0.140 2.9 0.140
FSM 2.7 0.147 0.137 2.5 0.135 2.5 0.135
MDA 2.0 0.200 0.182 1.8 0.160 1.8 0.170
MNG 3.0 0.089 0.084 2.9 0.084 2.9 0.084
MAR 3.1 0.086 0.074 2.6 0.074 2.6 0.074
MOZ 5.0 0.008 0.005 3.0 0.006 2.8 0.006
NAM 3.2 0.060 0.057 3.0 0.057 3.0 0.057
NPL 2.9 0.048 0.047 2.9 0.048 2.9 0.048
NLD 1.3 0.290 0.283 1.3 0.245 1.3 0.272
NZL 1.2 0.320 0.353 1.2 0.229 1.2 0.328
NIC 2.7 0.115 0.100 2.3 0.096 2.3 0.098
NER 3.2 0.010 0.009 3.0 0.009 3.0 0.009
NGA 3.2 0.075 0.071 3.0 0.071 3.0 0.071
NOR 1.1 0.314 0.317 1.1 0.221 1.1 0.306
OMN 2.1 0.170 0.169 2.1 0.167 2.1 0.168
PAK 2.4 0.044 0.039 2.2 0.037 2.2 0.038
PAN 2.3 0.228 0.216 2.1 0.207 2.2 0.210
PNG 3.1 0.055 0.051 2.8 0.051 2.8 0.051
PRY 2.1 0.111 0.109 2.0 0.108 2.1 0.108
PER 1.9 0.300 0.298 1.8 0.295 1.8 0.297
PHL 2.4 0.294 0.277 2.2 0.264 2.3 0.269
POL 1.6 0.191 0.177 1.4 0.136 1.5 0.160
PRT 1.9 0.122 0.135 1.9 0.128 1.9 0.131
QAT 2.0 0.166 0.163 2.0 0.161 2.0 0.162
ROU 2.6 0.140 0.127 2.3 0.123 2.4 0.124
RWA 4.2 0.011 0.008 3.0 0.009 2.9 0.009
LCA 4.0 0.139 0.098 2.7 0.103 2.7 0.102
VCT 5.5 0.172 0.089 2.6 0.106 2.5 0.101
WSM 2.9 0.153 0.134 2.5 0.131 2.5 0.132
STP 6.4 0.042 0.020 3.0 0.028 2.7 0.026
SAU 2.1 0.205 0.203 2.1 0.201 2.1 0.202
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Table 4.A4: Effect of intl. migration on human capital in 2010 (cont’d 4/4)
Iso Observations No mig. (par. eq.) No mig. (gen. eq.)
Λ H h Λ H = h Λ H = h
SEN 3.9 0.037 0.029 3.0 0.031 2.9 0.031
SRB 2.3 0.167 0.169 2.4 0.170 2.3 0.169
SLE 4.4 0.033 0.023 3.0 0.026 2.9 0.025
SGP 2.5 0.344 0.335 2.4 0.328 2.4 0.331
SVK 1.3 0.151 0.142 1.2 0.078 1.2 0.124
SVN 1.3 0.189 0.180 1.3 0.186 1.3 0.181
SLB 3.1 0.075 0.071 3.0 0.072 3.0 0.072
SOM 4.2 0.035 0.025 3.0 0.028 2.9 0.027
ZAF 3.2 0.128 0.119 3.0 0.120 3.0 0.119
ESP 1.4 0.180 0.186 1.4 0.167 1.4 0.179
LKA 3.5 0.070 0.057 2.8 0.059 2.8 0.059
SDN 3.1 0.049 0.047 3.0 0.047 3.0 0.047
SUR 3.6 0.127 0.087 2.4 0.087 2.4 0.087
SWZ 2.8 0.078 0.075 2.7 0.074 2.7 0.074
SWE 1.2 0.364 0.353 1.2 0.300 1.2 0.343
CHE 1.6 0.212 0.228 1.5 0.178 1.5 0.207
SYR 2.2 0.143 0.139 2.2 0.136 2.2 0.137
TJK 2.4 0.179 0.178 2.3 0.178 2.3 0.178
TZA 3.4 0.020 0.018 3.0 0.018 3.0 0.018
THA 2.2 0.145 0.144 2.2 0.144 2.2 0.144
TGO 3.3 0.051 0.046 3.0 0.047 3.0 0.047
TON 3.2 0.156 0.124 2.5 0.122 2.5 0.123
TTO 5.9 0.143 0.060 2.3 0.073 2.2 0.068
TUN 2.8 0.115 0.107 2.6 0.106 2.6 0.106
TUR 2.3 0.119 0.121 2.4 0.121 2.4 0.121
TKM 2.3 0.185 0.184 2.3 0.184 2.3 0.184
UGA 3.6 0.026 0.022 3.0 0.023 3.0 0.023
UKR 1.9 0.218 0.208 1.8 0.193 1.8 0.200
ARE 2.1 0.164 0.162 2.1 0.161 2.1 0.162
GBR 1.5 0.257 0.274 1.4 0.198 1.5 0.243
USA 1.4 0.492 0.468 1.4 0.488 1.4 0.473
URY 1.9 0.141 0.133 1.7 0.122 1.8 0.127
UZB 2.4 0.152 0.148 2.4 0.147 2.4 0.147
VUT 2.7 0.076 0.070 2.5 0.069 2.5 0.069
VEN 1.9 0.247 0.240 1.9 0.230 1.9 0.235
VNM 3.1 0.070 0.062 2.8 0.062 2.8 0.062
YEM 3.0 0.042 0.041 2.9 0.041 2.9 0.041
ZMB 3.4 0.057 0.050 3.0 0.051 3.0 0.051
ZWE 3.9 0.074 0.058 3.0 0.061 2.9 0.060
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4.A.4 Internal migration in the dyadic model
The model described above could be extended by assuming that agents in country i
additionally have the option to migrate internally to a number of m regions, which is an
increasing function of the country size Si (i.e.,
∂m(Si)
∂Si
> 0). For expositional convenience,
we assume that the other regions are characterized by similar economic conditions (same
wage rates, etc.) and internal migration costs c˜ii,s to all regions are identical. We assume
µ = 1 for tractability. Actual international migration costs are denoted by c˜ij,s. The
multinomial logit expression (4.12) described above then becomes:
N sij
N si
=
wj,s(1− c˜ij,s)
wi,s +mwi,s(1− c˜ii,s) +
∑
k 6=iwk,s(1− c˜ik,s)
=
wj,s(1− c˜ij,s)
wi,s(1 +m(1− c˜ii,s)) +
∑
k 6=iwk,s(1− c˜ik,s)
, (4.22)
which can be rewritten as a standard logit model:
N sij
N si
=
wj,s
1−c˜ij,s
1+m(1−c˜ii,s)
wi,s +
∑
k 6=iwk,s
1−c˜ik,s
1+m(1−c˜ii,s)
. (4.23)
We do not observe internal migration and directly calibrate 1− cij,s, which is negatively
affected by m. It clearly appears that our calibrated international migration costs im-
plicitly accounts for internal migration costs:
1− cij,s = 1− c˜ij,s
1 +m(1− c˜ii,s) . (4.24)
In large countries with more internal migration opportunities, m is large. This means the
calibrated international migration costs cij,s are larger: other things equal, large countries
send less emigrants abroad.
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Conclusion
This thesis discusses human migration at all spatial scales. It analyzes how local, regional
and international migration are connected with and affected by high-skilled human capital
accumulation, global inequality and climate change. In particular, the analysis addresses
the education-migration nexus by specifically investigating the connection between high-
skilled educational attainment and mobility. In addition, the analysis focuses on the
climate-migration nexus by evaluating the impact of slow-onset effects of climate change
on human mobility. The thesis proposes models that allow quantitatively assessing these
connections. With the exception of the third chapter, which addresses the development
in Africa, the discussion focuses on the world economy. Furthermore, while our models
are micro-founded, results are provided at the macro-level.
The thesis starts by investigating the geography of skills in Chapter 1. This chapter
analyzes how high-skilled human capital is spatially distributed and linked with global
inequality. As opposed to many existing studies, the analysis jointly assesses the effects of
international and internal migration. We show that the geography of skills has important
implications for global inequality. Furthermore, our projections indicate that - with the
continuation of current migration and education policies - inequality in the distribution
of skills will persist over the 21st century. Our results highlight the impact of education
and urbanization on future inequality and demographic pressures.
Based on the finding that high-skilled capital accumulation and urbanization are key
determinants of future development, Chapter 2 further extends the model developed
in Chapter 1. It incorporates the effects of climate change on human mobility at the
local, regional and international scale. The analysis accounts for the effect of projected
temperature increases on productivity and on sea-level rise. We find that climate change
has a limited impact on international migration and predominantly induces movements
at the local level over the 21st century.
This conclusion is crucial for the analysis conducted in Chapter 3 which aims at
further specifying the results by focusing on the development in Africa. This chapter
explicitly addresses the impact of climate change on high-skilled educational attainment
in African economies. The focus of this chapter lies on the adaptation mechanisms to
climate change. The proposed theoretical model accounts for internal mobility only. The
findings derived from this model are validated by an empirical analysis and lead to the
conclusion that adverse climatic conditions may have an unexpected beneficial effect on
high-skilled educational attainment in Africa.
Finally, the focus of the analysis remains on high-skilled human capital accumulation
in the last chapter but returns to the global scale and to international migration. Chapter
4 analyzes the brain drain phenomenon and updates the findings of the many previous
studies on this topic. We propose a new theoretical dyadic approach. This allows us to
assess the country-specific effects of international migration prospects on human capital
accumulation and the efficiency of public education policies. We find smaller average
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effects of international migration on high-skilled education than the standard macroe-
conometric models. Furthermore, we show that the impact of international migration on
the effectiveness of public education is rather limited.
In terms of policy implications, this thesis emphasizes the importance of policies
that improve the access to all levels of education, enhance the quality of education and
contribute to sustainable urban development. Moreover, the analysis illustrates that
international migration does not have a detrimental impact on the effectiveness of public
education policies. Hence, international migration cannot serve as an argument to limit
the access to or the quality of public education. Finally, we show that the expected
adverse effects of climate change call for coherent policy frameworks targeting sustainable
development and migration at all spatial scales.
Overall, this thesis demonstrates that the links between mobility, inequality, human
capital accumulation, and climate change are complex. This indicates that a multidi-
mensional analysis of the connections between these different factors is very important.
Migration at the local, regional and international scale are linked with global develop-
ment through a variety of channels that are shown to be frequently interconnected. While
this certainly explains the mixed and often conflicting findings of the literature on the
economics of migration, it also calls for more sophisticated and careful studies of the
phenomenon of human mobility. The world is becoming increasingly interconnected and
human migration is closely tied to the international integration process. This thesis,
therefore, aspires to provide and refine some important findings in order to contribute to
a better informed debate about human migration.
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